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Drei Varianten des Paradoxons der Nicht-Existenz

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Published/Copyright: September 16, 2017
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Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
From the journal Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Volume 65 Issue 4

Abstract

The original version of the philosophical paradox of non-existence can be found in Plato’s dialog Sophist. Different ancient and medieval philosophers discussed this problem and proposed their own solutions to it. As far as I know, the problem had no important impact on the discussions about the notion of existence in the early modern period between Descartes and Frege. Philosophical interest in the notion of existence in this period was mainly driven by discussions on the ontological argument for the existence of God. Meinong and Russell are responsible for a renaissance of this paradox in the 20th century. Russell shaped two new semantic versions of the paradox. In this paper, I will discuss and introduce three different versions of it. Firstly, the original version, which can be found in the Sophist. Secondly, the two more recent and sophisticated semantic versions that concern the semantics of (a) general negative existential sentences like “Unicorns do not exist” and (b) singular negative existential sentences like “Pegasus does not exist”. Philosophical discussion of the paradox in the Analytic Tradition has mainly focused in the last decades on the version related to (b). Concerning the version related to (a), there is a general consensus that Russell convincingly solved it. However, I will show that Russell’s solution of this version of the paradox is problematic, and I will argue for an alternative uniform solution to both semantic versions of the paradox based on free logic.

Keywords: non-existence; paradox; reference; quantification; bare plurals; existential import

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Published Online: 2017-9-16
Published in Print: 2017-9-26

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  3. Moral, moralisches Müssen und Sanktionen
  5. Drei Varianten des Paradoxons der Nicht-Existenz
  7. Schwerpunkt: Ethik der Migration
  9. Migration, Flucht und der liberale Staat
  11. Zur Legitimität von Staatlichkeit: Eine kosmopolitische Kritik offener Grenzen
  12. Interview
  13. „Republikanismus ist heute ein Rassismus für Intellektuelle“
  14. Literaturessay
  15. Neues zur Theorie des Gerechten Krieges: Die Wende zum Soldaten und Fragen der Kriegsmoral
  16. Buchkritik
  17. Aufbruch ohne Zerstörung
  18. Buchkritik
  19. Die philosophischen Grenzen der Lehrbuchökonomik
  20. Buchkritik
  21. Wie viel Subjektivität verträgt der ontologische Realismus?
  22. Buchkritik
  23. Das wirkliche Leben?
https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2017-0046
Keywords for this article
non-existence; paradox; reference; quantification; bare plurals; existential import

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  3. Moral, moralisches Müssen und Sanktionen
  5. Drei Varianten des Paradoxons der Nicht-Existenz
  7. Schwerpunkt: Ethik der Migration
  9. Migration, Flucht und der liberale Staat
  11. Zur Legitimität von Staatlichkeit: Eine kosmopolitische Kritik offener Grenzen
  12. Interview
  13. „Republikanismus ist heute ein Rassismus für Intellektuelle“
  14. Literaturessay
  15. Neues zur Theorie des Gerechten Krieges: Die Wende zum Soldaten und Fragen der Kriegsmoral
  16. Buchkritik
  17. Aufbruch ohne Zerstörung
  18. Buchkritik
  19. Die philosophischen Grenzen der Lehrbuchökonomik
  20. Buchkritik
  21. Wie viel Subjektivität verträgt der ontologische Realismus?
  22. Buchkritik
  23. Das wirkliche Leben?
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