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Macro Meets Micro: Stochastic (Calvo) Revisions in Games

  • Jan Libich EMAIL logo and Dat Thanh Nguyen
Published/Copyright: December 20, 2013

Abstract

The timing of moves in conventional games is deterministic. To better capture the uncertainty of many real world situations, we postulate a stochastic timing framework. The players get a revision opportunity at a pre-specified time (common to them) with some known probability (different across them). The probabilistic revisions resemble the Calvo (1983) timing widely used in macroeconomics, and by nesting the standard simultaneous move game and Stackelberg leadership they can serve as a “dynamic commitment” device. The analysis shows how the revision time and probabilities affect the outcomes in games with multiple and/or inefficient equilibria. Unsurprisingly, we show in the Battle of the sexes that commitment – low revision probability relative to the opponent – improves the player’s chances to uniquely achieve his preferred outcome (i.e. to dominate). What may, however, seem surprising is that the less committed (higher revision probability) player may dominate the game under some circumstances (for which we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions). This is in contrast to the intuition of Stackelberg leadership where the more committed player (leader) always does so. The paper then applies the framework to the strategic interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in the aftermath of the Global financial crisis. It is modelled as the Game of chicken in which a double-dip recession and deflation can occur when both policies postpone stimulatory measures – attempting to induce the other policy to carry them out. In order to link our theoretic results to the real world, we develop new indices of monetary and fiscal policy leadership (pre-commitment) and quantify them using institutional characteristics of high-income countries. This exercise shows that the danger of the undesirable deflationary scenario caused by a monetary–fiscal policy deadlock may be high in some major economies.

JEL Classification: C71; C73; E63

Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Czech Science Foundation (GA402/10/1046), the European Social Fund (CZ.1.07/2.3.00/20.0296), and the NFKJ (Neuron) Foundation. We would like to also thank the editor and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

Appendices

Appendix A: proof of necessity in Theorem 1 for general payoffs

Proof. Re-consider the Imitating scenario for general payoffs in eq. [4]. Rearrange eq.[8] to obtain the general form of eq. [9] and then reverse the inequality to obtain17

[32]

To reflect the imitating behaviour of player M in his revision, Condition C is altered to eq. [17], which yields, after rearranging, the general version of eq. [18]

[33]

The conditions in eqs [32] and [33] can never hold jointly. To see this, realize that the former condition implies the denominator of the latter condition to be positive. But because the numerator of eq. [33] is negative for all general parameters in eq. [4], there are no values satisfying both eqs [32] and [33]. In other words, without Condition B, Conditions A and C cannot both hold.

To see the necessity of Condition B in a different way, consider the following counter-example. Take the case of eq. [9] holding with equality. In such case, both and are best responses to . This modifies Condition C, as it decreases the minimum payoff M can get from playing . In particular, Condition C is altered from eq. [10] to

[34]

which can never be satisfied. Intuitively, as there may be no reward to the more committed player M from trying to induce the opponent to cooperate, he may not go ahead with the conflict. Therefore, the outcome still appears in the set of equilibria. ⃞

Appendix B: proof of Proposition 3

Proof. Building on the proof of Theorem 1, it is apparent that the general Conditions A, B, and C are, for the general payoffs in eqs [3] and [4], identical to the Battle of the sexes.18 Using those for the case with the normalized payoffs in eqs [27] and [28] yields Condition A as:

[35]

Condition B as:

and Condition C as:

[36]

which is again stronger than Condition B for all considered parameter values. Revisiting the Imitating scenario in Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 1, condition [17] still applies, and the analogs of conditions [16] and [18] are

It is straightforward to see that these two conditions cannot hold jointly (and Appendix A implies the same for the general payoffs). By symmetry, for the case , we obtain

[37]
[38]

In summary, in the normalized game, the payoff dominant outcome becomes the unique equilibrium iff either eqs [35] and [36] or eqs [37] and [38] hold. ⃞

Appendix C: monetary and fiscal leadership in high-income countries

There exist no comprehensive indices of monetary and fiscal leadership in the literature. Libich, Nguyen, and Stehlík (2012), therefore, develop a measure of these variables based on related established indices, averaging over a number of them for maximum robustness. As explained in the main text, they capture constraints on the players’ actions that reduce their ability to revise their strategies freely and flexibly.

