Can Targeted Child Benefits Affect Fertility? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Panayiota Lyssiotou

doi:10.1515/bejeap-2020-0165

Article

Can Targeted Child Benefits Affect Fertility? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Panayiota Lyssiotou

Published/Copyright: May 11, 2021

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From the journal The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Volume 21 Issue 3

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on whether targeted cash child benefits can affect fertility and, specifically, induce families to have more than two children. We exploit the introduction of a monthly non-means tested cash child benefit paid only to families with at least four children. We apply a quasi experimental methodology since the reform is expected to have increased births of fourth child relative to births of third child or higher than four. We find robust evidence that the reform increased significantly the treated family’s probability to have a (fourth) child by about 5% and had no effect on births greater than four. In the post reform period, the control group’s probability to have a (third) child was not significantly different than before the reform. In particular, the finding that the probability of birth among parities greater than four was not affected by the reform supports that what we are estimating is a response of the targeted family to the introduction of the child benefit and not a change in the fertility preferences of families with many children. Other changes (besides the reform) had a negative effect on the probability to have a child that was reversed only for the birth of fourth child among treated families due to the economic incentives created by the reform.

Keywords: fertility; child benefits; financial incentives; unbalanced sex ratios; female labour force participation

JEL Classification: D12; J13; J18; H31; J11

Corresponding author: Panayiota Lyssiotou, Department of Economics, University of Cyprus, P.O. Box 20537, 1678Nicosia, Cyprus, E-mail: p.lyssiotou@ucy.ac.cy

Funding source: University of Cyprus

Award Identifier / Grant number: Unassigned

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to the Editor in Chief Prof. Hendrik Schmitz and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. I also would like to thank the University of Cyprus for financial support and the Statistical Service of Cyprus for making available the Family Expenditure Survey data. I am solely responsible for the interpretation of the data and all errors.

Appendix

Table 1A:

Summary statistics of macro fertility indicators.

Fertility indicators	Before reform: 1980–1989				After reform: 1990–2002
Fertility indicators	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Total fertility rate	2.42	0.06	2.32	2.50	1.97	0.34	1.49	2.49
Total number of births	10585.00	301.17	10099.00	11005.00	9537.85	1099.80	7883.00	11372.00
Total number of first birth	4255.60	301.68	3791.00	4726.00	3473.00	379.37	3026.00	4145.00
Total number of second birth	3886.40	151.08	3657.00	4104.00	3206.92	433.29	2551.00	3826.00
Total number of third birth	1823.20	180.35	1463.00	2021.00	1803.85	330.83	1195.00	2249.00
Total number of forth birth	449.40	80.16	327.00	559.00	714.77	160.54	461.00	931.00
Total number of fifth to eight birth	149.90	14.00	126.00	178.00	231.08	40.97	154.00	290.00

Source: The data are obtained from the Statistical Service of Cyprus.

Table 2A:

Marginal probit estimates – marriage behavior and educational outcomes of the youth.

	Unmarried and in education						IN Education
	Post reform survey(s)						Post reform survey(s)
	FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97		FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97
	Male children age 18–25	Female children age 18–23	Male children age 18–25	Female children age 18–23	Male children age 18–25	Female children age 18–23	Male children age 18–25	Female children age 18–23	Male children age 18–25	Female children age 18–23	Male children age 18–25	Female children age 18–23
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	0.105	0.324^***	0.0921	0.277^***			0.105	0.358^***	0.0921	0.308^***
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	(1.143)	(2.890)	(1.143)	(2.889)			(1.143)	(3.188)	(1.143)	(3.187)
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	0.126	0.285^***			0.119	0.264^***	0.147	0.287^***			0.137	0.265^***
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	(1.352)	(2.698)			(1.351)	(2.697)	(1.569)	(2.698)			(1.568)	(2.697)
Post91^*Family has two children	0.0753	−0.103	0.0686	−0.0891			0.0755	−0.136	0.0686	−0.118
Post91^*Family has two children	(0.685)	(−0.935)	(0.685)	(−0.935)			(0.685)	(−1.274)	(0.685)	(−1.274)
Post91^*Family has three children	−0.0681	−0.126	−0.0620	−0.107			−0.0683	−0.148	−0.0620	−0.126
Post91^*Family has three children	(−0.693)	(−1.058)	(−0.693)	(−1.058)			(−0.693)	(−1.275)	(−0.693)	(−1.275)
Post91^*Family has more than three children	−0.159	−0.119	−0.142	−0.100			−0.159	−0.140	−0.142	−0.118
Post91^*Family has more than three children	(−1.536)	(−0.870)	(−1.535)	(−0.870)			(−1.536)	(−1.056)	(−1.535)	(−1.055)
Post96^*Family has two children	0.0841	0.0466			0.0816	0.0446	0.0635	0.0351			0.0618	0.0336
Post96^*Family has two children	(0.754)	(0.388)			(0.754)	(0.387)	(0.579)	(0.293)			(0.579)	(0.293)
Post96^*Family has three children	−0.0672	0.0233			−0.0663	0.0224	−0.0825	0.0234			−0.0818	0.0225
Post96^*Family has three children	(−0.680)	(0.173)			(−0.680)	(0.173)	(−0.856)	(0.173)			(−0.855)	(0.173)
Post96^*Family has more than three children	0.0568	−0.0661			0.0556	−0.0632	0.0365	−0.0666			0.0358	−0.0635
Post96^*Family has more than three children	(0.438)	(−0.507)			(0.438)	(−0.507)	(0.288)	(−0.507)			(0.288)	(−0.507)
Family has two children	−0.00732	0.101	−0.00667	0.0886	−0.00717	0.0976	−0.00734	0.113	−0.00667	0.0996	−0.00720	0.109
Family has two children	(−0.0920)	(1.218)	(−0.0919)	(1.218)	(−0.0919)	(1.218)	(−0.0920)	(1.357)	(−0.0919)	(1.357)	(−0.0919)	(1.357)
Family has three children	0.0475	0.0201	0.0435	0.0175	0.0466	0.0193	0.0476	0.0202	0.0435	0.0177	0.0467	0.0194
Family has three children	(0.578)	(0.210)	(0.578)	(0.210)	(0.578)	(0.210)	(0.578)	(0.210)	(0.578)	(0.210)	(0.578)	(0.210)
Family has more than three children	−0.0667	0.0647	−0.0607	0.0568	−0.0656	0.0621	−0.0668	0.0650	−0.0607	0.0573	−0.0658	0.0624
Family has more than three children	(−0.852)	(0.678)	(−0.852)	(0.677)	(−0.852)	(0.678)	(−0.852)	(0.678)	(−0.852)	(0.677)	(−0.852)	(0.678)
Observations	968	703	666	492	654	516	968	703	666	492	654	516
Pseudo R2	0.0423	0.0768	0.0431	0.0506	0.0403	0.0988	0.0428	0.0764	0.0431	0.0526	0.0412	0.0969

Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses ^***p < 0.01, ^**p < 0.05, ^*p < 0.1. The estimates are based on the observations of male children age 18–25 and female children age 18–23 of the family. The reference is the child of the family with one child. The multi-member family has more than three children and the non-multi-member family has less than four children.

Table 3A:

Linear probability estimates – all families and married families with two and three children age 2–17.

Variables	All families with two and three children age 2–17						Married families with two and three children age 2–17
	Post reform survey(s)						Post reform survey(s)
	FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97		FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	−0.0155	−0.0124	−0.00453	−0.0124			−0.0132	−0.0105	−0.00189	−0.0105
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	(−0.851)	(−1.093)	(−0.220)	(−1.093)			(−0.700)	(−0.914)	(−0.0893)	(−0.915)
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	−0.0192	−0.0217^*			−0.0494^**	−0.0217^*	−0.0168	−0.0200			−0.0471^**	−0.0200
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	(−1.074)	(−1.659)			(−2.225)	(−1.658)	(−0.913)	(−1.502)			(−1.997)	(−1.502)
Post91^*Has three children age 2–17 dummy	0.0137	0.0124	0.0120	0.0124			0.0117	0.0104	0.00992	0.0104
Post91^*Has three children age 2–17 dummy	(0.832)	(0.764)	(0.730)	(0.765)			(0.699)	(0.625)	(0.592)	(0.625)
Post96^*Has three children age 2–17 dummy	0.0423^*	0.0396^*			0.0511^**	0.0396^*	0.0411^*	0.0395^*			0.0506^**	0.0395^*
Post96^*Has three children age 2–17 dummy	(1.944)	(1.828)			(2.310)	(1.827)	(1.818)	(1.762)			(2.206)	(1.762)
Has three children age 2–17 dummy	−0.0385^***	−0.0402^***	−0.0379^***	−0.0402^***	−0.0390^***	−0.0402^***	−0.0377^***	−0.0389^***	−0.0372^***	−0.0389^***	−0.0387^***	−0.0389^***
Has three children age 2–17 dummy	(−2.917)	(−3.094)	(−2.864)	(−3.095)	(−2.895)	(−3.094)	(−2.795)	(−2.938)	(−2.746)	(−2.939)	(−2.809)	(−2.937)
Sex ratio index	0.859		0.144		0.190		0.898		0.205		0.185
Sex ratio index	(0.956)		(0.123)		(0.184)		(0.961)		(0.171)		(0.172)
Has two children with same sex	0.00792		0.00862		0.0239		0.00507		0.00509		0.0185
Has two children with same sex	(0.679)		(0.654)		(1.421)		(0.432)		(0.386)		(1.096)
Log real household income	0.00449		0.00281		0.0162^**		0.00307		0.000228		0.0125
Log real household income	(0.918)		(0.488)		(2.516)		(0.550)		(0.0338)		(1.572)
Couple household	0.0485^**		0.0458^*
Couple household	(2.428)		(1.752)
Working spouse	−0.0205^***		−0.0205^**		−0.0257^**		−0.0206^***		−0.0206^**		−0.0271^**
Working spouse	(−2.703)		(−2.453)		(−2.508)		(−2.710)		(−2.452)		(−2.565)
Age of spouse	−0.00575^*		−0.00735^**		−0.00376		−0.00581^*		−0.00740^**		−0.00388
Age of spouse	(−1.910)		(−2.138)		(−1.047)		(−1.918)		(−2.146)		(−1.070)
Age of spouse square	7.94 × 10⁻⁵		0.000152		−3.51 × 10⁻⁵		7.62 × 10⁻⁵		0.000145		−4.92 × 10⁻⁵
Age of spouse square	(0.623)		(1.031)		(−0.240)		(0.598)		(0.987)		(−0.335)
Age of head	−0.000142		−0.000446		−4.69 × 10⁻⁵		−3.14 × 10⁻⁵		−0.000258		0.000172
Age of head	(−0.133)		(−0.331)		(−0.0323)		(−0.0277)		(−0.186)		(0.108)
Number of additional adults	−0.00317		−0.00217		−0.00536		−0.00246		−0.000998		−0.00322
Number of additional adults	(−0.653)		(−0.377)		(−0.834)		(−0.483)		(−0.165)		(−0.456)
Constant	−0.375	0.0668^***	0.00329	0.0668^***	−0.141	0.0668^***	−0.338	0.0663^***	0.0347	0.0663^***	−0.112	0.0663^***
Constant	(−0.830)	(7.386)	(0.00556)	(7.387)	(−0.271)	(7.384)	(−0.719)	(7.238)	(0.0574)	(7.239)	(−0.205)	(7.236)
Observations	3378	3378	2689	2689	1752	1752	3288	3288	2621	2621	1698	1698
R-squared	0.034	0.004	0.039	0.005	0.045	0.005	0.033	0.004	0.039	0.005	0.044	0.004

Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ^***p < 0.01, ^**p < 0.05, ^*p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–17. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–17.

Table 4A:

Linear probability estimates – all families and married families with more than one child age 2–17.

