Home Business & Economics Learning, Central Bank Conservatism, and Stock Price Dynamics
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Learning, Central Bank Conservatism, and Stock Price Dynamics

  • Marine Charlotte André ORCID logo and Meixing Dai ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: March 27, 2023

Abstract

This paper studies how adaptive learning affects the interactions between monetary policy, stock prices and the optimal degree of Rogoff conservatism in a New Keynesian DSGE model with non-Ricardian agents whose heterogeneous portfolios generate a financial wealth channel of monetary transmission. A positive intergenerational portfolio turnover in the stock market could improve the dual-mandate central bank’s intertemporal trade-off allowed by learning and implies a positive weight on financial stability in the social welfare criterion. For plausible learning gains and turnover rates, a rise in the turnover rate could lead the central bank to reduce the aggressiveness in its policy needed to manage private beliefs if the learning gain is high enough. Both the distortion due to learning and the central bank’s lack of concern for financial stability could lead the government to appoint a liberal central banker, i.e. less conservative than society. A rise in the turnover rate implies a higher (lower) degree of liberalism for low (high) learning gains.

JEL Classification: D83; D84; E52; E58

Corresponding author: Meixing Dai, Université de Strasbourg, Université de Lorraine, CNRS, BETA, 67000 Strasbourg, France, E-mail: .

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Juan R. Hernández, Sebastian Schmidt, and all the participants at an internal seminar at Banco de México and the T2M 2018 Conference for their helpful remarks. We thank in particular two anonymous reviewers who have given very insightful comments and suggestions.

Appendix A

In A.1, we derive the inflation targeting rule under learning. In A.2 and A.3, we closely follow Molnár and Santoro (2014) to find the equilibrium solution under constant-gain learning. In A.4, we show the equilibrium effects of constant-gain learning, while in A.5 we derive the equilibrium effects of the inflation penalty.

A.1 The Optimal Targeting Rule under Learning

Substituting E t * π t + 1 = a t , E t * x t + 1 = b t and E t * q t + 1 = s t into (1), (3) and (4), we write the Lagrangian of the CB’s minimization problem as follows:

L t CB = E t i = 0 + β i 1 2 α x x t + i 2 + ( 1 + τ ) π t + i 2 λ 1 , t + i π t + i β ̃ a t + i κ 1 + χ x t + i z t + i λ 2 , t + i x t + i 1 1 + ψ b t + i ψ 1 + ψ q t + i + 1 1 + ψ ( r t + i a t + i ) υ t + i λ 3 , t + i q t + i β ̃ s t + i + η b t + i + ( r t + i a t + i ) v t + i λ 4 , t + i a t + i + 1 a t + i γ t + i + 1 ( π t + i a t + i ) λ 5 , t + i b t + i + 1 b t + i γ t + i + 1 ( x t + i b t + i ) λ 6 , t + i s t + i + 1 s t + i γ t + i + 1 ( q t + i s t + i ) ,

where λi,t, with i = 1, 2, …, 6, are Lagrange multipliers associated with (1), (3), (4) and (13)(15), respectively. Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to π t , x t , r t , q t , at+1, bt+1 and st+1 yields the first-order conditions:

(A.1) ( 1 + τ ) π t λ 1 , t + λ 4 , t γ t + 1 = 0 ,
(A.2) α x x t + λ 1 , t 1 + χ κ λ 2 , t + λ 5 , t γ t + 1 = 0 ,
(A.3) 1 1 + ψ λ 2 , t + λ 3 , t = 0 ,
(A.4) ψ 1 + ψ λ 2 , t λ 3 , t + λ 6 , t γ t + 1 = 0 ,
(A.5) β ̃ β E t λ 1 , t + 1 + β ̃ E t λ 2 , t + 1 + β E t λ 3 , t + 1 λ 4 , t + β E t λ 4 , t + 1 ( 1 γ t + 2 ) = 0 ,
(A.6) β ̃ E t λ 2 , t + 1 β η E t λ 3 , t + 1 λ 5 , t + β E t λ 5 , t + 1 ( 1 γ t + 2 ) = 0 ,
(A.7) β ̃ β E t λ 3 , t + 1 λ 6 , t + β E t λ 6 , t + 1 ( 1 γ t + 2 ) = 0 .

