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MRS Functions and the Pareto Interval in Public Good Provision

  • Norman L. Kleinberg ORCID logo and Barry K. Ma EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: January 6, 2023

Abstract

The Lindahl-Samuelson condition is adapted to derive the range, or interval, of the efficient/Pareto levels of a public good. The size and bounds of the interval are shown to be dependent on the curvature of the marginal rate of substitution functions and the degree of heterogeneity of preferences. A policy implication is that unlike Nash or private provision, the relationship between the efficient level of a public good and income inequality can be ambiguous.

JEL Classification: D61; D62; H00; H41

Corresponding author: Barry K. Ma, Department of Economics & Finance, Baruch College and the Graduate Center, The City University of New York, One Bernard Baruch Way, Box B10-225, New York, NY 10010, USA, E-mail:

Funding source: Baruch College Wasserman Fellowship Grant

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Larry Samuelson for encouraging comments in an early version of the paper. We are indebted to Wolfgang Buchholz for his insightful comments and encouragement. The current paper has benefited substantially from the comments and suggestions of the Editor and an anonymous referee.

  1. Research funding: This work was supported by funds from a Baruch College Wasserman Fellowship Grant.

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Received: 2022-08-09
Accepted: 2022-12-27
Published Online: 2023-01-06

© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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