Table 1

Components of our fiscal leadership index

MeasureF1F2F3–5F6–8
Measure nameFiscal balanceFiscal spaceFiscal spaceFiscal responsibility
Measure byIMFAizenman and Jinjarak(2011)Ostry et al. (2010)Augustine et al. (2011)
Data periodAverage 2001–2011Average 2001–2011Projected futureProjected future
Measure typeBudget surplus to GDPPublic debt to GDP over tax base to GDPProbability of F space (% GDP)

3. FS > 0

4. FS > 50

5. FS > 100
6. F space

% GDP to debt ceiling
7. F path

# years to debtceiling
8. Fgovernance

index out of 100

Table 1 summarizes the eight measures of fiscal leadership that enter our overall index with equal weights. Measures M1 and M2 reflect past fiscal outcomes; measures M3M7 are based on the projected future fiscal outcomes implied by the existing tax and expenditure legislation. Measure M8 describes fiscal governance, which is their important determinant. Intuitively, if a large fiscal gap (inter-temporal imbalance) exists, then the government is more constrained in its actions, i.e. it has a lower probability of revision.

Table 2

Components of our monetary leadership index

MeasureM1M2M3M4
MeasurenamePolitical transparencyFinal responsibilityInflationfocusAccountability
MeasurebyEijffinger and Geraats (2006)Haan, Amtenbrink, andEijffinger (1999)Fry et al. (2000)Fry et al. (2000)
QuantifiedbyDincer and Eichengreen (2009)Sousa (2002)Fry et al. (2000)Fry et al. (2000)
Data periodAverage 1998–2006200219981998
Measure typeIndex out of 3Index out of 6Index out of100Index out of100

Table 2 summarizes the four measures of monetary leadership that enter our overall index with equal weights. They all relate to the transparency with which inflation goals are specified in the central banking legislation/statutes, and the accountability of the bank for achieving these. Arguably, a numerical inflation target the central bank is accountable for makes the bank pre-committed and gives it more ammunition against the government.

Table 3 reports the data from the papers of Tables 1 and 2 (for the 25 countries for which at least 5 out of the 8 fiscal measures have been provided). Our ranking of countries is fairly robust to alternative weighting of the underlying measures. Iceland and Hungary are two non-Eurozone exceptions whereby some of their post-2008 developments may not be fully captured.

A more important exception is the Eurozone. Caution should be exercised when interpreting the monetary leadership data of countries using (or pegged to) the Euro, as they do not possess an independent monetary policy. Our measure combines the values for the ECB (where available, namely measures M1 and M2 (, and values for the individual countries (M4 (. For these countries, we have excluded measure M3 since it reflected the fixed exchange rates within the Eurozone just prior to its inception.

To adjust for different units of the underlying measures we normalize all values on the interval. As some of the measures do not have a natural lower and/or upper bound, we assign the polar values 0 and 1 to the minimum and maximum appearing in our sample of 25 countries. Table 4 reports the resulting scores, as well as their ratio and country ranking.