Using (A.3), we get λ 3 , t = 1 1 + ψ λ 2 , t . Substituting λ3,t in (A.4) leads to λ2,t = −λ6,tγt+1 and λ 3 , t = 1 1 + ψ λ 6 , t γ t + 1 . Replacing λ2,t, λ3,t and β = 1 + ψ β ̃ into (A.6) and (A.7) yields:

(A.8) β ̃ 1 + η γ t + 2 E t λ 6 , t + 1 λ 5 , t + β ( 1 γ t + 2 ) E t λ 5 , t + 1 = 0 ,
(A.9) λ 6 , t + β ̃ 2 γ t + 2 + β ( 1 γ t + 2 ) E t λ 6 , t + 1 = 0 ,

Equation (A.9) implies that the only bounded forward-looking solution is λ6,t = E t λ6,t+1 = 0. It follows that λ2,t = λ3,t = 0. Substituting E t λ6,t+1 = 0 into (A.8) similarly yields λ5,t = E t λ5,t+1 = 0. Given λ2,t = λ5,t = 0, we get from (A.2) that λ 1 , t = α x x t 1 + χ κ . Substituting λ1,t into (A.1) gives the optimal inflation targeting rule when private agents are learning:

(A.10) x t = κ 1 + χ ( 1 + τ ) α x π t 1 + χ κ α x γ t + 1 λ 4 , t .

Rearranging terms in (A.10) yields λ 4 , t = α x κ 1 + χ γ t + 1 x t ( 1 + τ ) γ t + 1 π t . Substituting the solution of λ1,t+1, λ4,t and λ4,t+1, and λ2,t+1 = λ3,t+1 = 0 into (A.5), we obtain:

(A.11) ( 1 + τ ) π t + α x κ 1 + χ x t = α x β γ t + 1 [ 1 γ t + 2 ( 1 β ̃ ) ] κ 1 + χ γ t + 2 E t x t + 1 + β γ t + 1 ( 1 + τ ) ( 1 γ t + 2 ) γ t + 2 E t π t + 1 ,

which, after rearrangement of terms and forward iterations, gives rise to (16) for γt+i = γ. Notice that the Lagrange multipliers on (3), (4), (14) and (15) are zero, i.e. λ2,t = λ3,t = λ5,t = λ6,t = 0, implying that b t , s t , z t and v t have no effect on social welfare and are not true state variables for inflation and the output gap.

A.2 The ALM for Inflation

The CB’s rational inflation expectations, E t π t + 1 , are a function of π t , a t and z t . From the Philips curve (1), we extract the value of x t and xt+1 while implementing the learning algorithm (13) for period t + 1:

(A.12) x t = 1 κ 1 + χ π t β ̃ κ 1 + χ a t 1 κ 1 + χ e t ,
(A.13) E t x t + 1 = 1 κ 1 + χ E t π t + 1 β ̃ 1 γ t κ 1 + χ a t β ̃ γ κ 1 + χ π t .

Using (A.12) and (A.13) and the fact that β = 1 + ψ β ̃ , we rewrite (A.11) as

(A.14) E t π t + 1 = A 11 , t π t + A 12 , t a t + P 1 , t e t ,

with

(A.15) A 11 α x + α x γ β ̃ 2 1 + ψ 1 γ 1 β ̃ + κ 2 ( 1 + χ ) 2 ( 1 + τ ) ( 1 + ψ ) β ̃ α x 1 γ 1 β ̃ + κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 γ 1 + τ ,
(A.16) A 12 α x β ̃ 1 β ̃ 1 + ψ 1 γ [ 1 γ ( 1 β ̃ ) ] 1 + ψ β ̃ α x 1 γ 1 β ̃ + κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 γ 1 + τ ,
(A.17) P 1 α x 1 + ψ β ̃ α x 1 γ 1 β ̃ + κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 γ 1 + τ .

It follows from proposition 1 in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) that the solution of the ALM for inflation takes the following form:

(A.18) π t = c π c g a t + d π c g e t .

Forwarding (13) and (A.18) by one period, taking expectations and eliminating at+1, we obtain:

(A.19) E t π t + 1 = c π c g ( 1 γ ) a t + γ π t

Using (A.19) to eliminate E t π t + 1 in (A.14) and arranging terms give:

(A.20) π t = A 12 c π c g ( 1 γ ) c π c g γ A 11 a t + P 1 c π c g γ A 11 e t .

