Umwelt, enchantment, and McDonaldization

1 Introduction

Enchantment is a defining aspect of formal rationalization within contemporary society, and studies on the topic are fairly prevalent in areas focused on social and cultural systems (Ahonen 2012; Levy 2015; Ritzer and Stillman 2001). However, it is also to some extent neglected in some applications of George Ritzer’s work regarding environmental, ecological, and animal studies (Kolinjivadi et al. 2020; Morris and Reed 2007). Moreover, I believe it is also the most relevant for semiotic studies, as the concept concerns itself with the perception and representation of formal rationalized systems and structures. Consequently, the meaning and emotions associated with enhancement by various actors is an important area of study, as it is where many justifications and reasonings for why McDonaldized systems operate can be found, especially in their irrational rational forms. Moreover, with the increasing relevance of the Anthropocene (Clark 2017; Mahli 2017; Whitehouse 2015), as well as an increased awareness of the importance of studying multispecies environments and conflicts between humans and nonhuman animals (Maran 2020; Tønnessen 2020), it becomes apparent that Ritzer’s work largely misses a more ecosemiotic and zoosemiotic encompassing view of enchantment and formal rationalized systems – although some McDonaldization theorists have taken an interest in ecosystems and their inhabitants, they tend not to consider enchantment (Kolinjivadi et al. 2020; Morris and Reed 2007). Consequently, I believe it is important to gain a better understanding of how enchantment and McDonaldization relate not just to social systems and culture, but also to wider ecosystems and nonhuman animals.

This brings me to the intention of this article, which is to further draw out Ritzer’s work on enchantment by contextualizing his work within the confines of semiotics to create a better understanding of the cultural and semiotic relationship enchantment has on actor perceptions of nonhuman animals and nonhuman animal umwelts in relation to formal rationalized systems. I will largely focus on zoosemiotic and ecosemiotic views of umwelt, and focus my examination on the enchantment of McDonaldized systems and structures as opposed to these systems and structures themselves. Specifically, I will draw upon the works of Jakob von Uexküll and from zoosemiotic and ecosemiotic works on the semiotic modeling of multispecies environments. I believe a synthesis of these two perspectives, enchantment and semiotics, will allow a theoretical understanding of human actor perceptions of enchanted systems and how this relates to ecological matters and nonhuman animals.

I will first give a brief discussion of umwelt and Ritzer’s concepts of enchantment and McDonaldization. I will follow this with a synthesis of umwelt with the concept of formal rationalization as enchantment. This synthesis of umwelt will continue in the next section concerned with enchantment through the spectacle, the extravaganza, and the simulation. I will then conclude with a small discussion that will contextualize the synthesis.

2 Umwelt, enchantment, and McDonaldization

Enchantment as a concept stems from Max Weber’s work on rationality, and specifically, the formal rationalization, or instrumental rationalization, of society. For Weber, these processes of modernity were leading increasingly to a world less and less structured by enchantment or signs and sign systems such as myths, legends, and concepts such as magic and other fantastical, as we perceive them, constructions and perceptions of reality (Alexander 2013: 44; Weber 1965: 89–90, 2001 [1930]: 33–37, 1978 [1968]: 161–162). In their place arose disenchantment, either through the scientific “unraveling” of natural phenomenon, the self-destruction of religion through the protestant ethic, or by increasing bureaucratic formalization.

However, such disenchantment, arguably, has been rescinded, though not necessarily due to a de-rationalization or limits on the rationalizability of society. Sherlock (2013) argues, following Jenkins (2000), that disenchantment is reversible, and that modern technologies in the form of popular culture and digital media create enchantment. As Sherlock (2013: 173) states: “The Internet and digital technology, to the vast majority of the general public, remain largely incomprehensible […]. This lack of understanding leaves the door wide open for mythical interpretation […].” Moreover, Marenko (2009) argues that enchantment and re-enchantment are continuous processes of everyday life, and that: “Every object is susceptible to investments (and divestments) of meaning, of acquiring (and losing) a specific aura, of becoming encrusted with (or stripped [of]) affects, of enriching (or reducing) our emotional world” (Marenko (2009: 240). Boltanski and Chiapello (2018: 98–99) make a similar point relating to consumerism, labor, and neo-managerial techniques, in what could be described as the enchantment of labor relations. As the two scholars state, neo-management techniques tend to emphasize a more human approach to management, through encouraging expressions of feelings, flexibility in work, and a stronger focus on people skills. However, they indicate that the enchantment of management–labor relations can be used to disguise poor labor conditions, unsteady employment, and reduced wages, while at the same time implementing increased expectations of production.

Ritzer’s approach to enchantment and disenchantment focuses on consumerism and the bureaucratization of social reality, and is strongly related to the above. Ritzer states: “Rationalization (or, what I have more contemporaneously called ‘McDonaldization’) has five basic elements: efficiency, calculability, predictability, control through the replacement of human by nonhuman technology, and the irrationality of rationality” (2005: 72).^[1] The sociologist argues that this McDonaldization has increasingly dominated social structures and systems, including new media forms (Ritzer 1983, 2019). As Boltanski and Chiapello (2018) agree, this rationalization tends to lead to destructive consequences – e.g., reduced wages and poor labor conditions – and as such requires enchanting techniques like neo-management.

Ritzer develops this type of enchantment and re-enchantment regarding consumption into several categories, of which re-enchantment caused by the inherent characteristics of McDonaldized systems and re-enchantment through spectacles, extravaganzas, and simulations will be discussed in this article. Through these enchanting techniques and characteristics, various corporations, organizations, and companies are able to disguise irrational rationalities like environmental destruction, labor violations, and poor-quality products from consumers (Ritzer 2005). Thus, these categorizations allow an understanding of how formal rationalization is able to continue relatively unchallenged: through the manipulation of affect, the real, and social reality in general. However, Ritzer does not explicitly relate these concepts to the individual and semiotic systems of group relations and their environment; he by and large only discusses the mechanisms and structures of these enchanting processes and their effects. As such, a further perspective, or perspectives, is needed to better contextualize these concepts into a more semiotic understanding of how individuals and groups interact with enchantment in relation to nonhuman animals and their environment.

I believe that the most potent concept for this is the concept of umwelt. First termed by Baltic-German biologist Jakob von Uexküll, umwelt denotes a living entity’s relationship with the world, or as the theorist states: “This we may call the phenomenal world or the self-world of the animal” (Ginn 2014: 129–130; J. von Uexküll 1992 [1934]: 319 italics original). Uexküll argues against more mechanistic understandings of nonhuman animals, stating that they cannot simply be reduced to their biological structures, and should be understood as agents utilizing these biological structures to interact with the world (J. von Uexküll 1992 [1934]: 324). As such, consideration of the nonhuman animal umwelt may lead to an understanding of how the semiotic interpretation of enchantment relates to environments.

