Abstract
This paper studies how adaptive learning affects the interactions between monetary policy, stock prices and the optimal degree of Rogoff conservatism in a New Keynesian DSGE model with non-Ricardian agents whose heterogeneous portfolios generate a financial wealth channel of monetary transmission. A positive intergenerational portfolio turnover in the stock market could improve the dual-mandate central bank’s intertemporal trade-off allowed by learning and implies a positive weight on financial stability in the social welfare criterion. For plausible learning gains and turnover rates, a rise in the turnover rate could lead the central bank to reduce the aggressiveness in its policy needed to manage private beliefs if the learning gain is high enough. Both the distortion due to learning and the central bank’s lack of concern for financial stability could lead the government to appoint a liberal central banker, i.e. less conservative than society. A rise in the turnover rate implies a higher (lower) degree of liberalism for low (high) learning gains.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Juan R. Hernández, Sebastian Schmidt, and all the participants at an internal seminar at Banco de México and the T2M 2018 Conference for their helpful remarks. We thank in particular two anonymous reviewers who have given very insightful comments and suggestions.
In A.1, we derive the inflation targeting rule under learning. In A.2 and A.3, we closely follow Molnár and Santoro (2014) to find the equilibrium solution under constant-gain learning. In A.4, we show the equilibrium effects of constant-gain learning, while in A.5 we derive the equilibrium effects of the inflation penalty.
A.1 The Optimal Targeting Rule under Learning
Substituting
where λi,t, with i = 1, 2, …, 6, are Lagrange multipliers associated with (1), (3), (4) and (13)–(15), respectively. Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to π t , x t , r t , q t , at+1, bt+1 and st+1 yields the first-order conditions:
Using (A.3), we get
Equation (A.9) implies that the only bounded forward-looking solution is λ6,t = E
t
λ6,t+1 = 0. It follows that λ2,t = λ3,t = 0. Substituting E
t
λ6,t+1 = 0 into (A.8) similarly yields λ5,t = E
t
λ5,t+1 = 0. Given λ2,t = λ5,t = 0, we get from (A.2) that
Rearranging terms in (A.10) yields
which, after rearrangement of terms and forward iterations, gives rise to (16) for γt+i = γ. Notice that the Lagrange multipliers on (3), (4), (14) and (15) are zero, i.e. λ2,t = λ3,t = λ5,t = λ6,t = 0, implying that b t , s t , z t and v t have no effect on social welfare and are not true state variables for inflation and the output gap.
A.2 The ALM for Inflation
The CB’s rational inflation expectations,
Using (A.12) and (A.13) and the fact that
with
It follows from proposition 1 in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) that the solution of the ALM for inflation takes the following form:
Forwarding (13) and (A.18) by one period, taking expectations and eliminating at+1, we obtain:
Using (A.19) to eliminate
Comparing (A.20) with (A.18) yields
Substituting γ = 0 and γ = 1 into (A.15)A.17)–(A.17) and using the results in (A.21) and (A.22) lead straightforwardly to (20)–(22).
We can easily show, following Molnár and Santoro (2014), that the dynamic system formed by (13) and (A.14), as a
t
is predetermined and π
t
non-predetermined, is stable and there is a unique non-explosive solution among infinite stochastic sequences of
A.3 The Non-Explosive Solution of the ALM for Inflation
Rewriting (A.21) as
with
We can rewrite p1 as
Then, it follows straightforwardly that the discriminant of the polynomial in (A.23) is positive and (A.23) admits two real solutions.
To find the nature of the solutions of
The function
The other solution
Substituting A11 and P1 respectively given by (A.15) and (A.17) into (A.22) leads to the solution of
Furthermore, we can show that
Using
Substituting the above expression of −p1 into (A.27) and using
Since
A.4 The Effect of Learning Gain
Differentiating the non-explosive solution of
Using (A.28) and
where
For γ = 1, we have
We have H(1) < 0 if
Differentiating H(γ) with respect to γ yields
Twice differentiating p0 and p1 with respect to γ, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1), leads to
Substituting these second derivatives as well as the definition of p0 and p1 into (A.31), we obtain that, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1),
Under condition (A.30), since H(1) < 0 for γ = 1 and
Differentiating
Using
Associating the new expression of Θ with (A.32) leads to (27). If
Using the definition of
A.5 The Effect of the Inflation Penalty
Differentiating
Using this result and differentiating
Using the relationship between the feedback coefficients in the ALM for inflation and those in other ALMs, it is straightforward to obtain the sign of other feedback coefficients’ partial derivatives with respect to τ:
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This article contains supplementary material (https://doi.org/10.1515/bejm-2020-0243).
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Advances
- The Macroeconomic Impact of the 1918–19 Influenza Pandemic in Sweden
- Aggregate Costs of a Gender Gap in the Access to Business Resources
- The Macroeconomic Effects of Shadow Banking Panics
- Wealth Inequality and the Exploration of Novel Technologies
- Contributions
- Learning, Central Bank Conservatism, and Stock Price Dynamics
- Progressive Taxation and Robust Monetary Policy
- The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and Imperfect Exchange Rate Pass-Through
- The Macroeconomic Impact of Social Unrest
- Interest Rates, Money, and Fed Monetary Policy in a Markov-Switching Bayesian VAR
- Un-Incorporation and Conditional Misallocation: Firm-Level Evidence from Sri Lanka
- Idiosyncratic Shocks, Lumpy Investment and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
- Open Economy Neoclassical Growth Models and the Role of Life Expectancy