Comparing (A.20) with (A.18) yields

(A.21) c π c g = A 12 c π c g ( 1 γ ) c π c g γ A 11 ,
(A.22) d π c g = P 1 c π c g γ A 11 .

Substituting γ = 0 and γ = 1 into (A.15)A.17)(A.17) and using the results in (A.21) and (A.22) lead straightforwardly to (20)(22).

We can easily show, following Molnár and Santoro (2014), that the dynamic system formed by (13) and (A.14), as a t is predetermined and π t non-predetermined, is stable and there is a unique non-explosive solution among infinite stochastic sequences of c π c g satisfying (A.21) under two boundary conditions: a0 and lim s | E t π t + s | < , for ν ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.

A.3 The Non-Explosive Solution of the ALM for Inflation

Rewriting (A.21) as c π c g c π c g γ c π c g A 11 A 12 + c π c g ( 1 γ ) = 0 and substituting A11 and A12 by their expressions respectively given by (A.15) and (A.16), we obtain:

(A.23) p 2 c π c g 2 + p 1 c π c g + p 0 = 0

with

p 0 = α x β ̃ 1 β ̃ ( 1 + ψ ) 1 γ 1 γ 1 β ̃ > 0 , p 1 = β ̃ 1 + ψ 1 γ α x 1 γ 1 β ̃ + κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 γ 1 + τ α x α x γ β ̃ 2 ( 1 + ψ ) 1 γ 1 β ̃ κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 + τ , p 2 = β ̃ γ ( 1 + ψ ) α x 1 γ 1 β ̃ + κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 γ 1 + τ > 0 .

We can rewrite p1 as

(A.24) p 1 = κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 + τ 1 β ̃ 1 + ψ 1 γ α x 1 β ̃ 1 β ̃ 1 + ψ 1 γ ( 1 β ̃ ) p 0 p 2 < 0 .

Then, it follows straightforwardly that the discriminant of the polynomial in (A.23) is positive and (A.23) admits two real solutions.

To find the nature of the solutions of c π c g in (A.23), we rewrite the latter as:

(A.25) c π c g = p 0 + p 2 c π c g 2 p 1 f ( c π c g )

The function f ( c π c g ) is characterized by f ( 0 ) = p 0 p 1 > 0 and f ( 1 ) = p 0 + p 2 p 1 < 1 because (A.24) yields −p1 > p0 + p2 > 0. This implies f ( c π c g ) : 0,1 ( 0,1 ) . Given that f c π c g = 2 p 2 p 1 c π c g > 0 for c π c g 0,1 , f ( c π c g ) is strictly increasing in this interval. Applying the theorem of Brouwer, we deduce that there is one unique solution of c π c g inside the unit interval:

(A.26) c π c g = p 1 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 2 p 2 .

The other solution c π c g = p 1 + p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 2 p 2 is greater than unity and is to be excluded to avoid inflation following an explosive path.

Substituting A11 and P1 respectively given by (A.15) and (A.17) into (A.22) leads to the solution of d π c g given in (19).

Furthermore, we can show that f ( c π c g ) : 0 , α x β ̃ Υ 0 , α x β ̃ Υ . Knowing that f(0) > 0 and substituting c π c g by α x β ̃ Υ into (A.25), we find

(A.27) f α x β ̃ Υ = α x β ̃ Υ Υ α x β ̃ p 0 + α x β ̃ Υ p 2 p 1 .

Using p 0 = α x β ̃ Υ α x β ̃ p 0 + Υ α x β ̃ p 0 and the definition of p0, p1 and p2 given above, we find after some rearrangements that

(A.28) p 1 = β ̃ p 2 + Υ α x β ̃ p 0

Substituting the above expression of −p1 into (A.27) and using Υ = α x + κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 + τ , we obtain:

f α β ̃ Υ = α x β ̃ Υ Υ α x β ̃ p 0 + α x β ̃ Υ p 2 β ̃ κ 2 ( 1 + τ ) 1 + χ 2 Υ p 2 + Υ α x β ̃ p 0 + α x β ̃ Υ p 2 < α x β ̃ Υ .

