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The Partisan Dimensions of Earmarking in the U.S. House of Representatives

  • Edward J. Fagan , Sean M. Theriault EMAIL logo and Ryan Whittington
Published/Copyright: August 3, 2023
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The Forum
From the journal The Forum Volume 21 Issue 2

Abstract

Passing out federal dollars to specific projects in particular districts had been a popular way for congressional leaders to build large bipartisan majorities for major bills since the very first meeting of Congress. By matching projects to districts, scholars have been able to systematically analyze which members were successful in getting their project funded. But for one year, though, the requests members submitted were never known. Using earmark requests data during the 111th Congress, we can know both the requests and the awards. Knowing the former changes our understanding of the latter. We find that the request process is largely driven by ideology, rather than electoral vulnerability. More moderate Republicans tended to seek more earmarks than their more conservative copartisans; some of whom completely opted out of the process. The effect was the opposite for Democrats, whose moderates requested fewer earmarks. When these requests are taken into consideration, the awarding process appears to be even less partisan than the raw data would suggest, confirming the bipartisan nature of the earmarking process.

Keywords: budgetary policy; democrats; earmarks; ideology; political parties
Corresponding author: Sean M. Theriault, University Distinguished Teaching Professor in the Government Department at the University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA, E-mail:
Appendix

Appendix Table 1:

OLS estimation of the logged dollar value of House earmark requests.

Independent variables Democrats Republicans
Electoral vulnerability
Winning percentage −0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
District liberalness −0.01 0.001
(0.01) (0.02)
Institutional advantage
Appropriations com. 0.23 0.39
(0.25) (0.41)
Seniority −0.002 0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
Ideology
DW-NOMINATE −1.42 −1.07
(1.01) (1.24)
Constant 4.90*** 4.96***
(0.50) (1.02)
r 2 0.01 0.05
n 250 137
Appendix Table 2:

Predictors of Senate earmark requests, negative binomial regression results.

Independent variables Democrats Republicans
Electoral vulnerability
Winning percentage 1.02 1.64
(0.72) (1.58)
District liberalness 1.02 0.98
(0.02) (0.03)
Institutional advantage
Appropriations com. 1.49 0.90
(0.42) (0.44)
Seniority 1.00 1.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Ideology
DW-NOMINATE 1.93 0.02
(2.54) (0.05)
Constant 191.16*** 430.91***
(88.43) (460.60)
Alpha 0.85*** 1.36***
(0.15) (0.29)
Log likelihood −367.19 −231.23
n 59 40

Incidence rate ratios reported. Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Total number of senators is 99 for FY2010, due to the delay in Sen. Al Franken’s seating.

Appendix Table 3:

Predictors of Senate earmark awards, negative binomial regression results.

Democrats Republicans
Independent variables Con. wisdom (A) With requests (B) Con. wisdom (C) With requests (D)
Earmark preferences
Requests 1.00** 1.01***
(0.001) (0.001)
Electoral vulnerability
Winning percentage 0.73 0.81 0.88 0.65
(0.44) (0.46) (0.64) (0.38)
District liberalness 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Institutional advantage
Appropriations com. 1.28 1.11 1.19 1.36
(0.30) (0.24) (0.47) (0.41)
Seniority 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Ideology
DW-NOMINATE 0.52 0.27 0.06 0.36
(0.52) (0.26) (0.11) (0.52)
Constant 67.68*** 39.31*** 152.58*** 38.02***
(23.65) (14.23) (132.12) (26.22)
Alpha 0.57*** 0.48*** 0.90*** 0.54***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.21) (0.15)
AIC 11.27 11.15 10.48 10.06
BIC 441.00 435.69 274.87 268.30
Log likelihood −324.48 −319.78 201.51 −193.17
n 59 59 40 40

Incidence rate ratios reported. Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Total number of senators is 99 for FY2010, due to the delay in Sen. Al Franken’s seating.

Appendix Figure 1: The effect of earmark requests on senate awards.
Appendix Figure 1:

The effect of earmark requests on senate awards.

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Published Online: 2023-08-03

© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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  1. Frontmatter
  2. Introduction
  3. The Forum: Spring 2023 Issue Introduction
  4. Articles
  5. Speaker Nancy Pelosi: A Master of the House
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  7. The Speaker Election in the 118th Congress: A Procedural Review
  8. Just How Unorthodox? Assessing Lawmaking on Omnibus Spending Bills
  9. The Partisan Dimensions of Earmarking in the U.S. House of Representatives
  10. After Dobbs: The Partisan and Gender Dynamics of Legislating on Abortion in Congress
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  12. Out-of-State Donors and Nationalized Politics in U.S. Senate Elections
  13. Book Reviews
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  15. LaGina Gause: The Advantage of Disadvantage: Costly Protest and Political Representation for Marginalized Groups
https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2023-2015
Keywords for this article
budgetary policy; democrats; earmarks; ideology; political parties

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Introduction
  3. The Forum: Spring 2023 Issue Introduction
  4. Articles
  5. Speaker Nancy Pelosi: A Master of the House
  6. The House Freedom Caucus, Kevin McCarthy’s Race for Speaker, and the Fate of Rules Reform in the 118th Congress
  7. The Speaker Election in the 118th Congress: A Procedural Review
  8. Just How Unorthodox? Assessing Lawmaking on Omnibus Spending Bills
  9. The Partisan Dimensions of Earmarking in the U.S. House of Representatives
  10. After Dobbs: The Partisan and Gender Dynamics of Legislating on Abortion in Congress
  11. Disability Policy in the Contemporary Congress
  12. Out-of-State Donors and Nationalized Politics in U.S. Senate Elections
  13. Book Reviews
  14. Anna Gunderson: Review of Captive Markets. Accountability and State Prison Privatization
  15. LaGina Gause: The Advantage of Disadvantage: Costly Protest and Political Representation for Marginalized Groups
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