Congressional Fundraising Dynamics and Their Implications for Problem-Solving
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Brandice Canes-Wrone
Abstract
A major development in the modern Congress is the increased centrality of fundraising. Although raising money has long been a component of members’ responsibilities, until recently it was a more moderate one. As this essay describes, numerous factors have contributed to the development, including the reduced role of seniority in determining committee positions, the rise of the internet as a medium through which challengers can raise funds from out-of-district donors, and reforms to campaign finance law that have handicapped parties’ ability to serve as the dominant fundraising organizations. These changes, individually and in combination, have been quite detrimental to congressional problem-solving. The increased amount of time needed for fundraising means that members have less time for problem-solving; donor opinion has an outsized impact on members’ policy behavior; and the types of members and candidates who are interested in problem-solving are now less willing to run for office. The essay concludes by offering potential reforms to the campaign finance system and congressional rules that would better incentivize problem-solving in the contemporary Congress, as well as suggestions for future research that would help us better understand the current dynamics.
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