However, umwelt is usually related to animal studies, and the concept could be argued to have little importance in comparison to Alfred Schutz’s lebenswelt for instance. While there is no doubt that umwelt is extremely relevant in biosemiotic studies, when focusing more on cultural and social structures, this concept could be seen as being somewhat redundant, especially when Schutz’s own work not only regards human social and cultural structures and knowledge, but also considers human corporeal relations with the environment (Schutz and Luckmann 1973). However, umwelt’s consideration of all living entities as subjective entities is an important point that Schutz and Luckmann miss. Umwelt, as I will demonstrate, allows a theorist to view nonhuman animals as being agents within a McDonaldized system (and not just as being turned into hamburgers). Consequently, when taking umwelt into perspective, humans are seen not only as existing in a social reality, but as being part of a wider ecological system and environment, in which subjective nonhuman entities with their own interpretations of and corporeal relations to the world also exist (T. von Uexküll 1992: 301–303).

Engelland (2020) argues for a need to return to experience in our studies. Here he is coming from a more “traditional” phenomenological point of view, which is excellent, as Engelland’s belief in the need to return to experience is largely what umwelt focuses on, and will as such help to contextualize McDonaldization through experience. This could be understood as focusing on the essence of experience for the nonhuman animal, and consequently refocuses the researcher’s attention toward this element. Experience in this instance is easily understood by following an umwelt model, by focusing on a nonhuman animal’s corporeality. As such, this corporeality can be understood as a cooperative relationship between an entity’s perceptor organs, which receive information from the environment, and operational organs, which enable the entity to physically interact with the environment (J. von Uexküll 1992 [1934]: 319–320). Semiotician Claus Emmeche specifies this point, and umwelt’s relationship to the environment, by drawing from J. and T. von Uexküll:

[…] the subject is the constructor of its own Umwelt, as everything in it is labelled with the perceptual cues and effector cues of the subject. Thus, one must at least distinguish between these concepts: (1) the habitat of the organism as ‘objectively’ (or externally) described by a human scientific observer; (2) the niche of the organism in the traditional ecological sense as the species’ ecological function within the ecosystem, (3) the Umwelt as the experienced self-world of the organism. (Emmeche 2001: 655)

So, when the perspective of umwelt is used in scholarly studies, it is important to understand that the subjective reality of an entity is based on its abilities to interpret an environment through its perception and physical interaction with the said environment. Martinelli (2011: 260–261) refers to this as an emic perspective, or the insider perspective of a nonhuman animal, as opposed to the etic perspective, which denotes the observer’s view. With the ever-widening intrusion of McDonaldization brought into many global environments in the current Anthropocene epoch, it becomes increasingly important to understand how individuals and groups perceive said environments and the nonhuman animals within them, as well as understanding nonhuman animal perceptions. Umwelt, here, acts as a sort of gauge or measurement that may permit an understanding of how these perceptions relate to the actual health or perceptions and behaviors of said entities and of the conditions of their environments. Umwelt itself does not create an understanding of a nonhuman animal’s actual inner subjective state, but it does point to an approximation based on the corporeal structures of an entity (J. von Uexküll 1992 [1934]: 338–339). Maran et al. (2016: 31) refers to an extension of this as “[…] umwelt mapping, where knowledge about the animal’s perceptual organs, body plan, ways of living, and ecology are taken into account for building hypotheses about the structure and contents of its umwelt.”

The importance of umwelt mapping in understanding inner subjective spaces and their relations to the environment and humans is well demonstrated by Morten Tønnessen. The semiotician argues for a multiscale study of ecological systems encompassing everything from a more global perspective to a subjective individual – the human and nonhuman animal (Tønnessen 2020: 90). Consequently, it is argued that this will bring about more knowledge of local and individual issues needed for resolving the current global ecological crisis, and allow a more competent model of the workings of ecological systems by not relying on overly abstract generalizations and theories. As Tønnessen (2020: 94) states: “What is lacking in the most referred to framework notions for global human ecology is the subjective, organismic perspective. For ecosemiotics, this perspective is the logical starting point for any analysis of human ecology.” This organismic perspective is largely obtained through an understanding of relevant umwelts. However, to attempt to fully understand umwelt holistically in an ecological and ecosemiotic context, Tønnessen contends there is a need for multiscale considerations, as he states here:

As we have seen in the case of ecological developments and developing human-animal relations in the Mamirauá Sustainable Development Reserve, assessing adjacent levels of observation is not always sufficient. In the Mamirauá case study, the global level of study, for instance related to aggregate anthropogenic climate change, strongly influences the local ecosystem, affecting e.g. human dwellings and livelihoods, and the future prospects of the black-headed squirrel monkey. This calls for the use of a multiscalar perspective, focused on scales of empirically verifiable interaction and relationality rather than on levels of study. (Tønnessen 2020: 104)

Here, Tønnessen is indicating a need for the use of multiscale perspectives to encompass a more holistic understanding of an issue while drawing from not only multiscale modeling, but also from empirical evidence relating to interaction and relations. This is important as it focuses on relationships and interactions within scales, demonstrating a relational understanding that encompasses multiple levels simultaneously, whether macro, meso, micro, or semiotic. Tønnessen makes use of four scales, them being: “1. Human ecology scale from global/human perspective […] 2. Human ecology scale from local/ecological perspective […] 3. Scale of global human ecology from personal point of view […] 4. Scale of personal–to–global human ecology from semiotic point of view” (Tønnessen 2020: 105). These are subdivided into smaller scales relating to subjective individuals, and wider social, cultural, and environmental structures and processes.

So, Tønnessen (2020) has demonstrated a structure and process to ensure a holistic umwelt methodology. This again is especially important for enchantment, as it allows a relatively physiological or corporeal based understanding that could be compared to enchanted understandings of umwelts and environments within McDonaldized systems and structures, while also taking into perspective cultural and social dynamics and structures. Moreover, it relates umwelt to a better contextualized human though emphasizing the need to understand the different “bubbles” within the world and how this relates to our own umwelt and wider issues. Regarding the nonhuman animal, this comparison permits an understanding of how nonhuman animals, environments, and ecosystems can be compared to enchanted systems, as the umwelts and the needs of umwelts within their environments are more likely to represent the structural and processual characteristics of what is needed for nonhuman animals in their survival, as well as a more accurate presentation of their behaviors and actions. As such, this, in many cases, may facilitate an understanding of how enchantment and formalized views of said entities and their environments represent these subjects and elements to individuals and groups within formal rationalized systems and, especially for the purposes of this article, within the enchanting messages themselves. I will elucidate on this point in the following sections, by focusing first on the enchanting abilities of McDonaldization, then the enchanting and re-enchanting abilities of the spectacle, extravaganzas, and simulations. However, and while this project will not make use of such detailed scales as those of Tønnessen, I will make use of some general scales relating to subjective individuals in the form of human perception of nonhuman animal umwelt and inner subjective states, nonhuman animals and their umwelt and inner subjective world, and the sociocultural structures and processes in the form of McDonaldization’s enchantment.