Table 3

Original values of the underlying measures from Tables 1 and 2

MeasureF1F2F3F4F5F6F7F8M1M2M3M4
Australia0.260.6699.899.599.516840+65.9359483
Canada−0.782.0992.292.170.31063951.53488100
Hungary−5.321.7153.21246.12.6721983
Iceland−0.732.2849.1445.817.12020.2341992
Japan−6.77.750.10.10.149547.21.535050
Korea1.631.42100100100124.940+27.5346383
New Zealand0.881.1193.39392.11643868.53494100
Norway13.190.97100100100171.62247.925050
Poland−5.081.4494.931582.8939458
Sweden0.80.6999.999.999.915440+592.44110083
UK−4.62.1878.175.98.9912766.434100100
USA−5.523.0971.852.21.2621646121983
Austria−2.281.4897.997.875.176.41267.83*1*67
Belgium−1.611.9395.989.72.942.3861.23*1*33
Denmark1.060.8100100100153.13454.72275
Finland2.040.9596.29669.399.21357.93*1*92
France−4.061.7488.786.61258.71562.83*1*83
Germany−2.461.879392.335.375.71857.43*1*17
Greece−7.644.216.30.10.100453*1*33
Ireland5.23.216655.91.738.1648.43*1*83
Italy−3.542.6717.31.70.217.8759.23*1*58
Netherlands−1.91.4699.399.283.192.71272.33*1*83
Portugal−3.472.6234.427.10.427.8545.13*1*83
Slovakia−4.591.3107.73350.93*1*67
Spain−2.51.7769.9611.681.51260.73*1*83
Table 4

Our fiscal and monetary leadership indices, their ratios, and the countries’ ranks

CountryCodeF rigidityM commitmentM commitment to F rigidity scores
ScoreRankScoreRankRatioRank
AustraliaAUS0.19240.9324.941
CanadaCAN0.35160.9142.616
HungaryHUN0.6370.52160.8218
IcelandISL0.7050.7171.0115
JapanJAP0.8910.41200.4624
KoreaKOR0.31190.7952.577
New ZealandNZL0.21210.9234.302
NorwayNOR0.18250.47192.685
PolandPOL0.49110.7261.4612
SwedenSWE0.21220.6393.034
UKGBR0.48140.9411.969
USAUSA0.6380.31250.4923
AustriaAUT0.34170.53151.5611
BelgiumBEL0.49120.40210.8119
DenmarkDEN0.23200.48182.138
FinlandFIN0.33180.6381.9410
FranceFRA0.48130.60101.2413
GermanyGER0.43150.33240.7721
GreeceGRE0.8720.40210.4625
IrelandIRL0.6560.60100.9216
ItalyITA0.7530.50170.6622
NetherlandsNED0.2230.60103.053
PortugalPOR0.7340.60100.8217
SlovakiaSVK0.49100.39230.7820
SpainESP0.5490.60101.1214

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  1. 1

    In Calvo’s framework, each agent faces an exogenously given probability, independent across periods, that they will be able to revise their existing action. While the context of our timing differs from Calvo’s, the time of the probabilistic revision is pre-determined, which implies a stochastic duration of actions in both frameworks.

  2. 2

    Specifically, the random revision element may express technological factors, e.g. the probability that firms will be able to convert their R&D investment into a new invention allowing them more frequent production rounds. Alternatively, the revision probability may express physical or environmental constraints, e.g. different weather conditions in various parts of the country affecting the farmers’ relative ability to supply to the market. Macroeconomic factors can also be captured by the revision probabilities, for example, a recession in one country reduces the probability (relative to a competitor in a well-performing country) that local firms will be able to launch a new marketing campaign. Stochastic revisions may also represent political and legal developments that can never be predicted with certainty, but affect the ability of economic agents to make decisions at will. Section 5 will compare the analysis with alternative timing frameworks we have examined. One is a fully-stochastic setup from Basov, Libich, and Stehlík (2013) in which the revision of one player can arrive at any time (but the other player cannot revise or can only revise prior to that). Another is a fully-deterministic setup of Libich and Stehlík (2010) in which each player i moves with a constant frequency – every periods.

  3. 3

    For example, the central bank may prefer to avoid additional rounds of quantitative easing for fear of a difficult “exit strategy”. Similarly, the government may be reluctant to engage in additional fiscal packages to avoid debt problems.

