Abstract.
We consider a key exchange procedure whose security is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in a group, and where exponentiation is hidden by a conjugation. We give a platform-dependent cryptanalysis of this protocol. Finally, to take full advantage of this procedure, we propose a group of matrices over a noncommutative ring as platform group.
Received: 2011-11-30
Published Online: 2012-05-01
Published in Print: 2012-May
© 2012 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Two-party key establishment: From passive to active security without introducing new assumptions
- Continuous hard-to-invert functions and biometric authentication
- Existence, algorithms, and asymptotics of direct product decompositions, I
- Isomorphism in expanding families of indistinguishable groups
- Search and test algorithms for triple product property triples
- Evolutionary algorithm solution of the multiple conjugacy search problem in groups, and its applications to cryptography
- A Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol using matrices over noncommutative rings
- No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method