Since f c π c g = 2 p 2 p 1 c π c g > 0 for c π c g [ 0,1 ] , f ( c π c g ) is strictly increasing in 0 , α x β ̃ Υ . This characteristic and the fact that f ( c π c g ) : 0 , α x β ̃ Υ 0 , α x β ̃ Υ prove the existence of a unique non-explosive solution for c π c g such that 0 < c π c g < α x β ̃ Υ . Using the last result and Υ = α x + κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 + τ in (19) implies that 0 < α x Υ < d π c g < 1 .

A.4 The Effect of Learning Gain

Differentiating the non-explosive solution of c π c g given by (A.26) with respect to γ gives

c π c g γ = p 2 p 1 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 p 1 γ + 2 p 2 p 2 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 p 0 γ + p 1 + p 1 2 2 p 2 p 0 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 p 2 γ 2 p 2 2 .

Using (A.28) and p 1 γ = β ̃ p 2 γ Y α β ̃ p 0 γ obtained using (A.28) to transform the above derivative, and after some rearrangements of terms, we finally obtain

(A.29) c π c g γ = α x β ̃ Υ c π c g α x β ̃ 2 p 2 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 H ( γ ) .

where H ( γ ) p 0 p 1 γ p 1 p 0 γ . The fact that c π c g < α x β ̃ Υ yields α x β ̃ Υ c π c g > α x β ̃ Υ α x β ̃ Υ = 0 . To show the conditions below which c π c g γ < 0 , we consider the case where H(γ) < 0 for γ = 1, and show that, in this case, we can have H ( γ ) γ > 0 , ∀γ ∈ (0, 1).

For γ = 1, we have p 0 γ = α x β ̃ 3 1 + ψ > 0 , p 1 γ = 2 α x β ̃ 3 1 + ψ < 0 , p 1 = α x β ̃ 3 1 + ψ Υ , and p 0 = α x β ̃ . For γ = 1, we get

H ( 1 ) = 2 α x 2 β ̃ 4 1 + ψ + α x β ̃ 3 1 + ψ α x β ̃ 3 1 + ψ + α x + κ 2 1 + χ 2 ( 1 + τ ) .

We have H(1) < 0 if

(A.30) 1 + τ < α x β ̃ 2 β ̃ 2 1 + ψ 1 κ 2 1 + χ 2 .

Differentiating H(γ) with respect to γ yields

(A.31) H ( γ ) γ = p 0 2 p 1 2 γ p 1 2 p 0 2 γ

Twice differentiating p0 and p1 with respect to γ, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1), leads to

2 p 0 2 γ = 2 α x β ̃ 2 1 β ̃ 1 + ψ < 0 , 2 p 1 2 γ = 2 α x β ̃ 1 + ψ ( 1 β ̃ 2 ) + 2 β ̃ 1 + ψ κ 2 1 + χ 2 ( 1 + τ ) > 0 .

Substituting these second derivatives as well as the definition of p0 and p1 into (A.31), we obtain that, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1),

H ( γ ) γ = 2 α x 2 β ̃ 3 1 β ̃ 1 + ψ 1 β ̃ 1 + ψ 1 γ 1 β ̃ + 2 α x β ̃ 3 1 + ψ κ 2 1 + χ 2 ( 1 + τ ) 1 β ̃ 1 + ψ 1 γ > 0 .

Under condition (A.30), since H(1) < 0 for γ = 1 and H ( γ ) γ > 0 , ∀γ ∈ (0, 1), it follows that H(γ) < 0, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1). Using this result, we deduce from (A.29) that, if (A.30) holds,

c π c g γ < 0 , γ ( 0,1 ) .

Differentiating d π c g given by (19) with respect to γ and denoting Θ 2 α x γ β ̃ β ̃ c π c g + 1 2 γ α x β ̃ c π c g Υ yield

(A.32) d π c g γ = α x β ̃ 1 + ψ Θ γ α x γ β ̃ + 1 γ Υ c π c g γ Υ + α x γ 2 β ̃ 2 1 + ψ β ̃ c π c g + β ̃ γ 1 + ψ 1 γ α x β ̃ c π c g Υ 2 .