3 Enchanting rationalization

Weber clearly argued that the rationalization of a social system and society would inevitably lead to disenchantment (Weber 2001 [1930]: 33–37, 71, 62–84, 97). This is due to the structuring of systems within formal rationalization which removes enchanted, irrational, and humanist characteristics. This removal is inherent, as the main goal of rationalization is to create the most efficient, predictable, controlled, and calculable systems and structures possible. As Ritzer (2005: 55–57, 2019: 101) states, allowing nonrational characteristics to play a role in a formal rationalized system itself would disturb the very formalization of the system. However, Ritzer (2005: 72–86) also notes that such systems do have the ability to create enchantment without the help of a spectacle, though such enchantment is not particularly the most effective or sustainable form of enchantment. The main characteristics of McDonaldization itself, control through nonhuman technologies, predictability, efficiency, and calculability, ease the structuring and restructuring of experiences that are relatively novel in many cases. This novelty is in large part where such enchantment comes from. For instance, dining at a fast-food restaurant has its novelty, as the McDonaldization of being able to order an entirely cooked meal for the entire family, and of receiving it within a matter of minutes, may be found to be enchanting by those who are used to the long preparation and cooking times of home cooking. However, in most contemporary societies, the average adult will probably not be too enchanted by a fast-food meal, though the introduction of such establishments to areas unused to fast-food, or the introduction of individuals inexperienced in such dining may still create enchantment. Moreover, the continuous introducing of nonhuman technologies within said establishments can also be enchanting. Self-checkout machines and self-ordering machines allow customers to conduct the work of the employee, effectively saving the company money through not having to pay as many cashiers. Moreover, these machines may appear ‘futuristic’ and act as a novelty for many customers, consequently creating enchantment. Though, just as formalized systems tend to lose enchantment once participants become used to the associated experiences, so do technologies like self-checkout machines.

This sort of enchantment can be related to human perceptions of nonhuman animals and nonhuman animal umwelts, which in turn may create a better understanding of nonhuman animals in multispecies environments related to formalized systems. Regarding the human perception of nonhuman animals, it may be helpful to examine their use in consumption, production, and labor due to these areas’ susceptibility to rationalization processes. Sociologist Meštrović (1997: 146–154) grazes this topic in his work on societal emotions and rationalization while discussing the formal rationalization of transportation through technologies. Meštrović uses a passage from George Orwell’s The Road to Wigan Pier in which Orwell discusses the advantages of taking a bus to visit London instead of taking a mule.^[2] Mule and nonhuman animal transportation, once seen as the most effective and fastest form of land transportation, has come to be seen as ineffective when regarded besides trucks, buses and cars. Meštrović uses this example, in part, to indicate how rationalization is a relatively one-way street so to speak. According to the sociologist, once an object, or in this case a subject, is no longer seen as the most all-around effective functionary, it is replaced by an object that is, and consequently becomes less and less prevalent within society, which makes de-rationalization exceptionally difficult. This is an important point, and I bring this up not to dispute Meštrović, but to further contextualize his argument. As seen from a perspective concerning human perceptions of nonhuman animals, Meštrović’s argument not only exemplifies a shift in technology, but a shift in the social and cultural function and perception of the mule and the use of nonhuman animals as transportation. The nonhuman animal was, and is, no longer the most applicable or effective form of labor in transportation, and consequently is no longer viewed so culturally, as its meaning has been reconsidered and its use as a mode of transport is viewed as outdated (though of course this is only one generalized interpretation, and Amish or Mennonite communities will argue differently based on moral and religious grounds; however most contemporary societies do not sustain these same grounds). Consequently, nonhuman animals have been replaced by formal rationalized technologies, and their presence and perceptions within human societies have become relatively marginalized – for example, to activities such as leisure, consumption, and production – while mechanical and combustion transportation in many instances have become relatively mundane and disenchanted within social and cultural perceptions. Their effectiveness still remains relatively unchallenged by nonhuman animal transportation, even as said transportation may be considered more enchanting; this can perhaps best be seen in leisure activities associated with horses, as horse riding, hay rides, and similar activities provide a sense of older forms of transportation in to the case of hay rides or even social interaction with horses, including grooming, affection, communication, and eating, when it comes to more committed horseback riders. As such, my argument here indicates that the use of nonhuman animals in labor can be eclipsed by the enchantment created by the novelty and functionality of rationalized systems and plays a role in nonhuman animals being reconsidered in their roles and cultural perceptions within human society. So, when the nonhuman animal is viewed strictly from the perspective of its relationship to transportation, and McDonaldization, its umwelt is not necessarily a main consideration for the furtherance of transportation, although of course an understanding of its dietary needs and other means to sustain it are required, but its wider umwelt map is not.

It is somewhat counterintuitive to understand how such McDonaldized changes are understood from a more zoosemiotic umwelt view. This is especially important to argue as the notion that nonhuman animals may be enchanted or disenchanted in the same sense as humanity is questionable, and J. von Uexküll’s (1992 [1934]: 338–339) emphasis on umwelts being contained in a metaphorical bubble supports this to an extent, in that strong intersubjective understandings between humans and nonhuman animals is highly unlikely. However, the very notion of umwelt suggests that there can be some intersubjectivity, as J. von Uexküll (1992 [1934]: 338–339) notes – our ability to understand another entity’s perceptor organs and operational organs indicates an ability to imagine, or hypothesize, to some extent the inner world of said entity. So how can nonhuman animals be enchanted? This in itself is, practically speaking, unanswerable due to the vast differentiation in types of preceptor and operational organs found among nonhuman animals. However, perhaps it would be best to focus on those nonhuman animals which are integrated into symbiotic or exploitative relationships with humanity within current societies. The presence of these relationships suggests abilities to sustain or attract these entities for their socioeconomic functions within society, which suggests an effective understanding and implementation of this understanding regarding their preceptor and operational organs. So, following my argument, enchantment upon nonhuman animals stemming from rationalized systems may be seen as ways in which rationalized systems appease the needs of these entities based on the systems’ inherent rationalized characteristics but are fully capable of irrational rationality regarding nonhuman animal agency and health just as such systems are to humans.

