Does Leadership Status Matter to Educational Performance? Evidence from an Experimental Study
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Tuyen Thanh Hoang
Abstract
This study examines whether assigning students to leadership roles can enhance academic performance. We conducted an experiment at two universities in Vietnam, where students were randomly assigned to teams of two to four members, and one student in each team was randomly designated as the team leader. Team leaders were further randomized into four treatment arms: (i) receiving a motivational email expressing the teacher’s trust, (ii) receiving a “double-weight scheme” email indicating that their exam score would count twice toward the team average, (iii) receiving both emails, (iv) receiving neither. The three teams with the highest average scores in each class received compliments from the instructor. Midterm and final exam scores served as outcome measures. The results show that merely holding a leadership position increases midterm performance and course interest, while receiving motivational or “double-weight” emails significantly improves final exam scores, suggesting that recognition and responsibility reinforce academic effort.
Appendix 1: Emails Sent to the Team Leaders
Email to mention the instructor’s trust in the team leaders
Subject: Study for the final exam
Hello [Student name],
In the near future, you will be taking the final exam for [the course name]. I’m reaching out to you because you are the leader of the team, and I hope that you will perform well in the final exam to help our team achieve a high average score. Your good exam results will also positively impact your university grade point average.
Best regards,
Instructor name
Email to mention the double weight scheme
Subject: The weight of the team leaders
Hello everyone, In the near future, you will be taking the final exam for [the course name]. As you know, the three teams with the highest average scores on the final exam will be announced and awarded 100,000 VND each. While the prize may seem small, its primary purpose is to add an element of fun and motivation for students to strive for better scores. To emphasize the role of the team leaders, your individual score will be doubled in calculating the average group score to rank the teams. For instance, suppose that your team consists of three students, your score will be multiplied by 2 and then added to the scores of the remaining two team members. The total will then be divided by 4 to determine your team’s average score.
I hope you and your team will have a good exam result.
Best regards,
Appendix 2: Additional Figure and Tables
Overview of related studies.
| Study | Context/setting | Design | Intervention type | Primary outcome | Effect size |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anderson and Lu (2017) | China, secondary school students | Experiment | Leadership appointment (class leaders) | Exam scores, popularity, overconfidence | Overall score +0.33 SD; rank +7.4 pp; increase in popularity; reduction in overconfidence |
| Azmat and Iriberri (2010) | Spain, secondary school students | Experiment | Feedback intervention: Showing class rank on report cards | Grades (GPA, math, language) | Average GPA +0.19 SD; math +0.22 SD; larger for low-ability and boys; no negative effects for high-ability. |
| Bettinger (2012) | USA, primary and secondary students | Experiment | Financial incentives ($100/year) | Math scores | Math scores +0.15–0.20 SD; but insignificant effects on reading, social science, and science test scores |
| Castleman and Page (2015) | USA, college students | Experiment | Automated personalized text reminders (deadlines, forms, counseling); peer mentor outreach (encouragement, info, referrals) | College enrollment (overall, 2-year vs 4-year colleges) | Text messaging: 2-year college enrollment (pooled) +3 pp and up to +7 pp overall in certain sites. Peer mentoring: +2.3 pp overall; 4-year enrollment +4.5 pp. |
| Castleman and Page (2016) | USA, college students | Experiment | Personalized text reminders (FAFSA renewal, academic progress, campus resources, assistance) | College persistence (fall enrollment; continuous enrollment) | Community colleges: +11.5 pp fall persistence; +13.8 pp continuous enrollment (strongest for GPA< 3.0: +20–23 pp). Four-year colleges: no significant effects. |
| Castleman and Meyer (2020) | USA, college students | Quasi-experiment | Text message nudges with reminders, encouragement, advising access | Persistence, credit completion, GPA | Persistence odds +1.5x–2x; credit completion +1.5; GPA +0.2. |
| Czibor et al. (2020) | Netherlands, university students | Experiment | Relative grading (classroom rank-based evaluation) | Preparation, exam scores | Insignificant effects |
