Eight Common Fallacies of Elementary Semiotics

2.1 The Sign Fallacy

The Sign Fallacy assumes that when Peirce used the word “sign” he meant “representamen” instead of the abstract triadic relation as we use the word today, as when he defined the sign as the triad <object, sign, interpretant>, which should properly read as <object, representamen, interpretant>; but see the Fallacy of Interpretation at a Distance next, which is also involved in this definition. This fallacy has been noted by many other semioticians and most semioticists. Today, we often use Charles Morris’s term “sign vehicle” for Peirce’s term “representamen” for the physical embodiment of the sign, and reserve the term “sign” for the abstract triadic relation.

2.2 The Fallacy of Interpretation at a Distance

The Fallacy of Interpretation at a Distance assumes that the object of the sign is interpreted directly and immediately as the representamen, i.e. with no help from the interpretant or anything else. For example, a very popular definition of the sign is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

A popular definition of the sign

The word “distance” in the name of this fallacy stems from the famous controversy between Newton and Descartes over “action at a distance,” i.e. with the source of a force at some distance from the result of the force and with no intervening aid or process to carry the force across that distance, which was later explained by Einstein using the concept of a field^[1] used in his theory of general relativity. Here, we have the object and its interpretation, the representamen (or sign vehicle as it is more commonly called today), with no intervening aid or process to do the actual work of interpretation, but with the interpretant hanging on as a useless appendage. This makes the interpretant appear to be both an accidental and useless result of evolution.

With any relation, the order of the individual relata are critically important, especially in semiotics with its triadic relations. In order to avoid this fallacy, the order of the three components of the triadic relation that makes up the sign should appear as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

As the sign definition should be in order to avoid the Fallacy of Interpretation at a Distance

The correction of this fallacy also clears up another claim by Peirce that is otherwise difficult to understand. Peirce claims that the Interpretant is another sign that represents the same Object as the original sign. While this may be true, it is difficult to understand why and how it does this. But by correcting this fallacy, the meaning of Peirce’s claim becomes obvious.

An example makes this clear. If the neumenal object of the original sign S is a hammer, then O is the perceived phenomenal image of the hammer while I interprets that image to produce R, another sign for the original hammer. In natural language, this final sign might be the word “hammer,” a sign that we might then interpret as standing for a hammer.

2.3 The Fallacy of Instantaneous Interpretation

The Fallacy of Instantaneous Interpretation assumes that all sign creation and all sign interpretation occurs instantaneously, whereas all physiological and psychological experiments have shown that it takes a minimum amount of time – measured in milliseconds – to do either one.

This has the drastic effect of changing the requirements for a philosophy of semiotics from one of continuity to one involving a discrete sequence of sign interpretation, much like the static frames in a movie film that yield, when interpreted properly, a seemingly continuous appearance. And also much like Einstein’s interpretation of Plank’s original quanta as applying to all energy interchanges whatever.

This has a more practical effect of allowing a single frame of the interpretation picture to be written in terms of semiotic combinators as:

as in the Dynamic Equation of the Theory of Operational Semiotics, (TOS), (Pearson I/P), where Ψ_f stands for the final sign, Ψ_i for the initial sign, and Π_int is the combinator that stands for the interpretation process.

To paraphrase a whole bunch of different people who said a lot of different things: “The whole world is nothing but signs and the interpretation of signs is a process that requires time.” The process of interpretation progresses through time and every completed process of interpretation requires a finite amount of time. Interpretation only occurs in stages. We complete only one stage at a time, but the ultimate completion of the interpretation process occurs only after all stages have themselves been completed. Therefore, the ultimate completion of interpretation, like Peirce’s process of inquiry in search of truth and reality, and for the same reasons, requires an infinite amount of time.

2.4 The One-Way Interpretability Fallacy

The One-Way Interpretability Fallacy assumes that the sign is always and only interpreted by the source, or creating, interpreter in the process of sign creation, as in the triadic order <semantic, pragmatic, syntactic>. This is illustrated, for instance, by the very popular rheme <object, representamen, interpretant>, which in its correct order should be <object, interpretant, representamen> (see Fallacy # 2), whereas, the sign must also be interpreted by the sink, or receiving, interpreter in the process of sign interpretation, as in the triadic order <syntactic, pragmatic, semantic>.

This has an important bearing on all relationships involving the interpretant. Either there are two distinct interpretants, one for synthesis and one for analysis, or else the triadic relation of the sign must be symmetric or possibly antisymmetric, so that the same interpretant can be used to build the sign and later to interpret it.

2.5 The Inference Fallacy

The Inference Fallacy assumes that various forms of inference have various fixed forms of semantic structure; for instance, it is often said that deduction has an iconic structure.

However, inference is a process and various forms of the inference process transform various forms of semantic structure into different, but appropriate, forms of semantic structure. For example, induction transforms overall indexical structure into overall iconic structure; abduction transforms overall iconic structure into overall symbolic structure; subduction transforms overall symbolic structure into overall iconic structure; and deduction transforms overall iconic structure into overall indexical structure (Pearson 1991).

Parsing this into logical terminology, we can say that induction transforms concrete singular structure into concrete general structure; abduction transforms concrete general structure into abstract singular structure; subduction transforms abstract singular structure into concrete general structure; and deduction transforms concrete general structure into concrete singular structure (Pearson 2011). Therefore, we see that inference must have both an initial and a final structure as shown in Eq. 1).

2.6 The Fallacy of Things

Many students approach the study of semiotics with a materialistic metaphysics or even no metaphysics at all. Semiotics challenges this common assumption that the universe consists entirely of little things and their motions, leaving no room for generals, abstractions, or processes. Semiotics is Peirce’s attempt to develop a mathematics that is adequate for describing a universe made up exclusively of processes,^[2] including concrete singular mentions of processes, general descriptions of processes and even abstractions of processes.

The fallacy that the universe consists only of things stems from the Aristotelian languages of the West. There are both African languages and Trobriand^[3] languages that view the world as consisting only of processes. Semiotics requires both an epistemological realism and a process ontology. Again, this fallacy has been noted by many semioticians and most semioticists.

2.7 The Fallacy of Isolation

One sign component, such as a sign vehicle, cannot exist in isolation. What might otherwise be a sign vehicle, when totally isolated, has no object and no interpretant, and hence is not part of a sign, and hence is not a sign vehicle. Of course, as Peirce says, we can isolate a sign component purely for the purposes of logical analysis, but in this case, that sign component is not purely isolated, but only so in our minds. In reality, the other two sign components are still hanging around – we just don’t bother thinking about them.

Or paraphrasing Marc Champagne (2015): Nothing in one component of a sign obliges us to see it as participating in the greater triad… And also paraphrasing Merleau-Ponty (1975): The sign is always already there before logical analysis begins…

2.8 The Fallacy of Realism

The Fallacy of Realism occurs when some thinkers divide other thinkers into two classes: nominalists and realists. Nominalists in this classification muddle thought by using the word “realist” carelessly to mean either conceptualist, realist, or both indiscriminately. However, realists in this classification also muddle thought by using the word “nominalist” carelessly to mean nominalist, conceptualist, or both indiscriminately.

The problem lies in the fact that there are three levels of semantic structure leading to nominalism, conceptualism, and realism. Most thinkers are still using pre-Peircean semiotics, which knew only the first two levels of semantic structure.

This emphasizes the necessity for the reader or listener to pay very close attention and ask him or herself “What does the author mean? How is (s)he using these words, what is their effect, and what does (s)he really intend?”