Variables	All families with more than one child age 2–17						Married families with more than one child age 2–17
	Post reform survey(s)						Post reform survey(s)
	FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97		FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	−0.0110	−0.0124	−0.00304	−0.0124			−0.00797	−0.0105	8.02 × 10⁻⁵	−0.0105
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	(−0.627)	(−1.092)	(−0.153)	(−1.092)			(−0.439)	(−0.914)	(0.00394)	(−0.914)
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	−0.0171	−0.0217^*			−0.0343	−0.0217^*	−0.0140	−0.0200			−0.0312	−0.0200
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	(−0.981)	(−1.658)			(−1.612)	(−1.658)	(−0.782)	(−1.502)			(−1.407)	(−1.501)
Post91^*Has three children	0.0131	0.0124	0.0119	0.0124			0.0108	0.0104	0.00952	0.0104
age 2–17 dummy	(0.798)	(0.764)	(0.723)	(0.764)			(0.650)	(0.625)	(0.569)	(0.625)
Post91^*Has more than three	0.0366	0.0407	0.0360	0.0407			0.0330	0.0401	0.0321	0.0401
children age 2–17 dummy	(0.916)	(1.027)	(0.898)	(1.027)			(0.801)	(0.974)	(0.776)	(0.974)
Post96^*Has three children	0.0430^**	0.0396^*			0.0499^**	0.0396^*	0.0419^*	0.0395^*			0.0495^**	0.0395^*
age 2–17 dummy	(1.973)	(1.827)			(2.258)	(1.826)	(1.855)	(1.762)			(2.161)	(1.761)
Post96^*Has more than three	−0.00703	−0.00969			−0.00714	−0.00969	−0.0108	−0.0133			−0.0167	−0.0133
children age 2–17 dummy	(−0.210)	(−0.294)			(−0.212)	(−0.294)	(−0.313)	(−0.393)			(−0.471)	(−0.393)
Has three children	−0.0990^***	−0.0402^***	−0.104^**	−0.0402^***	−0.0930^*	−0.0402^***	−0.102^***	−0.0389^***	−0.106^**	−0.0389^***	−0.0513^***	−0.0389^***
age 2–17 dummy	(−2.894)	(−3.093)	(−2.574)	(−3.094)	(−1.959)	(−3.092)	(−2.880)	(−2.937)	(−2.566)	(−2.938)	(−3.045)	(−2.936)
Has more than three children	−0.143^*	−0.0135	−0.153^*	−0.0135	−0.129	−0.0135	−0.146^*	−0.0108	−0.156^*	−0.0108	−0.0327	−0.0108
age 2–17 dummy	(−1.900)	(−0.491)	(−1.709)	(−0.491)	(−1.237)	(−0.491)	(−1.898)	(−0.377)	(−1.706)	(−0.377)	(−0.809)	(−0.377)
Number of children age 2–5	0.0674^*		0.0720^*		0.0480		0.0721^*		0.0768^*
Number of children age 2–5	(1.847)		(1.659)		(0.930)		(1.912)		(1.717)
Number of children age 6–17	0.0729^**		0.0786^*		0.0622		0.0777^**		0.0834^**		0.0199^**
Number of children age 6–17	(2.150)		(1.922)		(1.290)		(2.211)		(1.977)		(1.974)
Number of children age 2–5^*Number of	−0.0149^**		−0.0159^**		−0.00475		−0.0162^**		−0.0174^**		−0.00135
of children age 6–17	(−2.191)		(−1.982)		(−0.603)		(−2.314)		(−2.110)		(−0.246)
Sex ratio index	0.507		−0.188		0.0805		0.552		−0.0902		0.0911
Sex ratio index	(0.589)		(−0.165)		(0.0814)		(0.615)		(−0.0774)		(0.0883)
Has two children with same sex	0.00830		0.00833		0.0248		0.00559		0.00487		0.0200
Has two children with same sex	(0.712)		(0.632)		(1.472)		(0.476)		(0.369)		(1.182)
Log real household income	0.00463		0.00342		0.0136^**		0.00267		−5.34 × 10⁻⁵		0.0111
Log real household income	(0.994)		(0.618)		(2.016)		(0.500)		(−0.00830)		(1.513)
Couple household	0.0654^***		0.0626^**		0.0389
Couple household	(3.308)		(2.472)		(1.280)
Working spouse	−0.0258^***		−0.0270^***		−0.0269^***		−0.0259^***		−0.0269^***		−0.0270^***
Working spouse	(−3.527)		(−3.283)		(−2.667)		(−3.531)		(−3.280)		(−2.675)
Age of spouse	−0.00565^*		−0.00668^*		−0.00627		−0.00574^*		−0.00678^*		−0.00733^*
Age of spouse	(−1.671)		(−1.729)		(−1.599)		(−1.685)		(−1.743)		(−1.888)
Age of spouse square	3.13 × 10⁻⁵		7.97 × 10⁻⁵		4.41 × 10⁻⁶		2.58 × 10⁻⁵		6.95 × 10⁻⁵		3.74 × 10⁻⁵
Age of spouse square	(0.226)		(0.495)		(0.0280)		(0.185)		(0.431)		(0.247)
Age of head	−0.000770		−0.00136		−2.88 × 10⁻⁵		−0.000642		−0.00111		−4.87 × 10⁻⁵
Age of head	(−0.722)		(−0.985)		(−0.0206)		(−0.567)		(−0.779)		(−0.00325)
Constant	−0.351	0.0668^***	0.00580	0.0668^***	−0.202	0.0668^***	−0.305	0.0663^***	0.0327	0.0663^***	−0.0579	0.0663^***
Constant	(−0.803)	(7.384)	(0.00997)	(7.385)	(−0.401)	(7.381)	(−0.672)	(7.235)	(0.0552)	(7.236)	(−0.111)	(7.233)
Observations	3642	3642	2862	2862	1918	1918	3544	3544	2787	2787	1860	1860
R-squared	0.039	0.005	0.043	0.006	0.047	0.005	0.039	0.005	0.044	0.006	0.045	0.005

Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ^***p < 0.01, ^**p < 0.05, ^*p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–17. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–17.

Table 5A:

Linear probability estimates – all families and married families.