| Denning et al. (2023) | USA, elementary students | Quasi-experiment | Relative class rank exposure (not intervention, natural variation) | Retention, test scores, AP course-taking, graduation, college, earnings | Retention +6 pp; 8th grade scores +2.5 percentiles; AP Calc +6 pp; higher college entry/earnings. |
| Doss et al. (2019) | USA, kindergarten parents | Experiment | Personalized/differentiated texts | Child reading level; parental engagement | Parental engagement +0.26–0.32 SD; 63 % children more likely to move up a reading level |
| Fryer (2016) | USA, K–12 students | Experiment | Daily text message to students (returns to education information); non-financial rewards (phone minutes/texts) for reading & quizzes | Short-run: State tests (ELA, math), attendance, suspensions; long-run: ACT take-up & scores | Short-run: insignificant effects. Long-run: ACT composite +0.13 SD (info-only); ACT English +0.17–0.18 SD |
| Fryer (2011) | USA, primary and secondary student | Experiment | Student incentives for achievement/inputs | Test scores | Insignificant effects for output-based incentives; +0.10–0.22 SD for input-based incentives (reading, attendance, behavior) |
| Humphrey et al. (2019) | USA, university students | Quasi-experiment | Text reminders via remind app vs. email reminders | Assignment completion, mastery, confidence, grades | Assignment completion: d = 0.36; mastery: d = 0.27; confidence: d = 0.20; grades: d = 0.53. |
| Kraft and Rogers (2015) | USA, high school students | Experiment | Weekly 1-sentence teacher-to-parent messages: (i) Positive notes, (ii) improvement notes; delivered via phone/text/email | Course passing rate, dropout, absenteeism, parent-student communication | Passing rate +6.5 pp, 41 % fewer failures; −6.1 pp dropout. Improvement group: +8.8 pp passing (p = 0.016), −3.2 pp absenteeism. Positive group: +4.5 pp passing. |
| Oreopoulos et al. (2020) | Canada, university students | Experiment | Online 60-min module, coaching via text messages (encouragement, advice, reminders) | Academic: GPA, credits, grades; non-academic: well-being index, success strategies, help-seeking behaviors | No effects on GPA/grades/credits. Positive effects on non-academic outcomes: well-being +0.04 SD, success strategies +0.05 SD. Increased help-seeking: prof visits +16.5 %, tutor visits +17 %. |
| Tran and Zeckhauser (2012) | Vietnam, university students | Experiment | Rank feedback (private vs. Public vs. Control) | Official TOEIC standardized test scores; study hours | Private: TOEIC points +52 (∼0.25–0.30 SD); public: TOEIC points +76 (∼0.35–0.40 SD). |
Outcome variables.
| The midterm exam score | The final exam score | The level of interest in the course | |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| By team leadership | |||
| Team members | 7.81 | 6.20 | 69.70 |
| (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.87) | |
| Team leaders | 8.19 | 6.87 | 72.59 |
| (0.11) | (0.15) | (1.26) | |
| By team size | |||
| Two members | 8.04 | 6.41 | 70.31 |
| (0.16) | (0.19) | (1.58) | |
| Three members | 8.10 | 6.58 | 70.76 |
| (0.14) | (0.18) | (1.25) | |
| Four members | 7.76 | 6.32 | 70.79 |
| (0.12) | (0.14) | (1.06) | |
| Total | 7.94 | 6.42 | 70.67 |
| (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.72) |
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This table presents the outcome variables, which include the midterm exam score, the final exam score, and the level of interest in the course. The range of the midterm exam score and the final exam score is from 0 to 10. The level of interest in the course is given by students, and the scale of this variable is from 0 (not interested in the course) to 100 (highest interest in the course). Standard errors of means in parentheses.
Summary statistics of variables.
| Variables | Obs. | Type | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Midterm exam score (not standardized) | 518 | Continuous | 7.941 | 1.809 | 0 | 10 |
| Midterm exam score (standardized) | 518 | Continuous | 0.067 | 0.937 | −4.045 | 1.133 |
| Final exam score (not standardized) | 531 | Continuous | 6.424 | 2.198 | 0 | 10 |
| Final exam score (standardized) | 531 | Continuous | 70.67 | 16.54 | 0 | 100 |
| Interest in the course (not standardized) | 531 | Continuous | 0.059 | 1.011 | −4.261 | 1.852 |
| Interest in the course (standardized) | 531 | Continuous | 0.099 | 0.965 | −2.721 | 1.668 |
| Belong to teams with two students | 531 | Binary | 0.230 | 0.421 | 0 | 1 |
| Belong to teams with three students | 531 | Binary | 0.333 | 0.472 | 0 | 1 |
| Belong to teams with four students | 531 | Binary | 0.437 | 0.496 | 0 | 1 |
| Male (male = 1, female = 0) | 531 | Binary | 0.143 | 0.351 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 531 | Discrete | 19.39 | 1.026 | 18 | 25 |
| University average grade | 531 | Continuous | 2.554 | 0.627 | 0.995 | 4 |
| University entrance exam score | 531 | Continuous | 21.73 | 3.130 | 2.15 | 28.53 |
Balance test of students’ characteristics (pre-treatment variables).