An example of this form of enchantment may be certain types of bait hunting. While baiting nonhuman animals for hunting has been a major part of many hunting practices (Svizzero 2016), its use in current rationalized systems, as a form of business as opposed to sustaining human life, leads to a fully McDonaldized system for the hunters and to an extent the nonhuman animals involved. The hunters are guaranteed efficiency and predictability (they know almost certainly they will be able to hunt a nonhuman animal with the least amount of effort, as they will remain in relatively static positions without having to track and stalk their prey, which they know will likely appear within shooting-range). They are controlled by restricting said hunting practices to certain areas, and they may hunt only a certain number of nonhuman animals depending on establishment and governmental regulations, as well as the amount of financial assets they are willing to exchange. Lastly the hunters are able to calculate the likelihood of shooting a nonhuman animal that could be considered as a trophy and consequently gaining some, if ill-earned, prestige.

Companies like Agassiz Outfitters, which operates in the Interlakes region and Northern region of Manitoba Canada, exemplify this form of hunting by offering not only the above rationalization, but also lodgings and utilities, including the internet and television, as well as cooked meals to the hunters (Agassiz Outfitters 2021a). The nonhuman animals in these instances are offered similar rationalized enchantment in that the system within the confines of hunting regulations offers an environment where hunting is highly controlled (Agassiz Outfitters 2021b). So, younger entities – in the case of Agassiz Outfitters, these entities are black bears – are less likely to be hunted, which creates more efficiency, predictability, and calculability for nonhuman animals raising their young. However, to understand how these black bears and other nonhuman animals view being in such a rationalized system is difficult to imagine, and as such this enchantment should be taken more as a metaphor. The entities are controlled through bait, as well as employees (usually guides) and government restrictions (Government of Manitoba 2020). This population regulation may also offer efficiency and predictability regarding mating, as a controlled population that is continuously hunted will need the assurance of reproduction to be maintained.

This sounds almost idyllic in that such establishments seemingly create a symbiotic relationship allowing the existence and relative care of a population in exchange for a few trophy killings. However, the basic economic underpinning of such institutions means that the nonhuman animals are subject to changing demands, economic fluctuations, and poor management, all of which may create detriments to the population either through overhunting or large cullings. As such, and while nonhuman animals involved within these businesses will not have the same understanding of their situation as their managers and hunters, their umwelt is appeased through appealing to their perceptor organs by offering a natural environment, food, peers, and mating stimuli. This is true for operational organs as well, as, although through controlled means, these establishments facilitate the ability for said nonhuman animals to operate and interact with these elements of perception. Moreover, in order to incorporate nonhuman animals into systems similar to bait hunting establishments, individuals must have an understanding of associated nonhuman animals’ umwelts to ensure success, just as I noted above regarding how nonhuman animals that are more incorporated within society are better understood than those that are not. This designates, possibly, a further importance for a fuller contextual and multiscale understanding of umwelt, as merely knowing the structures and process of a nonhuman animal’s umwelt, will not necessarily lead to said animal being considered within the wider context, and here especially within wider McDonaldized systems and irrational rationality. When the enchantment of formal rationalization is put in the scale of human perceptions and nonhuman animals’ umwelts and inner subjectivity, a richer understanding is gained of how this enchantment affects not only human perceptions, but also nonhuman animals. This allows an understanding of nonhuman animals within the context of their roles under enchanting, rationalized processes, here as transportation or leisure, as well as hunting, and how human perceptions on rationalization and enchantment of nonhuman animals reinforce this.

Considering the above, it is apparent that the enchanting effect of formal rationalization has the ability to change perceptions of nonhuman animals through the rationalization of systems and structures. Moreover, when considering umwelt, it is also apparent that rationalized systems can enchant nonhuman animals to a certain extent by providing a rationalized environment that is able to fulfill the needs of their umwelt, while also putting these nonhuman animals at the risk of irrational rationalities created by formalized systems. These perspectives add to understandings of how formal rationalization works in relation to a multiscale understanding of multispecies environments by focusing on the enchanting effects of rationalized systematic and structural characteristics of said environments, while also taking a multiscale perspective through human perceptions of nonhuman animals as functionaries within society and culture and of the nonhuman animal umwelt and its relation to said rationalized structures and formalization. However, as I noted above, these are not the only forms of enchantment and re-enchantment, and I will now turn to the use of spectacles, extravaganzas, and simulations and their influences on human perceptions of nonhuman animals, as well as their relation to nonhuman animal umwelts.

4 Extravaganzas and simulations

Regarding enchantment created through the inherent properties of McDonaldization, its ability to be linked directly to the functional organs of nonhuman organisms may be something of an anomaly within these typifications of enchantment and re-enchantment. This is largely due to the enchantment created by formalized structures themselves having a direct influence on the organization and operations of an environment, and as such the biological needs of nonhuman animals. However, regarding extravaganzas and simulations, an understanding of umwelt and its relationship to enchantment and re-enchantment will not be so direct, as such enchantments are largely culturally based and coded within sign systems relatively unique to humans. Moreover, while extravaganzas and simulations may maintain physical changes or even recreations of environments, they are largely intended for human perception.

Ritzer argues: “The cathedrals of consumption must be continually reenchanted if they are to maintain their ability to attract a sufficient number of consumers” (2005: 93). Here Ritzer is specifically discussing spheres of consumption; however this need to re-enchant rationalized systems is required for any such system if the mechanical and irrational rationality of these systems are to be hidden or in Ritzer’s words “[…] to overcome the liabilities, especially the disenchantment associated with highly rationalized systems” (Ritzer 2005: 94). Two major means for such re-enchantment and enchantment pertain to the concepts of extravaganzas and simulations. Ritzer’s formulation of these concepts largely draws from the works of Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord, with both of Ritzer’s concepts having their bases in the spectacle (2005: 94–101). However, Ritzer recoins Debord’s spectacle somewhat idiosyncratically, in this instance meaning specifically non-manmade – i.e. naturally occurring attractions, points of interest, or wonders. This is in relation to the concept of extravaganzas (also sometimes termed as “spectacles as extravaganzas”), the meaning of which is relatively similar to Debord’s spectacle. Ritzer (2005: 94–95) also uses the term in a general sense, referring to any form of enchantment or re-enchantment – indicating an intentionally structured spectacle to attract the attention of a population by disguising rationalized systems and presenting an increasingly novel, affective, engrossing presentation, and so on. Ritzer (2005: 88, 103) refers to several outside shows at Las Vegas casinos to exemplify such extravaganzas, which include roller coasters, simulated volcanic eruptions, and dramatized sea battles.