Using c π c g < α x β ̃ Υ and the definition of ϒ, we find that if β ̃ > 1 2 , we have

Θ = 2 α x γ β ̃ β ̃ c π c g + 1 γ α x β ̃ c π c g Υ α x γ β ̃ c π c g Υ α x = 2 α x γ β ̃ β ̃ c π c g + Υ 1 γ α x Υ β ̃ c π c g α x γ β ̃ c π c g + γ κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 + τ c π c g = α x γ 2 β ̃ 1 β ̃ c π c g + Υ 1 γ α x Υ β ̃ c π c g + γ κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 + τ c π c g > 0

Associating the new expression of Θ with (A.32) leads to (27). If c π c g γ < 0 , it follows that

d π c g γ < 0 .

Using the definition of c x c g , d x c g , c q c g , and d q c g , c r c g and d r c g , it is straightforward to obtain the sign of their partial derivative with respect to γ.

A.5 The Effect of the Inflation Penalty

Differentiating c π c g given by (A.26) with respect to τ, using p1 < 0 which implies p 1 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 < 0 and p 1 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 < 1 , and knowing that p2 > 0, p0 > 0, p 1 τ = κ 2 1 + χ 2 [ 1 β ̃ ( 1 γ ) 2 1 + ψ ] < 0 , and p 2 τ = γ β ̃ κ 2 1 + ψ 1 + χ 2 ( 1 γ ) > 0 , we obtain

c π c g τ = p 2 1 + p 1 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 p 1 τ + 4 p 2 p 0 + 2 p 0 p 1 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 p 1 2 4 p 2 p 0 p 2 τ 2 p 2 2 < 0 .

Using this result and differentiating d π c g given by (19) with respect to τ, we get

d π c g τ = α x κ 2 1 + χ 2 1 β ̃ γ 1 + ψ 1 γ c π c g α x κ β ̃ γ 1 + χ 1 + ψ α x γ β ̃ + 1 γ Υ c π c g τ Υ + α x γ 2 β ̃ 2 1 + ψ β ̃ c π c g + β ̃ γ 1 + ψ 1 γ α x β ̃ c π c g Υ 2 < 0 .

Using the relationship between the feedback coefficients in the ALM for inflation and those in other ALMs, it is straightforward to obtain the sign of other feedback coefficients’ partial derivatives with respect to τ: c x c g τ = c q c g τ = c r c g τ = 1 κ 1 + χ c π c g τ < 0 , d x c g τ = d q c g τ = d r c g τ = 1 κ 1 + χ d π c g τ < 0 . We then compare the sign of a partial derivative with that of its corresponding feedback coefficient: if they have the same (different) sign, a higher inflation penalty rate has an amplification (attenuation) effect on the feedback coefficient. Notice that since κ is very small in the baseline calibration, the impact of the penalty weight on the feedback coefficients on inflation expectations and the cost-push shock in the ALMs for the output gap, stock prices and the interest rate is substantially greater than that on the corresponding coefficients in the ALM for inflation.

References

Airaudo, M. 2013. “Monetary Policy and Stock Price Dynamics with Limited Asset Market Participation.” Journal of Macroeconomics 36: 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2013.01.003.Search in Google Scholar

Airaudo, M., R. Cardani, and K. J. Lansing. 2013. “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices with Belief-Driven Fluctuations.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37 (8): 1453–78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.03.002.Search in Google Scholar

Airaudo, M., S. Nisticò, and L. F. Zanna. 2015. “Learning, Monetary Policy, and Asset Prices.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 47 (7): 1273–307. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12245.Search in Google Scholar

André, M. C., and M. Dai. 2017. “Is Central Bank Conservatism Desirable Under Learning?” Economic Modelling 60 (C): 281–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.10.002.Search in Google Scholar

André, M. C., and M. Dai. 2018. “Learning, Robust Monetary Policy and the Merit of Precaution.” The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 18 (2): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejm-2016-0236.Search in Google Scholar

Assenza, T., M. Berardi, and D. D. Gatti. 2015. “Was Bernanke Right? Targeting Asset Prices May not be a Good Idea after All.” In Monetary Policy in the Context of the Financial Crisis, edited by W. A. Barnett, and F. Jawadi, 451–96. Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing.10.1108/S1571-038620150000024025Search in Google Scholar

Bernanke, B. S., and M. Gertler. 1999. “Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility.” In Economic Review, Vol. 84, Issue Q IV, 17–51. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri, USA.10.3386/w7559Search in Google Scholar