| T: All team leaders | T1: Team leaders receiving a motivational email | T2: Team leaders receiving a ‘double weight scheme’ email | T3: Team leaders receiving both the emails | T4: Team leader not receiving an email | C: Team members (control group) | T-C | T1-C | T2-C | T3-C | T4-C | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | |
| Male (male = 1, female = 0 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.05 |
| (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | |
| Age of students | 19.35 | 19.09 | 19.26 | 19.64 | 19.43 | 19.41 | −0.06 | −0.32** | −0.15 | 0.24 | 0.03 |
| (0.08) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.20) | (0.18) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.16) | |
| University entrance exam score | 21.89 | 22.24 | 22.14 | 21.48 | 21.66 | 21.66 | 0.23 | 0.58 | 0.49 | −0.17 | −0.00 |
| (0.23) | (0.44) | (0.44) | (0.46) | (0.49) | (0.17) | (0.29) | (0.50) | (0.49) | (0.52) | (0.51) | |
| University average grade | 2.59 | 2.56 | 2.60 | 2.61 | 2.60 | 2.53 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.06 |
| (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
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Column 1 reports the mean values of the variables for team leaders (treatment group). Columns 2–5 show the means for team leaders in each treatment arm. Column 6 reports the means for team members (control group). Columns 7–11 present differences between the treatment arms and the control group. For all variables, we test the null hypothesis that these differences are equal to zero. Standard errors of means in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
OLS regression of raw midterm exam scores and course interest (not standardized scores).
| Explanatory variables | Dependent variables | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The midterm exam score | The level of interest in the course | The midterm exam score | The level of interest in the course | |
| (1) | (3) | (4) | (6) | |
| Team leader (yes = 1, no = 0) | 0.3825*** | 3.0583** | 0.2935** | 2.5681* |
| (0.1440) | (1.4510) | (0.1416) | (1.4569) | |
| In teams with two students | 0.2083 | −0.9763 | 0.3012 | −0.3906 |
| (0.2088) | (1.6979) | (0.2075) | (1.6716) | |
| In teams with three students | 0.3574* | −0.4682 | 0.3585** | −0.4936 |
| (0.1813) | (1.5800) | (0.1727) | (1.5411) | |
| In teams with four students | Reference | |||
| Male (male = 1, female = 0) | −0.9419*** | 3.1341 | −0.7482*** | 4.4306* |
| (0.2764) | (2.2631) | (0.2663) | (2.2530) | |
| Age | −0.0883 | 1.9254 | −0.0900 | 1.9047 |
| (0.1534) | (1.3461) | (0.1394) | (1.3210) | |
| University average grade | 0.7365*** | 5.1526*** | ||
| (0.1626) | (1.4722) | |||
| University entrance exam score | 0.1047** | 0.2126 | ||
| (0.0530) | (0.4759) | |||
| Class fixed-effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 9.5811*** | 37.3101 | 4.5279 | 15.4843 |
| (2.8911) | (25.5194) | (2.9182) | (28.8495) | |
| Observations | 518 | 531 | 518 | 531 |
| R-squared | 0.078 | 0.165 | 0.122 | 0.186 |
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This table presents the OLS regression of the dependent variables on the team leader variable and control variables. The dependent variables are the midterm exam score and course interest. The sample includes 518 students for the midterm exam score and 531 students for the course interest survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the team level). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
OLS regression of raw final exam scores (not standardized scores).
| Explanatory variables | Dependent variables | |
|---|---|---|
| The final exam score | The final exam score | |
| (1) | (2) | |
| T1: Team leaders receiving a motivational email | 0.6043** | 0.5681* |
| (0.3012) | (0.2951) | |
| T2: Team leaders receiving a ‘double weight scheme’ email | 0.7500** | 0.6319** |
| (0.3197) | (0.3121) | |
| T3: Team leaders receiving both motivational and double-weighting emails | 1.0357*** | 0.7730*** |
| (0.3150) | (0.2784) | |
| T4: Team leader not receiving any email | 0.4911 | 0.2816 |
| (0.3147) | (0.2981) | |
| In teams with two students | −0.0423 | 0.0940 |
| (0.2316) | (0.2291) | |
| In teams with three students | 0.2678 | 0.2710 |
| (0.2243) | (0.2181) | |
| In teams with four students | Reference | |
| Male (male = 1, female = 0) | −0.6920** | −0.3837 |
| (0.2858) | (0.2651) | |
| Age | 0.0408 | 0.0725 |
| (0.1398) | (0.1268) | |
| University average grade | 1.1004*** | |
| (0.2130) | ||
| University entrance exam score | 0.2566*** | |
| (0.0800) | ||
| Class fixed-effects | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 6.0836** | −4.6501 |
| (2.5928) | (3.1345) | |
| Observations | 531 | 531 |
| R-squared | 0.097 | 0.183 |
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Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the team level). *** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
OLS regression of standardized final exam scores using the sample of team leaders.
