Parental Transfers, Intra-household Bargaining and Fertility Decision

Emin Gahramanov; Khusrav Gaibulloev; Javed Younas

doi:10.1515/bejeap-2018-0118

Article

Parental Transfers, Intra-household Bargaining and Fertility Decision

Emin Gahramanov , Khusrav Gaibulloev and Javed Younas

Published/Copyright: October 12, 2018

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From the journal The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Volume 19 Issue 1

Abstract

This paper examines the role of parental transfers on family size. We introduce a simple theoretical model of fertility decision where preferences towards children may differ between female and male spouses. Parental transfers increase both the household income and the bargaining power of the recipient spouse. Therefore, transfers from wife’s and husband’s parents may have dissimilar effects on the number of children. Our empirical result, based on a unique household-level data for Japan, supports this hypothesis. In particular, received transfers from the wife’s parents are negatively associated with the demand for children. In contrast, both received and expected transfers from the husband’s parents are positively associated with the demand for children. These results hold important policy implications.

Keywords: family size; fertility; parental transfers; bargaining power; collective framework; quantity-quality model

JEL Classification: D10; D64; J13

Acknowledgements

We acknowledge the Osaka University program’s contributors Yoshiro Tsutsui, Fumio Ohtake and Shinsuke Ikeda. We are indebted to Editor Mariapia Mendola, two anonymous referees, Charles Horioka, participants of a seminar held at the American University of Sharjah, the 2018 Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, and the 38th Middle East Economic Association Annual Meeting for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are our own.

A Appendix

Table 6:

Descriptive statistics: holding the sample size constant.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of children	1,831	2.10	0.79	0	5
Transfer Rec.	1,831	0.47	0.50	0	1
Transfer Exp.	1,831	0.33	0.47	0	1
Transfer Rec. (W)	1,831	0.23	0.42	0	1
Transfer Rec. (H)	1,831	0.33	0.47	0	1
Transfer Exp. (W)	1,831	0.17	0.37	0	1
Transfer Exp. (H)	1,831	0.23	0.42	0	1
Marriage duration	1,831	34.12	8.55	1	56
Net wealth	1,831	34.47	37.05	−31.25	200
Below high school (W)	1,831	0.13	0.34	0	1
High school (W)	1,831	0.57	0.50	0	1
Associate (W)	1,831	0.20	0.40	0	1
Bach. or higher (W)	1,831	0.10	0.31	0	1
Below high sch. (H)	1,831	0.16	0.36	0	1
High school (H)	1,831	0.45	0.50	0	1
Associate (H)	1,831	0.05	0.22	0	1
Bach. or higher (H)	1,831	0.34	0.47	0	1
Religiosity	1,831	1.96	1.13	1	5

Notes: H stands for husband and W denotes wife. Abbreviations Rec., Exp. and Bach. stand for “received,” “expected” and “bachelor,” respectively.

Table 7:

Poisson regressions: holding the sample size constant.

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Transfer Rec.	−0.006
	(0.018)
Transfer Exp.	0.032
	(0.021)
Transfer Rec. (W)		−0.060***		−0.057***	−0.051**
		(0.021)		(0.022)	(0.022)
Transfer Rec. (H)		0.034*		0.031*	0.036**
		(0.018)		(0.018)	(0.018)
Transfer Exp. (W)			−0.012	−0.003	−0.002
			(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Transfer Exp. (H)			0.049**	0.043*	0.044**
			(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Marriage duration	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Net wealth					−0.001***
					(0.000)
High school (W)	0.063*	0.069**	0.064*	0.068**	0.073**
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Associate (W)	0.086**	0.098**	0.090**	0.097**	0.104**
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Bach. or higher (W)	0.094**	0.111**	0.096**	0.107**	0.121**
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)
High school (H)	−0.017	−0.018	−0.019	−0.020	−0.015
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Associate (H)	0.074	0.074	0.071	0.072	0.079
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Bach. or higher (H)	−0.017	−0.013	−0.020	−0.020	−0.007
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Religiosity	0.017**	0.017**	0.018**	0.017**	0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.441***	0.457***	0.442***	0.437***	0.420***
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.064)
N	1,831	1,831	1,831	1,831	1,831

Notes: Significance levels: *** is <0.01, ** is <0.05 and * is <0.10. Huber/White robust standard errors are in parentheses. H stands for husband and W denotes wife. Abbreviations Rec., Exp. and Bach. stand for “received,” “expected” and “bachelor,” respectively.

Table 8:

Poisson regressions: robustness analyses.

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Transfer Rec. (W)	−0.048**	−0.041*	−0.035
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Transfer Rec. (H)	0.037**	0.033*	0.032*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Transfer Exp. (W)	−0.001	−0.015	−0.004
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Transfer Exp. (H)	0.042*	0.015	0.018
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Inter vivos Rec. (W)				−0.060**	−0.055**
				(0.028)	(0.028)
Inter vivos Rec. (H)				0.069***	0.055**
				(0.025)	(0.026)
Inter vivos Exp. (W)					−0.048
					(0.059)
Inter vivos Exp. (H)					0.080*
					(0.045)
Marriage duration	0.008***	0.022***	0.022***	0.006***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Net wealth		−0.000	−0.000	−0.001***	−0.001***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wealth index	−0.012***
	(0.002)
Age (W)		−0.023***	−0.026***
		(0.004)	(0.004)
Age (H)			0.004
			(0.004)
High school (W)	0.075**	0.047	0.036	0.084**	0.091**
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Associate (W)	0.107**	0.082*	0.065	0.109**	0.119***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Bach. or higher (W)	0.125***	0.105**	0.090*	0.136***	0.142***
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.051)
High school (H)	−0.013	−0.019	−0.000	−0.037	−0.041
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Associate (H)	0.087*	0.077	0.074	0.081	0.068
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Bach. or higher (H)	0.000	−0.009	0.009	−0.040	−0.044
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Religiosity	0.015*	0.021***	0.023***	0.023***	0.021**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	0.407***	1.309***	1.267***	0.453***	0.442***
	(0.064)	(0.133)	(0.159)	(0.065)	(0.066)
N	1,831	1,831	1,725	1,676	1,657

Notes: Significance levels: *** is <0.01, ** is <0.05 and * is <0.10. Huber/White robust standard errors are in parentheses. H stands for husband and W denotes wife. Abbreviations Rec., Exp. and Bach. stand for “received,” “expected” and “bachelor,” respectively.

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This research uses micro-data from the Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University’s twenty-first Century COE Program “Behavioral Macrodynamics Based on Surveys and Experiments” and its Global COE project “Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics.”

Published Online: 2018-10-12

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Keywords for this article

family size; fertility; parental transfers; bargaining power; collective framework; quantity-quality model