On this point, nonhuman animals are a major part of extravaganzas. Ritzer (2005: 96–97) himself mentions the entertainers Siegfried and Roy’s use of white tigers in casino extravaganzas, and nonhuman animal use can be seen not only in other casino extravaganzas, but on television shows and streaming sites, in tourist attractions, at circuses, and in other mediums and forms of media. For instance, the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino hosts the Shark Reef Aquarium, which makes use of sea life, while the television series Fatal Attraction, on the channel Animal Planet, focuses on the danger of keeping exotic pets (Albert 2011). Moreover, the use of nonhuman animals within extravaganzas seems to further differentiate the concept from Debord’s spectacle. This is largely due to Debord (1995: 22–23) referring to the alienating aspects of these events within a society of the spectacle. Moreover, such spectacles, while enchanting, ultimately do not involve the audience in that said audience very much passively engages with information through a one-way broadcast. This can be seen in other forms of nonhuman animal extravaganzas following this process, which uses nonhuman animals to instill emotional and affective states within the audience, i.e. Siegfried and Roy would command tigers, flirting with danger, while tigers are also a rare sight to many, and there is no doubt that they have a strong aesthetic appeal, which many charismatic megafaunas embody for human spectators (Monsarrat and Kerley 2018: 69). Similar elements can be seen in the show Fatal Attraction regarding flirting with danger, as the flirter falls to harm more often within the show than is usually so in most extravaganzas.

However, Fatal Attraction also hints at another major component of the extravaganza, which in a sense runs opposite to Debord’s spectacle as it encompasses audience participation. Fatal Attraction’s main focus is on nonhuman animal relations with humans that have gone wrong, and this human attraction to animals has been taken advantage of by those creating extravaganzas in the form of nonhuman animal interactions with the audience. For instance, Shark Reef Aquarium can be enjoyed as a conventional aquarium, in which various forms of ocean life can be viewed from windows outside of the tanks (MGM Resorts International 2021a). However, these entities can also be viewed from within the tanks. The aquarium offers a special package which allows consumers to enter the aquarium tanks and swim with the sharks, and this is not an anomaly. Siegfried and Roy’s Secret Garden and Dolphin Habitat is a zoo and aquarium associated with the Las Vegas casino, the Mirage, and encourages participants to swim with, feed, and interact with the dolphins in the Dolphin Habitat area of the establishment. Moreover, the zoo’s description of the Secret Garden indicates that the participants will experience an environment that is characteristic of another country that is implied to be a natural habitat for the tigers (MGM Resorts International 2021b). Further, participants are told they will learn more about tigers as they will “[…] have the opportunity to gain a better understanding and awareness about them” (Vegas.com 2021). This sort of interaction can also be seen in many petting zoos, museums, and other attractions throughout North America and the world. Moreover, Siegfried and Roy’s Secret Garden and Dolphin Habitat takes this interaction into the direction of the arts, offering consumers a package that gives them the chance to: “Witness the artistic talents of our dolphins as you work together to create a truly unique piece of art” (MGM Resorts International 2021b). So, in this instance, consumers not only interact with nonhuman animals, but supposedly create art with them too. Therefore, while Debord’s spectacle is very much at play here in some instances, a closer look at these spectacles as extravaganzas reveals that these are much more than passive alienating experiences, namely interactive experiences. This suggests a human understanding that views nonhuman animals not only as, say, dangerous, cute, beautiful, or in situations with trainers and entertainers, but also as forming some sort of relationship with the consumer. Creating art with a dolphin or swimming with dolphins and feeding them constructs an intersubjective connection, or at least seemingly so. Extravaganzas allow individuals to become part of a nonhuman animal’s environment and interactions.

This can perhaps be best understood as being part of a need to create intersubjectivity because, as Luckmann (2002: 21) contends, the closest thing to a universal human morality is the structure of intersubjectivity, or the need and desire to understand the other. The notion that this structure includes nonhuman animals, I believe, is quite evident. As Dydynski (2020), as well as Mäekivi and Maran (2016: 214–216) indicate – while drawing from Konrad Lorenz (Lorenz 1981: 164–165) – the cuteness perceived in animals tends to parallel similar facial and bodily structures on human infants that are considered cute. This notion is echoed in biology, with dolphins as an example, as these nonhuman animals show an ability to “[…] mentally represent and form analogies between their own body and that of another individual—even improvising when that other individual doesn’t look much like a dolphin!” (Marino 2004: R910). Such abilities are noted in that they “[…] undoubtedly contribute much to the human passion for interacting with them” (Marino 2004: R910). Moreover, the strong tendency for humans to anthropomorphize not only nonhuman animals, though megafauna seem to be favored, (Dydynski and Mäekivi 2018; Mäekivi and Maran 2016: 219) but plants (Waytz et al. 2010: 58–60), insects (High 2012: 137–138; Lavrillier 2012: 120–121), arachnids (Lavrillier 2012: 119), and even technology (Coanda and Aupers 2021), along with the prevalence of animist beliefs (Marenko 2014; Marenko and van Allen 2016), seems to indicate that extravaganzas in this instance are using a basic structure within human corporeality to change perceptions of formal rationalized systems, and this basic structure is a desire for intersubjectivity.

However, in many instances of the use of nonhuman animals in extravaganzas, any human perception of creating intersubjectivity is very much a misconception. Biopsychologist Lori Marino (2004: R910) indicates that along with primates, dolphins have “[…] characteristics indicative of complex intelligence and cognitive ability, especially high encephalization levels, long juvenile periods and complicated social lives.” Diana Reiss, Brenda McGowan, and Marino (1997: 141) also noted that bottlenose dolphins operate within a complex environmental and social umwelt, in which social relationships are complexly structured intergenerationally in what are termed as fission–fusion societies. These nonhuman animals live in flexible and dynamic structures and processes that are subdivided into and even relate to social roles such as raising younger members. As such, the confining of dolphins to captivity tends to create adverse effects cognitively and emotionally, as their umwelt requires diverse social relationships within a dolphin society, and multiple and strong stimuli from an ocean environment – both of which aquariums are unable to provide (Grimm 2011: 526–527). Mäekivi (2016a: 209–210), while discussing zoological gardens, contends that while enclosed spaces may seem rich in stimuli from a human’s perspective, said space and environment may actually provide relatively little stimuli when compared to natural environments. Moreover, and returning to dolphins, infections and chemicals used to treat tank water have been noted as adversely influencing dolphin health, and dolphins being injured or dying from jumping out of their pools has also been noted (Grimm 2011: 526–527).