| Explanatory variables | Dependent variables | |
|---|---|---|
| The final exam score | The final exam score | |
| (1) | (2) | |
| T1: Team leaders receiving a motivational email | 0.0755 | 0.1355 |
| (0.1901) | (0.1885) | |
| T2: Team leaders receiving a ‘double weight scheme’ email | 0.1437 | 0.1755 |
| (0.1883) | (0.1830) | |
| T3: Team leaders receiving both motivational and double-weighting emails | 0.2670 | 0.2551 |
| (0.1866) | (0.1689) | |
| T4: Team leader not receiving any email | Reference | |
| In teams with two students | 0.1293 | 0.1572 |
| (0.1508) | (0.1470) | |
| In teams with three students | 0.2095 | 0.1921 |
| (0.1530) | (0.1500) | |
| In teams with four students | Reference | |
| Male (male = 1, female = 0) | −0.3899** | −0.2486 |
| (0.1527) | (0.1510) | |
| Age | −0.0649 | −0.0578 |
| (0.0754) | (0.0680) | |
| University average grade | 0.3068* | |
| (0.1597) | ||
| University entrance exam score | 0.1513*** | |
| (0.0524) | ||
| Class fixed-effects | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 1.6944 | −3.3947* |
| (1.3970) | (1.8720) | |
| Observations | 178 | 178 |
| R-squared | 0.114 | 0.181 |
| p-value of H0 | ||
| H0: T1 = T2 | 0.700 | 0.823 |
| H0: T1 = T3 | 0.291 | 0.508 |
| H0: T2 = T3 | 0.494 | 0.650 |
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This table presents the OLS regression of standardized final exam scores on treatments and control variables using the sample of team leaders (team members are dropped). Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the team level). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
OLS regression of standardized exam scores and course interest without control variables.
| Explanatory variables | Dependent variables | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| The midterm exam score | The level of interest in the course | The final exam score | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | |
| Team leader (yes = 1, no = 0) | 0.1952*** | 0.1764** | 0.3193** |
| (0.0744) | (0.0874) | (0.1266) | |
| T1: Team leaders receiving a motivational email | 0.3450** | ||
| (0.1383) | |||
| T2: Team leaders receiving a ‘double weight scheme’ email | 0.3808*** | ||
| (0.1371) | |||
| T3: Team leaders receiving both motivational and double-weighting emails | 0.1330 | ||
| (0.1494) | |||
| T4: Team leader not receiving any email | 0.3193** | ||
| (0.1266) | |||
| Constant | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | −0.0000 |
| (0.0540) | (0.0588) | (0.0569) | |
| Observations | 518 | 531 | 531 |
| R-squared | 0.010 | 0.007 | 0.024 |
-
This table presents the OLS regression of the dependent variables on the team leader variable and control variables. The dependent variables are the midterm exam score and course interest, both standardized by the mean and standard deviation of the team members. The sample includes 518 students for the midterm exam score and 531 students for the course interest survey and the final exam score. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the team level). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
OLS regression of midterm standardized exam scores and course interest with Eicker- Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard error.