  4. 4

    Let us note five related issues. First, it is apparent that our setup nests the standard simultaneous move game and the Stackelberg leadership game as special cases. Specifically, the former is represented, for all by , whereas the latter by . Second, we consider the case of a common to keep it closer to the standard setting and to only focus on one type of heterogeneity (regarding s). It is, however, easy to show that the intuition of the case is analogous. Third, the timing can be endogenized. Libich and Stehlík (2011) do so in a different timing framework, for an alternative avenue, see Leshem and Tabbach (2012). Fourth, we do not examine a repeated version of this game, since the effects of repetition in improving coordination are widely known. This is both under standard and asynchronous timing, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) or Wen (2002). Fifth and similarly, the players’ discounting has the standard effects and is, therefore, disregarded for parsimony.

  5. 5

    The respective condition is

  6. 6

    It is apparent that the players’ discounting would have the conventional effects. A greater amount of impatience would make it harder for the more committed player to achieve his dominance region, as it would decrease the present value of his ratio.

  7. 7

    Fully examining the multiplicity region is beyond the scope of the paper. Let us just note that the “probability” of coordinating on one of the efficient outcomes may differ within this region. Consider for example the case of . If , then M knows that if he initially plays S he will surely achieve his preferred coordinated regime after time – provided F gets a revision opportunity. If instead , this is no longer the case, and hence may occur throughout the whole game even if F does get a revision opportunity.

  8. 8

    In the general game, is further increasing in z and c, whereas it is decreasing in , and b. This is because (i) higher z and lower y lead to a more costly conflict for F, and (ii) higher c reduces M’s benefit from coordination with the opponent (payoffs a and b increase this benefit and, therefore, have the opposite effect on ).

  9. 9

    The companion scenario of the incomplete information game in Libich, Nguyen, and Stehlík (2012) features the long-term sustainability perspective and the threat of an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. We do not cover it here, as it has been studied extensively since Sargent and Wallace (1981).

  10. 10

    This incorporates the experience of the post-Nasdaq bubble, whereby it is commonly accepted that “The Fed’s decision to hold interest rates too low for too long from 2002 to 2004 exacerbated the formation of the housing bubble”, see Taylor and Ryan (2010). Rajan (2011) and many others voice similar concerns about the policy actions during the Great Recession.

  11. 11

    The and inequalities in eq. [4] may be reversed without affecting our conclusions.

  12. 12

    Obviously, there are some differences between the two games (in addition to one falling in the coordination and the other anti-coordination class). While these differences may be relevant for some purposes, e.g. equilibrium stability, they do not play any role in our analysis.

  13. 13

    While we have included the countries using/pegged to the Euro (indicated in blue), their monetary leadership values, and their position in the figure, should be interpreted with extreme caution. This is because they do not have an independent monetary policy, and thus the policy interaction is more complex. This is even more the case due to a free-riding problem in a monetary union, for details, see Libich, Nguyen, and Stehlík (2012).

  14. 14

    It is apparent that our framework with stochastic timing is different from – but compatible with – the stochastic games by Shapley (1953).

  15. 15

    The same is true of Libich and Stehlík (2012), which uses their special case of . The paper’s application is the long-term view of monetary–fiscal interactions, namely the sustainability of public finances and the likelihood of an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace (1981). The paper also formally studies policy interactions in a monetary union composed of independent fiscal authorities with differing sizes and revision probabilities and provides an empirical application to the Eurozone.

  16. 16

    Let us mention that both the fully-stochastic and fully-deterministic revision frameworks have some similarities to timing games developed by Simon and Stinchcombe (1989). In their framework, each player chooses the time(s) of his move from a finite set of options, implying that asynchronous timing and commitment can arise in such games (and can thus be used in various contexts, e.g. Monte 2010). For exploration of alternative timing structures and probability distributions using time scales calculus, see recent research in mathematics, e.g. Stehlík and Volek (2013).

  17. 17

    Note that this is simply Condition A for the opponent, player

  18. 18

    This is naturally the case for the Pure coordination game as well.

Published Online: 2013-12-20
Published in Print: 2014-1-1

©2014 by De Gruyter

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