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Shoot-Out Clauses in Partnerships and Close Corporations
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March 22, 2012
This article analyses shoot-out clauses as a popular means of resolving deadlocks in two member partnerships or close corporations. It presents the different varieties of shoot-out clauses developed in Anglo-American legal practice that are being increasingly discussed on the European continent. It goes on to look at their advantages and disadvantages by exploring the rich economic literature on partnership dissolution mechanisms in game theory. Finally, it focuses on the permissibility of these clauses and the doubts cast upon them in Germany, Austria, France, England and the United States.
Published Online: 2012-3-22
Published in Print: 2012-4
© 2012 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
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- New Regulation of Remuneration in the Financial Sector in the EU
- Shoot-Out Clauses in Partnerships and Close Corporations
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Articles in the same Issue
- New Regulation of Remuneration in the Financial Sector in the EU
- Shoot-Out Clauses in Partnerships and Close Corporations
- Incorporation of IFRS in the United States: An Analysis of the SEC's Options and the Implications for the EU
- Trustee or Delegate? Understanding Representation to Illuminate Shareholder Governance and Regulatory Change
- The Compatibility of Corporate Exit Taxation with European Law