So, while the use of dolphins within extravaganzas may create some sense of intersubjectivity among humans in their perceptions of dolphins, the overall umwelt of a dolphin in such environments is exceptionally under-stimulated due to a lack of environmental stimuli and social interaction and possesses several physical dangers as well. While it is evident that these nonhuman animals’ umwelt is understood to an extent, as facilities and trainers are generally able to keep them alive, a more multiscale model of their umwelt is required to fully understand their greater needs. As Reiss et al. (1997: 141) state: “Elucidating the cognitive abilities of any organism requires an understanding of the social and environmental umwelt in which it resides.” This also shows the importance of understanding multispecies environments in a multiscale perspective in relation to formal rationalization and the enchantment or re-enchantment related to human perceptions as a major force in the use of nonhuman animals. Here exemplified largely by dolphins, consumers lacking a multiscale perspective misconceive nonhuman animal expressions, needs, and umwelt, as well as the reasoning for nonhuman animal use in extravaganzas, which results in rationalization enchanted through intersubjectivity, anthropomorphizing, and affect. Dolphin cognition and their umwelt cannot be understood as being uniform with all or even many nonhuman animals within extravaganzas. However this example and argument shows that such destructive and injuring practices are being utilized, and this is largely due to formal rationalized systems using nonhuman animals to create enchantment within human perceptions.

Turning to the concept of simulations, Ritzer (2005: 101) stresses that the simulation is perhaps the most pervasive and prolific form of enchantment and re-enchantment in its abilities to enchant rationalized systems. Drawing from Jean Baudrillard, the sociologist contends that simulations currently and increasingly characterize many modern societies. This characterization consequently lends to a confusion between the real and the imaginary, and between true and false (Baudrillard 1990: 11; Hegarty 2008: 318). Within areas of consumption, this takes the form of replications, as exemplified by Ritzer in simulations within the Rio Casino Hotel, in Las Vegas, which held an “[…] exhibition of treasures from Russia’s Romanov dynasty. It included Peter the Great’s throne and a Fabergé pen used by Czar Nicholas […]” (2005: 101), among many other artifacts. All of which were housed in a reproduction of “[…] the Russian royal galleries […]” (2005: 101). However, perhaps most noteworthy here is the concept of simulated people, which refers to individuals and groups operating by strict and regulated rules, which extend to “[…] how they are supposed to look, speak, behave, and so forth” (Ritzer 2005: 103). These regulations consequently reduce human characteristics in a wide variety of individuals, creating more or less one set of human expressions, designed to be enchanting through kindness, smiles, helpfulness, etc., with the intention of disguising rationalized structures that create labor–consumer issues, poor products, and so on (Ritzer 2005: 102–103). It is also noted that real attractions are duplicated into simulations. Ritzer (2005: 102–103) explains that this is because it is easier to reconstruct and create spectacles in a simulated attraction as opposed to its real counterpart. The sociologist exemplifies this again with the case of Las Vegas casinos, which often simulate large cities such as Paris and New York, consequently maintaining these cities’ aesthetics within a rationalized system that creates more control, and consequently enchantment, than the actual cities.

Human perceptions of nonhuman animals are susceptible to simulations as well, and this has already been touched upon slightly in my discussion of dolphins being used in extravaganzas. The perceived intersubjective bond created between humans and nonhuman animals in these instances is largely unfounded, and, as I stated, this is likely due to a capitalization on a desire for intersubjectivity on the part of humans in their interactions with said dolphins. However, simulations play a role in facilitating these extravaganzas. It is common to see dolphins conduct tricks, such as jumping in acrobatics shows, balancing balls, and kissing trainers or volunteers from the crowds. Such behaviors are not conducted by the dolphins with the explicit intent of pleasing their human viewers. These tricks are habits instilled within them by their trainers and managers through continuous repetition and reward processes. Moreover, as seen from the nonhuman animal’s umwelt and inner state, these activities and shows occur within the confines of a world devoid of appropriate social and environmental stimuli. However, the simulation within such presentations of dolphins instills a sense of intersubjectivity for its viewers, as the dolphins are denoted as performing playful and human characteristics, like throwing a ball or kissing a trainer, which can consequently be considered relatable and perhaps even as intentional kindness and playfulness toward the human viewers. In these cases, nonhuman animals could perhaps be understood in a similar way as Ritzer’s simulated human. Just as numerous and diverse human individuals are regulated in many different aspects of their interactions, creating a singular type, this can be seen to slightly parallel the environmental and social isolation of dolphins and especially the training they receive to perform tricks.

This simulation is also apparent within human-constructed, or manipulated, nonhuman animal environments, such as the Secret Garden section in Siegfried and Roy’s Secret Garden and Dolphin Habitat, which is designed to mimic a tiger’s supposed habitat. There is no doubt that many tigers live within lush environments with similar plants to what can be found within the Secret Garden. However, the Secret Garden is in itself a simulation that contains extravaganzas, such as a plant sculpture of a tiger, while also being a much smaller enclosed space when compared to a more natural habitat for a tiger (MGM Resorts International 2021b). In this sense it is apparent the tiger habitat is a reconstruction of its natural environment that is able to be controlled, maintained, and used for profit when compared to say, a wide-open nature reservation. As such, being enclosed within these environments will limit behavior. Consequently, this simulation can also be seen in the tigers themselves, as Mäekivi and Marino indicated regarding stimulus, as they are not able to perform behaviors such as hunting prey, which indicates a deficiency in the simulation’s ability to stimulate the tiger’s umwelt regarding behavior and perception of prey.

Mäekivi, while not specifically aiming to discuss simulation, reveals aspects of simulations evident within zoological gardens, which, while taken from a more strictly zoosemiotic and ecosemiotic perspective, still offers a significant chance for understanding how zoos and zoological gardens can be enchanted and re-enchanted. While there is no doubt that zoological gardens experience formal rationalization, this rationalization is arguably curtailed, as Mäekivi (2018: 8) indicates: “When keeping wild animals in captivity, the hybrid nature of the captive environment illustrates the interplay between scientific knowledge and cultural perceptions and attitudes.” Such systems are not intended to create money at their main core, the opposite of what many private capital organizations do, but instead attempt to balance financial considerations with conservation, moral consideration, and educational opportunities. Consequently, these institutions operate on the bases of competing rationales, which includes, at times, nonhuman animal subjectivity and umwelt (Mäekivi 2018: 9–10). As such, Mäekivi offers an understanding of what perhaps in the best of cases is an area of subtle resistance to rationalization – or at least an area that has not been fully enveloped by this process – since attempting to understand, recreate, and deal with nonhuman animals’ umwelts and environments requires an inherently irrational approach, in that nonhuman animals tend not to operate within the same confines as those that formal rationalized systems require to be maintained. In other words, in order to be successful at conservation, welfare, and so on, conservationists and zoological workers must follow a rationale that is dictated from a nonhuman animal’s inner subjective views and through their behaviors and umwelt, though not all welfare and conservation approaches consider these factors (Mäekivi 2018: 9–10, 22). Nonhuman animals tend to require a vast degree of different stimuli and activities, while they also tend not to perceive their world in a formal rationalized sense, and as such they are not as easily enticed into operating within the confines of such a system if their welfare is to be considered. However, many zoological gardens acquire funds from public visits to the zoo, and as such must learn to balance profit making with conservation and education. Consumerist tendencies can be pretty prevalent within zoological gardens, for instance in gift shops and food stands, and such need for consumer attraction may explain the presence of simulations (Brando and Harfeld 2014). Mäekivi touches on this, stating:

