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A Note on University Admission Tests: Simple Theory and Empirical Analysis

  • Gianni De Fraja , Konstantinos Eleftheriou EMAIL logo and Marilou Ioakimidis
Published/Copyright: June 1, 2022

Abstract

University admission mechanisms are often quite complex. This paper examines one effect of their design on the students’ incentives to exert effort in preparation for the test. We adapt a multi-unit all-pay model of auction to draw the conclusion that abler students work harder: this conclusion is in line with the behaviour of a sample of students who apply for admission to the Greek university system with the complex rules newly introduced in 2013.

JEL Classification: I20; I23

Corresponding author: Konstantinos Eleftheriou, Department of Economics, University of Piraeus, 80, Karaoli and Dimitriou Street, 18534, Piraeus, Greece, E-mail:

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank George Papakonstantinou for providing the survey questionnaire and the dataset. We are also grateful to Editor Francesca Barigozzi and two anonymous referees of this journal for their several helpful comments and suggestions.

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Received: 2021-05-17
Revised: 2022-04-19
Accepted: 2022-05-15
Published Online: 2022-06-01

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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