A Comment on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
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Alec Sandroni
Abstract
Arrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow’s desiderata).
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- On the Choice of Liability Rules
- Social Image Concern and Reference Point Formation
- Extreme Parties and Political Rents
- On the Observational Implications of Knightian Uncertainty
- Functions with Linear Price Elasticity for Forecasting Demand and Supply
- Foreign Direct Investment and Crime Linkage: Drug Traffic and Kidnapping
- Absence of Envy among “Neighbors” Can Be Enough
- Financial Integration, Savings Gluts, and Asset Price Booms
- Social Coordination and Network Formation in Bipartite Networks
- A Choice Model of University Endowments Governance
- Envy Manipulation at Work
- An Entropy-Based Information Sharing Rule for Asymmetric Information Economies
- Notes
- A Comment on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- On the Choice of Liability Rules
- Social Image Concern and Reference Point Formation
- Extreme Parties and Political Rents
- On the Observational Implications of Knightian Uncertainty
- Functions with Linear Price Elasticity for Forecasting Demand and Supply
- Foreign Direct Investment and Crime Linkage: Drug Traffic and Kidnapping
- Absence of Envy among “Neighbors” Can Be Enough
- Financial Integration, Savings Gluts, and Asset Price Booms
- Social Coordination and Network Formation in Bipartite Networks
- A Choice Model of University Endowments Governance
- Envy Manipulation at Work
- An Entropy-Based Information Sharing Rule for Asymmetric Information Economies
- Notes
- A Comment on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