For people, the limitation of space in zoos elicits the most conflicting emotions. People want the animals to live in nature-like enclosures which project the feeling of the animal’s natural living, but on the other hand they want something totally unnatural from the point of view of wild animals: humans want to interact with nonhumans. Animals in situ, i.e. animals living in their natural habitats, usually do not present themselves; they tend to hide from people. However, any zoo would be unable to earn its revenue to support its endeavors if it could not guarantee that humans would be able to meet nonhumans during a zoo visit. (Mäekivi 2016b: 208)

This could be seen as a simulated and enclosed environment – Mäekivi (2016b: 207) also mentions the appearance of murals and paintings that have little meaning to nonhuman animals, but are there solely for human aesthetic perception, i.e. extravaganzas – as the conflicting needs for these spaces to appeal to humans requires a structuring of said spaces that imposes against nonhuman animal umwelts, and consequently reduces said environment to a simulation of a recreation. The ability for humans to perceive nonhuman animals in many cases results in stressful stimuli for nonhuman animals, as such creating an environment that in part compromises their needs and correspondingly potentially compromises conservationist or welfare efforts. The educational and conservational emphasis by zoological gardens in this instance, as well as the attempts to recreate the natural environments of nonhuman animals, could then be viewed as a simulation, as an attempt to enchant the contradictions created by consumption and the irrational rationalities of exposing nonhuman animals to consumers.

Simulations are not only the domain of enclosed spaces such as zoological gardens or dolphin tanks, but can very much be part of large natural environments. This can be seen in simulations created to enchant McDonaldized systems, especially in their irrational rational stage. Carol Morris and Matt Reed present a (2007) study of McDonaldization in the deintensification process of agriculture as a conservation method. According to Morris and Reeds (2007: 207), “[…] on-farm nature conservation in the UK is the ‘agri-environment scheme’ (AES), which represents the practical or operational face of ‘agri-environmental policy’ (AEP).” While this study revealed some successes with the AES and AEP programs, irrational rationality was also noted regarding the strong control and regulations the AES expressed over farmers, which prevented them from removing weeds and thistles, which in turn attracted large numbers of magpies and other birds that would damage wheat crops. Moreover, many farmers found that seeds and plants sold to them by the AES to aid in conservation efforts would not grow in their particular location, and a number of members complained that the AES did not take a holistic focus on various ecological differences throughout the UK; instead, the AES took a small sample of the country to base its decisions on (Morris and Reed 2007: 214–215).

Though Morris and Reed (2007: 213; Lorimer 2015: 95) do not take note of this, as they tend to stick to a limited use of Ritzer’s theory, simulation can also be noted as part of AES McDonaldization. This is especially so in regard to the use of spaces for the public which the farmers were encouraged to create, as these spaces are presented as areas to see birds and other nonhuman animals in an environment completely reconstructed to a time before farming began in the region. While perhaps this is not as harmful for nonhuman animals in comparison to nonhuman animals held in captivity and used in extravaganzas, the wider environment in this instance is rationalized and transformed in an irrational rational way, as many farmers complained the seeds mandated to them for planting were largely incompatible with their environments, which consequently does not enable the re-creation of such areas as they were before farming and human intervention. Further on this note, the notion that said environment is as it was before farming is very much a simulation. These regions are influenced by human activity, and the positioning of sightseeing spots encourages this notion by presenting space for tourists and others to regard the landscape as being untouched. Consequently, many of the nonhuman animals that were reliant on the ecosystems and environments that existed in these spaces before human intervention will not be able to return under such simulations as the needs of their umwelt are not able to be met, as this environment has never actually returned.

Beever (2013) makes a similar claim, drawing heavily from Baudrillard and Kalevi Kull, regarding the referential relationship between humans and nature. Kull (1998: 355) presents a model that designates types, or levels, of referents and significations of nature. This model presents level zero nature as nature in itself and nature three as cultural representations of nature through art, science, and so on. Beever (2013: 87–88) notes the similarities Kull’s model has with Baudrillard’s theory of signification, in that both present epistemological understandings of nature, or the real itself, as being more or less impossible, and as such they must be mediated through semiotic interpretation and interaction. Specific attention is given to Baudrillard’s concept of simulation. As Beever (2013: 88) states:

We can see, however, that Baudrillard develops a critical position against third nature that Kull does not. The problem that Kull’s analysis appears to overlook is that third nature, a system of signification that traditionally represents zero nature, has the potential instead to simulate zero nature and, in so doing, to destroy its relationship to the other orders. (Beever 2013: 88, italics original)

Here regarding other orders, Beever (2013: 88) refers to the empirical bases zero nature offers science and inquisition into zero nature. This in turn could be understood as relating to Morris and Reed’s study, as the presentation of a natural environment as being untouched by nature and a reversion to its original pre-Anthropocene state can be understood as presenting third nature (here nature controlled and ordered by conservation efforts and farmers) as being zero nature (pre-Anthropocene nature) and consequently as constituting a simulation. Similarly, the same can be said for the simulated animal, as I discussed above, in that trainers and institutions utilizing nonhuman animals within extravaganzas in part rely on creating simulations of intersubjectivity between nonhuman animals and humans, for instance kissing dolphins and allowing consumers to interact with said nonhuman animals in their enclosures. Such a simulation of intersubjectivity is a form of third nature in that it is a representation by relative authority figures of nonhuman animals in an extreme anthropomorphized state, with this state implied as being natural and inherent in said species.