Variables	All families						Married families
	Post reform survey(s)						Post reform survey(s)
	FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97		FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	−0.0324^**	−0.0124	−0.0369^**	−0.0124			−0.0346^**	−0.0105	−0.0379^**	−0.0105
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	(−2.008)	(−1.092)	(−2.086)	(−1.092)			(−1.991)	(−0.914)	(−1.983)	(−0.914)
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	−0.0341^**	−0.0217^*			−0.0371^*	−0.0217^*	−0.0367^**	−0.0200			−0.0388^*	−0.0200
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	(−2.056)	(−1.658)			(−1.843)	(−1.658)	(−2.087)	(−1.502)			(−1.773)	(−1.501)
Post91^*Has no	−0.0522^**	−0.0554^**	−0.0524^**	−0.0554^**			−0.0539^*	−0.0469	−0.0547^*	−0.0469
child age 2–17 dummy	(−2.115)	(−2.050)	(−2.113)	(−2.051)			(−1.730)	(−1.348)	(−1.756)	(−1.348)
Post91^*Has one	−0.0245	−0.0202	−0.0229	−0.0202			−0.0274	−0.0274	−0.0260	−0.0274
child age 2–17 dummy	(−0.982)	(−0.768)	(−0.919)	(−0.768)			(−1.032)	(−0.979)	(−0.980)	(−0.979)
Post91^*Has	0.00702	0.0124	0.00566	0.0124			0.00634	0.0104	0.00495	0.0104
three children age 2–17 dummy	(0.418)	(0.764)	(0.336)	(0.764)			(0.372)	(0.625)	(0.289)	(0.625)
Post91^*Has more than	0.00811	0.0407	0.00796	0.0407			0.00347	0.0401	0.00287	0.0401
three children age 2–17 dummy	(0.208)	(1.027)	(0.203)	(1.027)			(0.0857)	(0.974)	(0.0704)	(0.974)
Post96^*Has	−0.0200	−0.0151			−0.0225	−0.0151	−0.0118	−0.00474			−0.0144	−0.00474
no child age 2–17 dummy	(−0.668)	(−0.450)			(−0.746)	(−0.450)	(−0.306)	(−0.109)			(−0.374)	(−0.109)
Post96^*Has one	−0.0639^**	−0.0810^***			−0.0666^**	−0.0810^***	−0.0732^**	−0.0941^***			−0.0756^**	−0.0941^***
child age 2–17 dummy	(−2.324)	(−2.802)			(−2.418)	(−2.801)	(−2.493)	(−3.050)			(−2.568)	(−3.049)
Post96^*Has	0.0427^*	0.0396^*			0.0496^**	0.0396^*	0.0411^*	0.0395^*			0.0486^**	0.0395^*
three children age 2–17 dummy	(1.919)	(1.827)			(2.210)	(1.827)	(1.791)	(1.761)			(2.090)	(1.761)
Post96^*Has more than	−0.0322	−0.00969			−0.0256	−0.00969	−0.0323	−0.0133			−0.0248	−0.0133
three children age 2–17 dummy	(−0.942)	(−0.294)			(−0.736)	(−0.294)	(−0.908)	(−0.393)			(−0.686)	(−0.393)
Has no child age 2–17 dummy	0.443^***	0.116^***	0.460^***	0.116^***	0.400^***	0.116^***	0.478^***	0.171^***	0.499^***	0.171^***	0.435^***	0.171^***
Has no child age 2–17 dummy	(6.657)	(5.216)	(6.156)	(5.217)	(4.474)	(5.214)	(6.838)	(6.257)	(6.428)	(6.259)	(4.563)	(6.255)
Has one children	0.289^***	0.154^***	0.296^***	0.154^***	0.274^***	0.154^***	0.306^***	0.174^***	0.315^***	0.174^***	0.290^***	0.174^***
age 2–17 dummy	(7.837)	(7.541)	(7.300)	(7.543)	(5.748)	(7.539)	(7.946)	(7.989)	(7.501)	(7.991)	(5.750)	(7.987)
Has three children	−0.153^***	−0.0402^***	−0.160^***	−0.0402^***	−0.140^***	−0.0402^***	−0.161^***	−0.0389^***	−0.170^***	−0.0389^***	−0.147^***	−0.0389^***
age 2–17 dummy	(−4.794)	(−3.093)	(−4.485)	(−3.094)	(−3.266)	(−3.092)	(−4.864)	(−2.937)	(−4.641)	(−2.938)	(−3.257)	(−2.936)
Has more than three children	−0.237^***	−0.0135	−0.250^***	−0.0135	−0.211^**	−0.0135	−0.251^***	−0.0108	−0.269^***	−0.0108	−0.226^**	−0.0108
age 2–17 dummy	(−3.227)	(−0.491)	(−3.029)	(−0.491)	(−2.166)	(−0.491)	(−3.309)	(−0.377)	(−3.174)	(−0.377)	(−2.197)	(−0.377)
Number of children age 2–5	0.110^***		0.121^***		0.0767^*		0.117^***		0.130^***		0.0832^*
Number of children age 2–5	(3.306)		(3.217)		(1.682)		(3.409)		(3.376)		(1.720)
Number of children age 6–17	0.135^***		0.142^***		0.117^***		0.142^***		0.151^***		0.124^***
Number of children age 6–17	(4.348)		(4.025)		(2.743)		(4.412)		(4.178)		(2.731)
Number of children 2–5^*Number	−0.0232^***		−0.0265^***		−0.0106		−0.0235^***		−0.0269^***		−0.0110
of children 6–17	(−3.695)		(−3.646)		(−1.433)		(−3.631)		(−3.594)		(−1.432)
Sex ratio index	1.605^**		2.064^**		1.075		1.749^**		2.147^**		1.214
Sex ratio index	(2.345)		(2.346)		(1.328)		(2.283)		(2.175)		(1.346)
Has two children with same sex	−0.0111		−0.0122		0.000699		−0.0151		−0.0168		−0.00602
Has two children with same sex	(−0.936)		(−0.906)		(0.0410)		(−1.281)		(−1.260)		(−0.358)
Log real household income	0.00665^*		0.00630		0.00584		0.0132^**		0.0129^*		0.0102
Log real household income	(1.786)		(1.523)		(0.977)		(2.222)		(1.899)		(1.232)
Couple household	0.239^***		0.244^***		0.229^***
Couple household	(16.74)		(15.00)		(11.18)
Working spouse	−0.0377^***		−0.0407^***		−0.0306^***		−0.0387^***		−0.0417^***		−0.0320^***
Working spouse	(−4.859)		(−4.610)		(−2.862)		(−4.991)		(−4.724)		(−2.992)
Age of spouse	−0.00721^***		−0.00674^**		−0.00875^***		−0.00545^**		−0.00504^*		−0.00692^**
Age of spouse	(−2.873)		(−2.393)		(−2.606)		(−2.078)		(−1.717)		(−1.987)
Age of spouse square	−0.000259^**		−0.000295^**		−0.000220		−0.000324^***		−0.000357^***		−0.000302^**
Age of spouse square	(−2.369)		(−2.371)		(−1.513)		(−2.904)		(−2.821)		(−2.039)
Age of head	−0.000762		1.23 × 10⁻⁵		−0.00207^*		−0.00129		−0.000554		−0.00253^*
Age of head	(−0.902)		(0.0115)		(−1.777)		(−1.115)		(−0.382)		(−1.690)
Number of additional adults	−0.0102^**		−0.0108^**		0.000231		−0.0125^**		−0.0128^**		2.89 × 10⁻⁵
Number of additional adults	(−2.212)		(−2.070)		(0.0331)		(−2.253)		(−2.036)		(0.00353)
Constant	−1.209^***	0.0668^***	−1.463^***	0.0668^***	−0.876^**	0.0668^***	−1.114^***	0.0663^***	−1.338^***	0.0663^***	−0.769^*	0.0663^***
Constant	(−3.436)	(7.384)	(−3.245)	(7.385)	(−2.086)	(7.382)	(−2.849)	(7.235)	(−2.670)	(7.236)	(−1.651)	(7.232)
Observations	6279	6279	4953	4953	3341	3341	5705	5705	4502	4502	3051	3051
R-squared	0.163	0.047	0.168	0.050	0.174	0.051	0.163	0.064	0.167	0.066	0.178	0.070

Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ^***p < 0.01, ^**p < 0.05, ^*p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–17. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–17.

Table 6A:

Marginal probit estimates – all families and married families with two and three children age 2–15.

Variables	All families with two and three children age 2–15						Married families with two and three children age 2–15
	Post reform survey(s)						Post reform survey(s)
	FES 90/91 & FES96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97		FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post reform	−0.0139	−0.0149	−0.00201	−0.0149			−0.0122	−0.0135	−0.000233	−0.0139
1990/91 dummy	(−0.905)	(−1.302)	(−0.115)	(−1.252)			(−0.762)	(−1.144)	(−0.0129)	(−1.144)
Post reform	−0.0163	−0.0184			−0.0284^**	−0.0198	−0.0143	−0.0170			−0.0280^**	−0.0185
1996/97 dummy	(−1.121)	(−1.538)			(−2.107)	(−1.500)	(−0.941)	(−1.377)			(−1.975)	(−1.377)
Post91^*Has	0.0191	0.0159	0.0159	0.0150			0.0180	0.0144	0.0150	0.0143
three children age 2–15 dummy	(0.731)	(0.528)	(0.639)	(0.499)			(0.684)	(0.473)	(0.605)	(0.473)
Post96^*Has	0.0837^**	0.0697^*			0.0766^***	0.0693^*	0.0844^**	0.0691^*			0.0799^***	0.0704^*
three children age 2–15 dummy	(2.367)	(1.871)			(2.592)	(1.831)	(2.340)	(1.829)			(2.608)	(1.829)
Has three children	−0.0363^***	−0.0392^**	−0.0350^***	−0.0390^**	−0.0292^***	−0.0407^**	−0.0365^***	−0.0385^**	−0.0351^***	−0.0385^**	−0.0300^***	−0.0402^**
age 2–15 dummy	(−2.775)	(−2.480)	(−2.746)	(−2.445)	(−2.865)	(−2.445)	(−2.738)	(−2.378)	(−2.735)	(−2.378)	(−2.870)	(−2.378)
Sex ratio index	0.328		−0.468		0.0109		0.369		−0.388		0.0226
Sex ratio index	(0.465)		(−0.517)		(0.0187)		(0.507)		(−0.419)		(0.0370)
Has two children	0.00620		0.00700		0.00836		0.00367		0.00382		0.00558
with same sex	(0.679)		(0.690)		(0.952)		(0.396)		(0.375)		(0.625)
Log real household income	0.00753		0.00521		0.0118^*		0.00460		0.000603		0.00929
Log real household income	(1.220)		(0.767)		(1.951)		(0.695)		(0.0802)		(1.431)
Couple household	0.0238	0.0229	0.0173		0.0114
Couple household	(1.191)	(0.884)	(0.714)		(0.578)
Working spouse	−0.0177^**		−0.0183^**		−0.0180^**		−0.0180^**		−0.0183^**		−0.0186^**
Working spouse	(−2.288)		(−2.110)		(−2.412)		(−2.284)		(−2.092)		(−2.421)
Age of spouse	0.00141		0.000526		0.000166		0.00141		0.000508		0.000126
Age of spouse	(0.620)		(0.212)		(0.0820)		(0.609)		(0.203)		(0.0607)
Age of spouse square	−0.000341^***		−0.000298^**		−0.000219^*		−0.000353^***		−0.000317^**		−0.000231^**
Age of spouse square	(−2.699)		(−2.109)		(−1.944)		(−2.750)		(−2.217)		(−2.004)
Age of head	−0.000578		−0.00105		−3.72 × 10⁻⁵		−0.000459		−0.000764		8.73 × 10⁻⁵
Age of head	(−0.504)		(−0.743)		(−0.0339)		(−0.380)		(−0.526)		(0.0740)
Number of additional adults	−0.00560		−0.00334		−0.00611		−0.00336		0.000473		−0.00407
Number of additional adults	(−0.539)		(−0.305)		(−0.659)		(−0.316)		(0.0427)		(−0.420)
Observations	2295	2295	1690	1690	1564	1564	2233	2233	1646	1646	1517	1517
Pseudo R2	0.0863	0.0127	0.103	0.0156	0.108	0.0111	0.0841	0.0111	0.101	0.0148	0.106	0.0105

Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ^***p < 0.01, ^**p < 0.05, ^*p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–15. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–15.

Table 7A:

Marginal probit estimates for all families and married families with more than one child age 2–15.

