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Mereologisch, homunkulogisch oder pseudo-objektivierend? Über einige neurophilosophische Fehlschlüsse und Kategorienfehler
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Hans Lenk
Published/Copyright:
November 13, 2014
Summary
The paper discusses Bennett’s and Hacker’s critical work on the philosophical foundations of neuroscience and their so-called ” mereological fallacy“. It argues that Wittgensteinian arguments of mere ordinary language analysis are not enough to cover activations of patterns in the brain and especially of sense perception and meaningful human action. The approach offered by the author’s methodological scheme-interpretationism may solve these problems by using and differentiating higher-order concepts and metatheoretical and methodological as well as schema-theoretical perspectives.
Online erschienen: 2014-11-13
Erschienen im Druck: 2008-3-1
© 2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- Titelei
- Vorwort
- Ganze Sätze. Davidson über Prädikation
- A Note on Knowing and Having Thought to Know
- Moores Paradox, Behaupten, Urteilen
- Morschers Anselm – Eine Rekonstruktion in Behandlung
- Mereologisch, homunkulogisch oder pseudo-objektivierend? Über einige neurophilosophische Fehlschlüsse und Kategorienfehler
- Rezensionen/Book Reviews
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelei
- Vorwort
- Ganze Sätze. Davidson über Prädikation
- A Note on Knowing and Having Thought to Know
- Moores Paradox, Behaupten, Urteilen
- Morschers Anselm – Eine Rekonstruktion in Behandlung
- Mereologisch, homunkulogisch oder pseudo-objektivierend? Über einige neurophilosophische Fehlschlüsse und Kategorienfehler
- Rezensionen/Book Reviews