Drawing from the above, it is apparent that human interpretations of nonhuman animals, and nonhuman animals’ umwelts themselves when viewed in regard to simulations, take a certain position in that such simulations attempt to inform human perceptions as to what appears to be zero nature through disguised third nature. However, simulations also play off artistic representations that create atmosphere in the case of murals and simulate nonhuman animals themselves through anthropomorphizing. This involves simulations of intersubjectivity, perceptions of nonhuman animals, and enclosed and open environments. Moreover, it is apparent that the nonhuman animal umwelt is being taken into consideration – especially when a certain amount of understanding of a nonhuman animal’s umwelt is required to ensure its continued survival – but this consideration is often not realized in its full relation to social and environmental factors. Moreover, just as Beever argues, this confuses zero and third nature, or the real and the simulation. However, I believe umwelt as a concept and when applied can act as a sort of remedy or at least a reflexive device for ensuring a more thoughtful and holistic understanding of nonhuman animals and their environments and relations. This is because the epistemological claims associated with umwelt entail a sort of scientific or scholarly humility.

As I have noted above, the concept itself refutes any notion of a direct and full understanding of the actual subjective lives of a nonhuman animal, but it does maintain that such lives are there and can be studied and understood to some degree through studying perceptor and operational organs. Although once again, this does not entail a guarantee against operating within a simulation. However, Ritzer (2005: 110) argues that full and all-encompassing simulations are extremely difficult to create, and as such are rare. Nevertheless, this does suggest that studying relatively minute details, say only human perceptions of nonhuman animals in spectacles, is likely to only present the outcomes of simulations on said perceptions. However, following a general interpretation of Tønnessen’s multiscale model, encompassing a comparison of nonhuman animal and human subjectivity and umwelts within the context of McDonaldized enchantment and re-enchantment allows a study based in empirical understandings of experience, as well as sociocultural structures and processes. This creates a more complex and fuller understanding of said experiences within their wider context by focusing on the perceptions of and relations among these three elements. Consequently, multiscale models may permit understanding of simulations and their influences on the scale of human perception and interaction by focusing on the scale of sociocultural enhancement these structures use to create simulations, and how animals are used within these simulations. However, understanding and identifying these simulations is reliant on these scales being tied to the inner state and umwelt of nonhuman animals, allowing a comparison of the simulated umwelt and the real umwelt. Having reviewed simulations, I will now turn to some concluding remarks.

5 Conclusion

Having considered human perceptions and nonhuman animals within the context of inner subjective worlds, umwelt, and enchantment and re-enchantment as scales in relation to each other, I have demonstrated that enchanting rationalization influences human perceptions of nonhuman animals using the example of technological enchantment and the rationalization of transport playing a part in replacing mules in favor of automobiles, buses, etc. That the enchantment of combustion vehicles originally played a part in displacing mules as transportation, and though such enchantment has largely been dissolved, the enchanting and re-enchanting influences of mules and nonhuman animals have not caused them to retake such positions, but positioned them more within leisure activities. I have also demonstrated the enchanting structures of bait hunting for both humans and nonhuman animals, and the possible irrational rationality that stems from these activities. Such enchantment encourages hunters by promising easy trophies and in a sense enchants nonhuman animals by creating an ecosystem that corresponds well to their umwelt.

Extravaganzas as a form of enchantment and re-enchantment were also viewed within this multiscale relationship, and it was noted that nonhuman animals are often used in extravaganzas to create affect, wonderment, and a sense of danger in regard to tigers and their trainers and as in the television show Fatal Attraction. Moreover, extravaganzas using more interactive modes directs consumers to gain a belief that they are interacting with nonhuman animals intersubjectively. However, use of nonhuman animals within these situations, here exemplified with the case of the dolphin, demonstrates that such intersubjectivity is largely misinterpretation, and that the use of nonhuman animals within extravaganzas, interactive and otherwise, can be extremely harmful socially, mentally, and physically, as was seen regarding the dolphin’s inner subjectivity and umwelt being too complex to be replicated or appeased within artificial enclosed environments. The multiscale relationship here created an understanding of the need for a comparison of nonhuman and human umwelts within the context of enchantment and re-enchantment, as gaining a nonhuman animal perspective demonstrates human misconceptions and misinterpretations of nonhuman animals within extravaganzas, by allowing a comparison of these different entity types within such systems that also influence human perspective and control nonhuman environments.

Regarding simulations, a similar importance can be seen, as simulations blend the real and the fictional, here exemplified through the use of anthropomorphic characteristics at dolphin shows, again playing off of human needs for intersubjectivity. Moreover, similar situations can be regarded as creating a simulated nonhuman animal, as the under-stimulating environment and habits trained into the dolphins create behaviors that are not found within the wild and create a sort of unified behavior among the entities subjected to such training and environments. Such simulations can also be seen in larger spaces that are not enclosed, as seen with Morris and Reed’s study, in that conservational area is simulated as a pre-Anthropocene location. Moreover, Kull’s theory on semiotic ecology, as reworked into Baudrillard’s framework by Beever, has demonstrated the ability for third nature to simulate zero nature. Again, the multiscale perspective, which considers the nonhuman animal umwelt, human perceptions, and enchantment and re-enchantment as simulations, demonstrates an understanding of how simulations negate the nonhuman animal umwelt and enchant humans.

It is apparent that utilizing the nonhuman animal umwelt, especially umwelt-mapping techniques comparing them with human perspectives, and contextualizing these three scales within the confines of enchantment and re-enchantment allows an understanding of enchantment’s abilities to control both nonhumans and humans within multispecies environments. This control can be generalized through this model in two ways. First, it demonstrates that McDonaldized systems use enchantment to justify the poor treatment of nonhuman animals, as well as wider ecological systems and environments, for example using dolphins as attractions at casinos, despite the poor social and physical situations said dolphins are placed in. Secondly, this model demonstrates this justification as being very much affective and engaging, when seen from a human perspective, by appealing to intersubjectivity in the case of dolphins, to environmental experiences in the case of Morris and Reeds’ study and tigers, and to moral significance in the case of zoological gardens. Enchantments and re-enchantments have the ability to influence a large part of human desires, needs, and emotions, and as such are extremely influential and difficult to demystify in an everyday situation; this article, moreover, only slightly touches on all of the enchanting re-enchanting possibilities that may prevail throughout our societies. While it has been noted that using a multiscale umwelt-mapping perspective creates such demystification, this is coming from a scholarly perspective, and further studies are suggested on this topic that will propose ways to demonstrate this knowledge to the wider public.

Moreover, this paper has been a theoretical contemplation, and I have interpreted studies and findings from other scholars to demonstrate this model’s applicability and relevance. Consequently, a study specifically using the theoretical framework within this paper is required to further justify its applicability in relation to multispecies environments. However, I believe a call for a practical study of these phenomena is justified, as the social, environmental, and cultural implications of McDonaldization, enchantment, and re-enchantment have been clearly demonstrated in environmental studies, sociology, and management studies, and as such it is likely that similar phenomena, besides the examples I have given, are happening at the intersections of societies and nonhuman animals.