Variables	All families with more than one child age 2–15						Married families with more than one child age 2–15
	Post reform survey(s)						Post reform survey(s)
	FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97		FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post reform	−0.00802	−0.0145	−0.000896	−0.0152			−0.00551	−0.0135	0.00145	−0.0142
1990/91 dummy	(−0.545)	(−1.253)	(−0.0535)	(−1.252)			(−0.358)	(−1.144)	(0.0847)	(−1.144)
Post reform	−0.0113	−0.0182			−0.0183	−0.0196	−0.00849	−0.0171			−0.0171	−0.0183
1996/97 dummy	(−0.801)	(−1.501)			(−1.490)	(−1.500)	(−0.571)	(−1.377)			(−1.303)	(−1.377)
Post91^*Has three children age 2–15 dummy	0.0158	0.0150	0.0139	0.0153			0.0143	0.0144	0.0128	0.0146
Post91^*Has three children age 2–15 dummy	(0.645)	(0.499)	(0.588)	(0.499)			(0.583)	(0.473)	(0.540)	(0.473)
Post91^*Has more than	0.00901	0.0439	0.00729	0.0448			0.00670	0.0403	0.00469	0.0409
three children age 2–15 dummy	(0.264)	(0.856)	(0.220)	(0.856)			(0.196)	(0.785)	(0.143)	(0.785)
Post96^*Has	0.0796^**	0.0682^*			0.0699^**	0.0688^*	0.0800^**	0.0694^*			0.0734^**	0.0698^*
three children age 2–15 dummy	(2.314)	(1.831)			(2.532)	(1.831)	(2.281)	(1.829)			(2.530)	(1.829)
Post96^*Has more than	−0.0243	−0.0215			−0.0165	−0.0225	−0.0252	−0.0242			−0.0179	−0.0252
three children age 2–15 dummy	(−1.051)	(−0.614)			(−0.911)	(−0.614)	(−1.080)	(−0.696)			(−0.950)	(−0.696)
Has three children	−0.0465^*	−0.0383^**	−0.0531^**	−0.0394^**	−0.0335	−0.0394^**	−0.0471^*	−0.0380^**	−0.0518^**	−0.0389^**	−0.0294^***	−0.0390^**
age 2–15 dummy	(−1.911)	(−2.446)	(−2.091)	(−2.445)	(−1.416)	(−2.445)	(−1.904)	(−2.378)	(−2.032)	(−2.378)	(−2.867)	(−2.378)
Has more than three children	−0.0230	−0.00195	−0.0322	−0.00199	−0.0151	−0.00202	−0.0233	0.00114	−0.0301	0.00116	−0.000228	0.00117
age 2–15 dummy	(−0.466)	(−0.0732)	(−0.753)	(−0.0732)	(−0.293)	(−0.0732)	(−0.461)	(0.0410)	(−0.664)	(0.0410)	(−0.00912)	(0.0410)
Number of children age 2–5	0.0251		0.0357		0.00873		0.0269		0.0342
Number of children age 2–5	(0.814)		(1.037)		(0.267)		(0.861)		(1.007)
Number of children age 6–15	0.0322		0.0438		0.0183		0.0344		0.0425		0.0103^*
Number of children age 6–15	(1.072)		(1.300)		(0.573)		(1.124)		(1.281)		(1.776)
Number of children age 2–5^*Number	−0.0115^**		−0.0115^**		−0.00296		−0.0126^**		−0.0126^**		−0.00362
of children age 6–15	(−2.257)		(−1.981)		(−0.613)		(−2.437)		(−2.173)		(−0.804)
Sex ratio index	0.0897		−0.526		−0.0492		0.132		−0.414		−0.0423
Sex ratio index	(0.137)		(−0.613)		(−0.0931)		(0.194)		(−0.472)		(−0.0757)
Has two children with same sex	0.00667		0.00652		0.00855		0.00425		0.00340		0.00619
Has two children with same sex	(0.755)		(0.662)		(1.047)		(0.476)		(0.344)		(0.735)
Log real household income	0.00707		0.00448		0.0111^**		0.00396		−0.000751		0.00871
Log real household income	(1.210)		(0.686)		(2.025)		(0.629)		(−0.103)		(1.436)
Couple household	0.0282^*		0.0235		0.0153
Couple household	(1.646)		(1.092)		(0.932)
Working spouse	−0.0194^***		−0.0208^**		−0.0159^**		−0.0197^***		−0.0209^**		−0.0166^**
Working spouse	(−2.726)		(−2.535)		(−2.426)		(−2.718)		(−2.527)		(−2.432)
Age of spouse	0.00112		0.000766		−0.00125		0.00109		0.000734		−0.00139
Age of spouse	(0.466)		(0.283)		(−0.602)		(0.447)		(0.269)		(−0.646)
Age of spouse square	−0.000376^***		−0.000364^**		−0.000188^*		−0.000389^***		−0.000386^**		−0.000200^*
Age of spouse square	(−2.854)		(−2.410)		(−1.669)		(−2.912)		(−2.533)		(−1.734)
Age of head	−0.000871		−0.00144		−6.01 × 10⁻⁵		−0.000757		−0.00111		4.24 × 10⁻⁵
Age of head	(−0.795)		(−1.051)		(−0.0591)		(−0.657)		(−0.794)		(0.0382)
Observations	2471	2471	1791	1791	1698	1698	2404	2404	1743	1743	1647	1647
Pseudo R2	0.0975	0.0136	0.112	0.0162	0.113	0.0126	0.0966	0.0131	0.113	0.0157	0.111	0.0121

Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ^***p < 0.01, ^**p < 0.05, ^*p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–15. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–15. The estimate of the number of additional adults in the family is insignificant across all specifications.

Table 8A:

Marginal probit estimates – all families and married families without and with children age 2–15.