Blanchard, O. J. 1985. “Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons.” Journal of Political Economy 93 (2): 223–47. https://doi.org/10.1086/261297.Search in Google Scholar

Blanchard, O. J., and C. M. Kahn. 1980. “The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations.” Econometrica 48 (5): 1305–11. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912186.Search in Google Scholar

Blanchard, O., G. Dell’Ariccia, and P. Mauro. 2010. “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 42 (s1): 199–215. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00334.x.Search in Google Scholar

Broda, C., and D. E. Weinstein. 2006. “Globalization and the Gains from Variety.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121: 1234–66. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.541.Search in Google Scholar

Bullard, J., and E. Schaling. 2002. “Why the Fed Should Ignore the Stock Market?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 84 (2): 35–41. https://doi.org/10.20955/r.84.35-42.Search in Google Scholar

Calvo, G. 1983. “Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework.” Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (3): 383–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90060-0.Search in Google Scholar

Carlstrom, C. T., and T. S. Fuerst. 2007. “Asset Prices, Nominal Rigidities, and Monetary Policy.” Review of Economic Dynamics 10 (2): 256–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2006.11.005.Search in Google Scholar

Castelnuovo, E., and S. Nisticò. 2010. “Stock Market Conditions and Monetary Policy in a DSGE Model for the U.S.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (9): 1700–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2010.06.028.Search in Google Scholar

Cecchetti, S. G., H. Genberg, J. Lipsky, and S. Wadhwani. 2000. Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy. Centre for Economic Policy Research.Search in Google Scholar

Clarida, R., J. Galí, and M. Gertler. 1999. “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective.” Journal of Economic Literature 37: 1661–707. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.37.4.1661.Search in Google Scholar

Eusepi, S., and B. Preston. 2018. “The Science of Monetary Policy: An Imperfect Knowledge Perspective.” Journal of Economic Literature 56 (1): 3–59. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20160889.Search in Google Scholar

Eusepi, S., M. P. Giannoni, and B. Preston. 2018. “Some Implications of Learning for Price Stability.” European Economic Review 106: 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.002.Search in Google Scholar

Evans, G. W., and S. Honkapohja. 2001. Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press.10.1515/9781400824267Search in Google Scholar

Evans, G. W., and S. Honkapohja. 2009. “Learning and Macroeconomics.” Annual Review of Economics 1: 421–49. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142927.Search in Google Scholar

Gaspar, V., F. Smets, and D. Vestin. 2006. “Adaptive Learning, Persistence and Optimal Monetary Policy.” Journal of the European Economic Association 4: 376–85. https://doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.376.Search in Google Scholar

Gaspar, V., F. Smets, and D. Vestin. 2010. Inflation Expectations, Adaptive Learning and Optimal Monetary Policy. In Handbook of Monetary Economics, edited by B. M. Friedman, and M. Woodford, vol. 3, 1055–95, Chapter 19.10.1016/B978-0-444-53454-5.00007-4Search in Google Scholar

Haltom, R., and J. A. Weinberg. 2017. “Does the Fed Have a Financial Stability Mandate?” In Economic Brief, EB17-06. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.Search in Google Scholar

Imai, S., and M. P. Keane. 2004. “Intertemporal Labour Supply and Human Capital Accumulation.” International Economic Review 45: 601–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00138.x.Search in Google Scholar

Kreps, D. 1998. “Anticipated Utility and Dynamic Choice.” In Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory, edited by D. P. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, 242–74. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CCOL0521632226.014Search in Google Scholar

Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott. 1977. “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” Journal of Political Economy 85 (3): 473–92. https://doi.org/10.1086/260580.Search in Google Scholar

Lanne, M., A. Luoma, and J. Luoto. 2009. “A Naïve Sticky Information Model of Households’ Inflation Expectations.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 (6): 1332–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.01.004.Search in Google Scholar

Machado, V. d. G. 2013. “Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Adaptive Learning.” Journal of Financial Stability 9 (3): 251–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2013.04.002.Search in Google Scholar

Marcet, A., and J. P. Nicolini. 2003. “Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning Marcet.” American Economic Review 93: 1476–98, https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322655400.Search in Google Scholar

Marcet, A., and T. J. Sargent. 1989. “Convergence of Least Squares Learning Mechanisms in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models.” Journal of Economic Theory 48 (2): 337–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90032-x.Search in Google Scholar