| Explanatory variables | Dependent variables | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The midterm exam score | The level of interest in the course | The midterm exam score | The level of interest in the course | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Team leader (yes = 1, no = 0) | 0.1977** | 0.1798* | 0.1520* | 0.1570* |
| (0.0806) | (0.0951) | (0.0783) | (0.0899) | |
| In teams with two students | 0.1137 | −0.0836 | 0.1560 | −0.0239 |
| (0.1020) | (0.1178) | (0.1023) | (0.1054) | |
| In teams with three students | 0.1819* | −0.0301 | 0.1856** | −0.0302 |
| (0.0950) | (0.0997) | (0.0914) | (0.0936) | |
| In teams with four students | Reference | |||
| Male (male = 1, female = 0) | −0.5104*** | 0.2666* | −0.3874*** | 0.2708** |
| (0.1224) | (0.1359) | (0.1212) | (0.1351) | |
| Age | −0.0442 | 0.0310 | −0.0466 | 0.1164 |
| (0.0443) | (0.0432) | (0.0737) | (0.0720) | |
| University average grade | 0.3814*** | 0.3150*** | ||
| (0.0837) | (0.0901) | |||
| University entrance exam score | 0.0542** | 0.0130 | ||
| (0.0271) | (0.0287) | |||
| Class fixed-effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.8427 | −0.6115 | −1.7007 | −3.3141** |
| (0.8566) | (0.8401) | (1.5072) | (1.6476) | |
| Observations | 518 | 531 | 518 | 531 |
| R-squared | 0.056 | 0.018 | 0.122 | 0.186 |
-
This table presents the OLS regression of the dependent variables on the team leader variable and control variables. The dependent variables are the midterm exam score and course interest, both standardized by the mean and standard deviation of the team members. The sample includes 518 students for the midterm exam score and 531 students for the course interest survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the team level). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
OLS regression of standardized final exam scores with Eicker- Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard error.
| Explanatory variables | Dependent variables | |
|---|---|---|
| The final exam score | The final exam score | |
| (1) | (2) | |
| T1: Team leaders receiving a motivational email | 0.2916** | 0.2493* |
| (0.1291) | (0.1322) | |
| T2: Team leaders receiving a ‘double weight scheme’ email | 0.3414** | 0.2773** |
| (0.1369) | (0.1363) | |
| T3: Team leaders receiving both motivational and double-weighting emails | 0.4447*** | 0.3393*** |
| (0.1382) | (0.1221) | |
| T4: Team leader not receiving any email | 0.1556 | 0.1236 |
| (0.1445) | (0.1344) | |
| In teams with two students | −0.0378 | 0.0413 |
| (0.0989) | (0.0952) | |
| In teams with three students | 0.1114 | 0.1189 |
| (0.0984) | (0.0916) | |
| In teams with four students | Reference | |
| Male (male = 1, female = 0) | −0.2808** | −0.1684 |
| (0.1269) | (0.1181) | |
| Age | −0.1256*** | 0.0318 |
| (0.0429) | (0.0594) | |
| University average grade | 0.4830*** | |
| (0.0927) | ||
| University entrance exam score | 0.1126*** | |
| (0.0346) | ||
| Class fixed-effects | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 2.4414*** | −4.7619*** |
| (0.8316) | (1.4863) | |
| Observations | 531 | 531 |
| R-squared | 0.058 | 0.183 |
-
This table presents the OLS regression of standardized final exam scores on the treatment groups (team leaders) and control variables. The final exam scores are standardized by the mean and standard deviation of the team members. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the team level). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
OLS regression of the exam score of team members on characteristics of their team leaders.
| Explanatory variables | The small-specification model | The large-specification model | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The midterm exam score | The final exam score | The midterm exam score | The final exam score | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| Team leaders are male | 0.0303 | 0.0102 | 0.0942 | −0.1183 |
| (0.1431) | (0.1496) | (0.1312) | (0.1451) | |
| Age of team leaders | −0.0293 | −0.1003 | 0.0897 | 0.0873 |
| (0.0597) | (0.0658) | (0.0838) | (0.0783) | |
| University average grade of team leaders | 0.0526 | 0.0674 | 0.1281 | −0.1529 |
| (0.0929) | (0.1002) | (0.1132) | (0.1229) | |
| In teams with two students | 0.0459 | −0.0657 | ||
| (0.1423) | (0.1287) | |||
| In teams with three students | 0.1933* | 0.1205 | ||
| (0.1069) | (0.1161) | |||
| In teams with four students | Reference | |||
| Team members are male | −0.4674*** | −0.0788 | ||
| (0.1775) | (0.1669) | |||
| Age of team members | −0.1117 | 0.1048 | ||
| (0.1049) | (0.0812) | |||
| University average grade of team members | 0.4156*** | 0.6031*** | ||
| (0.1120) | (0.1140) | |||
| University entrance exam score of team members | 0.0568* | 0.0885** | ||
| (0.0333) | (0.0374) | |||
| Class fixed effects | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 0.4263 | 1.7641 | −2.8328 | −7.0407*** |
| (1.2791) | (1.3859) | (2.4963) | (2.4311) | |
| Observations | 341 | 353 | 341 | 353 |
| R-squared | 0.003 | 0.016 | 0.132 | 0.186 |
-
This table presents the OLS regression of the exam score of team members on characteristics of the team leaders. The number of team members participating in the midterm exam and the final exam is 341 and 353, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the team level). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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