Variables	All families						Married families
	Post reform survey(s)						Post reform survey(s)
	FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97		FES 90/91 & FES 96/97		FES 90/91		FES 96/97
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post reform	−0.0230	−0.0224	−0.0253	−0.0241			−0.0240	−0.0216	−0.0257	−0.0232
1990/91 dummy	(−1.624)	(−1.253)	(−1.500)	(−1.253)			(−1.506)	(−1.144)	(−1.363)	(−1.144)
Post reform	−0.0240^*	−0.0282			−0.0289^*	−0.0301	−0.0242	−0.0275			−0.0289	−0.0289
1996/97 dummy	(−1.706)	(−1.501)			(−1.729)	(−1.501)	(−1.524)	(−1.377)			(−1.581)	(−1.377)
Post91^*Has no child	−0.0178	−0.0193	−0.0195	−0.0204			−0.0183	−0.0141	−0.0197	−0.0149
age 2–15 dummy	(−1.161)	(−0.783)	(−1.178)	(−0.783)			(−1.023)	(−0.512)	(−1.030)	(−0.512)
Post91^*Has one child	−0.000423	0.00949	0.000348	0.00997			−0.00234	0.00885	−0.00173	0.00929
age 2–15 dummy	(−0.0265)	(0.380)	(0.0202)	(0.380)			(−0.134)	(0.336)	(−0.0921)	(0.336)
Post91^*Has three children	0.0167	0.0229	0.0170	0.0240			0.0149	0.0226	0.0153	0.0237
age 2–15 dummy	(0.560)	(0.499)	(0.539)	(0.499)			(0.461)	(0.473)	(0.448)	(0.473)
Post91^*Has more than three	0.00287	0.0645	0.00467	0.0675			−3.09 × 10⁻⁵	0.0611	0.00167	0.0638
children age 2–15 dummy	(0.0697)	(0.856)	(0.105)	(0.856)			(−0.000693)	(0.785)	(0.0349)	(0.785)
Post96^*Has no child	−0.00180	0.00525			−0.00512	0.00540	0.000403	0.0105			−0.00296	0.0108
age 2–15 dummy	(−0.0990)	(0.187)			(−0.280)	(0.187)	(0.0189)	(0.338)			(−0.141)	(0.338)
Post96^*Has one child	−0.0172	−0.0340			−0.0202	−0.0356	−0.0229	−0.0400^*			−0.0253	−0.0417^*
age 2–15 dummy	(−1.145)	(−1.490)			(−1.313)	(−1.490)	(−1.412)	(−1.685)			(−1.555)	(−1.685)
Post96^*Has three children	0.0994^**	0.1000^*			0.111^**	0.102^*	0.101^**	0.104^*			0.111^**	0.105^*
age 2–15 dummy	(2.317)	(1.831)			(2.491)	(1.831)	(2.198)	(1.829)			(2.380)	(1.829)
Post96^*More than three	−0.0310	−0.0340			−0.0284	−0.0352	−0.0364	−0.0397			−0.0331	−0.0409
children age 2–15 dummy	(−1.079)	(−0.614)			(−0.890)	(−0.614)	(−1.159)	(−0.696)			(−0.983)	(−0.696)
Has no children	0.709^***	0.0888^***	0.670^***	0.0931^***	0.722^***	0.0914^***	0.774^***	0.139^***	0.733^***	0.145^***	0.782^***	0.142^***
age 2–15 dummy	(5.528)	(4.577)	(4.159)	(4.577)	(4.615)	(4.577)	(5.608)	(5.998)	(4.240)	(5.998)	(4.715)	(5.998)
Has one children	0.330^***	0.124^***	0.315^***	0.129^***	0.347^***	0.126^***	0.349^***	0.138^***	0.334^***	0.144^***	0.361^***	0.140^***
age 2–15 dummy	(6.411)	(6.854)	(4.972)	(6.854)	(5.588)	(6.854)	(6.459)	(7.167)	(5.024)	(7.166)	(5.641)	(7.166)
Has three children	−0.0622^***	−0.0557^**	−0.0649^***	−0.0590^**	−0.0643^***	−0.0573^**	−0.0707^***	−0.0577^**	−0.0736^***	−0.0612^**	−0.0711^***	−0.0590^**
age 2–15 dummy	(−4.207)	(−2.446)	(−3.340)	(−2.446)	(−3.896)	(−2.446)	(−4.142)	(−2.378)	(−3.319)	(−2.378)	(−3.880)	(−2.378)
Has more than three children	−0.0498^**	−0.00300	−0.0513	−0.00316	−0.0531^**	−0.00309	−0.0563^**	0.00181	−0.0575	0.00190	−0.0582^**	0.00185
age 2–15 dummy	(−2.164)	(−0.0732)	(−1.560)	(−0.0732)	(−2.080)	(−0.0732)	(−2.122)	(0.0410)	(−1.538)	(0.0410)	(−2.059)	(0.0410)
Number of children	0.0810^***		0.0779^**		0.0796^**		0.0904^***		0.0858^**		0.0871^***
age 2–5	(3.250)		(2.327)		(2.553)		(3.281)		(2.343)		(2.601)
Number of children	0.0924^***		0.0885^***		0.0979^***		0.102^***		0.0975^***		0.106^***
age 6–15	(3.768)		(2.687)		(3.185)		(3.771)		(2.707)		(3.202)
Number of children	−0.0170^***		−0.0184^***		−0.0107		−0.0196^***		−0.0210^***		−0.0125^*
2–5^*No. Of children 6–15	(−2.979)		(−2.590)		(−1.549)		(−3.102)		(−2.697)		(−1.670)
Sex ratio index	0.617		0.783		0.396		0.842^*		0.959		0.591
Sex ratio index	(1.456)		(1.255)		(0.887)		(1.767)		(1.359)		(1.198)
Has two children	0.00854		0.00971		0.0149		0.00398		0.00328		0.00837
with same sex	(0.765)		(0.713)		(1.073)		(0.332)		(0.226)		(0.583)
Log real	0.00702		0.00717		0.00616		0.00979^*		0.00946		0.00944
household income	(1.511)		(1.237)		(1.037)		(1.798)		(1.383)		(1.389)
Couple household	0.0632^***		0.0675^***		0.0625^***
Couple household	(7.973)		(6.724)		(6.634)
Working spouse	−0.0269^***		−0.0294^***		−0.0246^***		−0.0312^***		−0.0340^***		−0.0280^***
Working spouse	(−4.671)		(−4.213)		(−3.474)		(−4.763)		(−4.311)		(−3.573)
Age of spouse	0.00176		0.00177		0.00142		0.00231		0.00246		0.00194
Age of spouse	(1.356)		(1.127)		(0.897)		(1.596)		(1.414)		(1.136)
Age of spouse square	−0.000624^***		−0.000668^***		−0.000648^***		−0.000723^***		−0.000772^***		−0.000747^***
Age of spouse square	(−7.508)		(−6.510)		(−6.615)		(−7.850)		(−6.834)		(−7.104)
Age of head	−0.000904		−0.000518		−0.00153		−0.000844		−0.000570		−0.00138
Age of head	(−1.163)		(−0.486)		(−1.637)		(−0.923)		(−0.451)		(−1.277)
Number of additional adults	0.00476		0.00541		0.0130^*		0.00641		0.00761		0.0164^**
Number of additional adults	(0.730)		(0.672)		(1.911)		(0.845)		(0.821)		(2.133)
Observations	4810	4810	3484	3484	3341	3341	4378	4378	3175	3175	3051	3051
Pseudo R2	0.251	0.0558	0.255	0.0600	0.255	0.0543	0.245	0.0689	0.249	0.0721	0.253	0.0684

Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. ^***p < 0.01, ^**p < 0.05, ^*p < 0.1. In specifications 1–6, the reference is the family with two children age 2–15. In specifications 7–12, the reference is the married family with two children age 2–15.

Table 9A:

Standard and recursive bivariate probit estimates.

	Birth probability				Working probability
	Recursive		Standard		Recursive		Standard
	Marginal	z	Marginal	z	Marginal	z	Marginal	z
Working spouse	−0.1238	−2.05
Sex ratio index	1.2063	2.53	1.1169	2.38	0.4246	0.34	0.4061	0.32
Post reform 1990/91 dummy	−0.0370	−2.56	−0.0430	−3.15	0.0491	1.45	0.0520	1.54
Post reform 1996/97 dummy	−0.0359	−2.87	−0.0400	−3.72	−0.0276	−0.48	−0.0052	−0.09
Post91^*Had no child age 2–17 dummy	−0.0279	−2.05	−0.0214	−1.72	−0.0614	−1.29	−0.0599	−1.25
Post91^*Has one age 2–17 dummy	−0.0032	−0.20	−0.0065	−0.48	0.0422	1.09	0.0428	1.11
Post91^*Has three children age 2–17 dummy	0.0153	0.51	0.0136	0.48	0.0053	0.12	0.0064	0.15
Post91^*Has more than three children age 2–17 dummy	0.0118	0.26	0.0184	0.39	−0.0772	−0.93	−0.0756	−0.90
Post96^*Had no child age 2–17 dummy	0.0000	0.00	0.0007	0.03	0.0003	0.00	0.0048	0.08
Post96^*Has one age 2–17 dummy	−0.0146	−0.85	−0.0174	−1.19	0.0654	1.37	0.0626	1.32
Post96^*Has three children age 2–17 dummy	0.0919	2.08	0.0808	1.95	0.0391	0.72	0.0390	0.72
Post96^*Has more than three children age 2–17 dummy	−0.0449	−2.24	−0.0349	−1.79	−0.1796	−2.17	−0.1800	−2.16
Has no child age 2–17 dummy	0.2583	6.51	0.2427	6.46	0.0367	1.02	0.0350	0.96
Has one child age 2–17 dummy	0.1513	6.25	0.1463	6.49	−0.0040	−0.13	−0.0037	−0.12
Has three children age 2–17 dummy	−0.0497	−3.43	−0.0407	−3.58	−0.0906	−2.59	−0.0916	−2.62
Has more than three children age 2–17 dummy	−0.0038	−0.12	0.0074	0.23	−0.1059	−1.70	−0.1059	−1.69
Log real household income	0.0154	2.55	0.0117	2.49	−0.1777	−2.04	−0.1363	−1.63
Square log real household income					0.0119	2.33	0.0095	1.93
Age of spouse	−0.0031	−4.22	−0.0041	−4.78	0.0132	5.92	0.0132	5.88
Age of spouse square	−0.0008	−4.85	−0.0006	−8.91	−0.0008	−5.22	−0.0008	−5.20
No. of additional adults	−0.0022	−0.29	−0.0049	−0.68	0.0289	2.54	0.0283	2.54
Living in rural area	0.0155	1.86	0.0240	3.01	−0.1212	−5.38	−0.1255	−5.92
Working husband	−0.0714	−1.79	−0.0817	−2.02	0.0764	1.52	0.0752	1.52
Age of husband			0.0002	0.23	−0.0060	−2.94	−0.0062	−2.99
Age of spouse_rural dummy			0.0001	0.07	0.0081	3.84	0.0085	4.29
Correlation parameter (rho)	0.3944		−0.1802
P-value	0.2108		0
Number of observations	5705		5705

Note: The reference is the married family with two children age 2–17.

Figure 1A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 20–24.

Note: Individuals born between 1965–1969 were of age 20–24 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 20–24 over the number of males and females of age 20–24.

Figure 2A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 25–29.

Note: Individuals born between 1960–1964 were of age 25–29 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 25–29 over the number of males and females of age 25–29.

Figure 3A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 30–34.

Note: Individuals born between 1955–1959 were of age 30–34 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 30–34 over the number of males and females of age 30–34.

Figure 4A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 35–39.

Note: Individuals born between 1950–1954 were of age 35–39 at the time of the child benefit reform. The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 35–39 over the number of males and females of age 35–39.

Figure 5A:

Sex Ratio Index: Age 0–4.

Note: The sex ratio index is defined as the number of males of age 0–4 over the number of males and females of age 0–4.

Figure 6A:

Mean Age of Female of Giving Birth to First Child.

Note: In Figures 1A–6A, the very thick lines show the year of the independence (1960) and war (1974). The lighter thick line shows the introduction of child benefits (1988). The lighter lines show the years of the FES individual data (1984/85, 1990/91, 1996/97). The data after 1974 refer to the area controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Sources:Figures 1A–6A are based on the OECD database; Figure 6A is based on Demographic Reports, CYSTAT, Cyprus.

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Received: 2020-06-01

Revised: 2021-04-07

Accepted: 2021-04-14

Published Online: 2021-05-11

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Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2020-0165

Keywords for this article

fertility; child benefits; financial incentives; unbalanced sex ratios; female labour force participation