Markiewicz, A., and A. Pick. 2014. “Adaptive Learning and Survey Data.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107: 685–707. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.04.005.Search in Google Scholar

McCallum, B. 1983. “On Non-Uniqueness in Rational Expectation Models – an Attempt at Perspective.” Journal of Monetary Economics 11 (2): 139–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90028-4.Search in Google Scholar

Mele, A., K. Molnár, and S. Santoro. 2020. “On the Perils of Stabilizing Prices when Agents Are Learning.” Journal of Monetary Economics 115: 339–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.08.006.Search in Google Scholar

Milani, F. 2006. “A Bayesian DSGE Model with Infinite-Horizon Learning: Do ’Mechanical’ Sources of Persistence Become Superfluous?” International Journal of Central Banking 2 (3): 87–106.Search in Google Scholar

Milani, F. 2007. “Expectations, Learning and Macroeconomic Persistence.” Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (7): 2065–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.11.007.Search in Google Scholar

Milani, F. 2014. “Learning and Time-Varying Macroeconomic Volatility.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 47 (10): 94–114. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.07.017.Search in Google Scholar

Milani, F. 2017. “Learning about the Interdependence between the Macroeconomy and the Stock Market.” International Review of Economics & Finance 49 (C): 223–42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2017.01.028.Search in Google Scholar

Molnár, K., and S. Santoro. 2014. “Optimal Monetary Policy when Agents Are Learning.” European Economic Review 66 (C): 39–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.08.012.Search in Google Scholar

Molnár, K., and A. Ormeño. 2015. “Using Survey Data of Inflation Expectations in the Estimation of Learning and Rational Expectations Models.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 47 (4): 673–99. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12224.Search in Google Scholar

Molnárová, Z., and Z. Reiter. 2022. “Technology, Demand, and Productivity: What an Industry Model Tells Us about Business Cycles.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 134: 104272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104272.Search in Google Scholar

Nisticò, S. 2012. “Monetary Policy and Stock-Price Dynamics in a DSGE Framework.” Journal of Macroeconomics 34 (1): 126–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2011.09.008.Search in Google Scholar

Nisticò, S. 2016. “Optimal Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in a Non-Ricardian Economy.” Journal of the European Economic Association 14 (5): 1225–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12182.Search in Google Scholar

Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 1993. “Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability.” In Carnegie Rochester Series on Public Policy, vol. 39, 33–84.10.1016/0167-2231(93)90003-FSearch in Google Scholar

Preston, B. 2005. “Learning about Monetary Policy Rules when Long-Horizon Expectations Matter.” International Journal of Central Banking 1 (2), 81–126. September.Search in Google Scholar

Rigon, M., and F. Zanetti. 2018. “Optimal Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a Non-Ricardian Economy.” International Journal of Central Banking 14 (3): 389–436.10.2139/ssrn.3084014Search in Google Scholar

Rogoff, K. 1985. “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100: 1169–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885679.Search in Google Scholar

Svensson, L. E. 1997. “Optimal Inflation Targets, Conservative Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts.” The American Economic Review 87: 98–114.10.2139/ssrn.1325Search in Google Scholar

Trehan, B. 2015. “Survey Measures of Expected Inflation and the Inflation Process.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 47 (1): 207–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12174.Search in Google Scholar

Walsh, C. E. 1995. “Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers.” The American Economic Review 85: 150–67.Search in Google Scholar

Walsh, C. E. 2003. “Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35 (5): 829–49. https://doi.org/10.1353/mcb.2003.0041.Search in Google Scholar

Woodford, M. 2003. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9781400830169Search in Google Scholar

Woodford, M. 2010. “Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy with Near-Rational Expectations.” The American Economic Review 100 (1): 274–303. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.1.274.Search in Google Scholar

Yaari, M., E. 1965. “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer.” The Review of Economic Studies 32 (2): 137–50. https://doi.org/10.2307/2296058.Search in Google Scholar


Supplementary Material

This article contains supplementary material (https://doi.org/10.1515/bejm-2020-0243).


Received: 2020-11-12
Revised: 2023-01-28
Accepted: 2023-03-05
Published Online: 2023-03-27

© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 3.2.2026 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejm-2020-0243/html?lang=en
Scroll to top button