Workplaces as Schools of Democratic Resilience? Conceptual Considerations About the Spillover Effect

1 Introduction

Democracy is not only a form of state or government; it is also a form of life and social interaction (Dewey 1916/2015). How people behave towards others, towards society and in the political sphere depends at least partly on their everyday experiences like those made in the workplace. Studies on the socialisation of individuals show that we can learn and train competences for a democratic culture where we spend large parts of our lives. Therefore, the everyday experiences of citizens are important for their political values, their behaviour, their attitudes and their engagement, and thus for the quality of a democracy as a whole (Pickel, Breustedt, and Smolka 2016, 653; Norris 2011; Pausch 2012, 6–7). Especially in times of democratic crisis (Przeworski 2019; Ercan and Gagnon 2014), it is vital for democratic states that their citizens are competent for a democratic culture. However, they must also be resilient and ready to defend democratic principles. To avoid threats from anti-democratic phenomena and actors, both institutions and citizens need democratic resilience (Merkel and Lührmann 2021, 870–1).

The present article focuses on the urgent need for democratic resilience in the 21st century. Firstly, democratic resilience must be emphasised more strongly in theories of democracy. Secondly, it must be incorporated into models of democratic competences, such as that of the Council of Europe. Thirdly, it must be discussed in connection with the spillover from the workplace to politics.

I argue that, in the 21st century, which has so far been characterised by a wave of autocratisation (Freedom House 2022), democratically competent citizens must be able to withstand authoritarian populists and develop democratic resilience. The starting assumption of the present article is that our everyday experiences have an important effect on our political values, attitudes and behaviour, as argued by various thinkers have argued and shown by socialisation studies ([Dewey 1916/2015]; Fromm 1947; Pateman 1970; Putnam 1994; Ryan and Turner 2021). Pateman (1970), and more recently Rybnikova (2022, 7), described this as the spillover effect of workplace democracy, meaning that those who experience themselves as self-efficient in everyday life, who can participate in decisions and co-determine important issues in mutual respect with others, are more likely to develop democratic competences. In the reality of our working relations, however, experiences of self-efficacy, participation, dialogue on an equal footing, etc. remain rare. Therefore, everyday experiences on the job hardly enable us to strengthen our democratic competences. Consequently, the same applies to democratic resilience, which would be particularly important in the present crisis of democracy and functional for resistance against authoritarianism at the political level.

I start by briefly describing the socialisation theory of authoritarian and mature personalities and a new model of democratic competences, to which I add conceptual considerations about democratic resilience. As the conceptualisation of democratic resilience is still a relatively young field, I propose a more concrete definition of the various dimensions of resilience. I then describe obstacles to experiencing democracy in the workplace. Finally, I suggest a concept for workplaces that help strengthen democratic resilience.

2 Theoretical Considerations on Democratic Competences and Resilience

How and why people develop democratic competences are complex questions. Human needs, fears and interests are relevant and it is widely agreed socialisation plays an important role in this process. Social psychology provides plausible explanations. In the early 20th century, the Frankfurt School set itself the goal of combining psychological assumptions with sociological theories. Erich Fromm’s theories on human personality and the influence of the social context are groundbreaking and remain a point of reference today (Sakurai 2020, 2024; Amlinger and Nachtwey 2022).

Fromm assumed that every human being has two fundamental needs: one for freedom, autonomy, individuality and one for belonging, security and conformity. The desire for freedom and autonomy is juxtaposed with the desire for security and belonging (Fromm 1947, 159–60). These two needs cannot always be satisfied at the same time and it is often necessary to choose one over the other. Fromm further distinguished between the authoritarian personality and the mature personality. A mature personality unites both needs and can find a balance between freedom and security. It is reason-oriented and turned towards the world, humanistic and open to dialogue. Authoritarian personalities, on the other hand, are afraid of freedom and escape from it. Independence is perceived as a threat. They are characterised by a blind faith in authority, subservience to the stronger, and the oppression of the weaker (ibid. 1947, 179–80). The phenomenon of authoritarianism manifests itself in both an active form – that is, taking pleasure in the oppression of others – and a passive form – taking pleasure in submitting to something or someone. The passive authoritarian character long to be part of something bigger, such as a nation, a culture, an idea, etc. This makes them the perfect target for populists, who are active authoritarian personalities and want to “eat up others” (Fromm 1957, 2). What is crucial is that every person has both the need for individuality and the need for conformity and that, consequently, every person can develop, in one direction or the other, an authoritarian or a mature personality. Fromm further argued that the development towards one direction or the other depends on the economic, social and political context and the life experiences. In this context, he referred to a social character or the “socially typical character” of a class or a society (Fromm 1992, 222).

His reference to economic structures is particularly relevant to our question about the influence of experiences at the workplace. The authoritarian personality, as described by Fromm, is unable to cope with democratic conditions due to its fear of freedom. A mature personality, on the other hand, is able to deal with this freedom, to grant it to others and to rebel against authoritarianism. This is where Fromm’s theory meets the ideas of the French–Algerian philosopher Albert Camus on rebellion. According to Camus, the path to freedom and to life depends on a non-violent, life-affirming revolt that, in addition to a metaphysical dimension that is less relevant to us, is directed against all forms of oppression. Camus addressed this in his works on historical revolts and revolutions, on political ideologies and utopias (Camus 1954), and in many other texts (Camus 1997), from which we can derive a democratic theory of rebellion (Pausch 2019). Democracy is inextricably linked to the idea of resistance and non-violent rebellion and begins where people rebel against injustice and coercion. Being able to speak out without being punished is one of its basic principles. We will come back to the importance of rebellion for democratic competence and democratic resilience later.

Fromm’s theses on social character fit perfectly with the theory of participation formulated by Carole Pateman in the 1970s (Pateman 1970). Independently of each other, but with very similar arguments, Fromm and Pateman advocated a democratisation of labour relations and working conditions. If people’s experiences in their everyday lives have an effect on their political attitudes and behaviour, then the democratisation of work is in the interests of free societies. Experiences and education are decisive for the development of democratic competences.

This leads us to the question of what it really means to be a mature personality with democratic competences. How should we imagine a democratic, mature citizen? Fromm, Pateman and Camus provided a few examples. Fromm’s mature personality is able to love others, to use their rationality, to act freely (Fromm 1947). Camus’ rebel fights against injustice and is solidary to all humans due to a shared existential experience (Camus 1954, 28). What is important to both thinkers is resistance to authoritarianism as a central characteristic of democratic competence and maturity. However, it is precisely this aspect that is neglected in most theories of democracy. Schumpeter (2010) was concerned with regular elections and the selection of rulers, Dahl (2008) with participation and civil liberties, Rawls with questions of justice and Habermas with deliberative quality and equal communication. While Laclau and Mouffe (2014) and other post-structuralists (Leggett 2013) or post-Marxists (Mouffe 1995) emphasised counter-hegemonic dynamics, critical opposition and deconstruction (Derrida 2020), they were less concerned with individual subjects and their competences than with collective forms of resistance. On the contrary, and as argued elsewhere, I emphasise that individual and collective rebellion against authoritarianism – based on Camus’ and Fromm’s reflections described above – is at the heart of democracy (Pausch 2019, 91–2).

Based on this theoretical argumentation, we can now analyse recent approaches to democratic citizenship education that have attempted a more precise definition of democratic competences. Unsurprisingly, and similar to democratic theory, we find few references to resilience or resistance to anti-democratic tendencies. In 2018, the Council of Europe introduced a new model of citizenship education in its Framework of Reference for the Competences of Democratic Culture (Council of Europe 2018). The authors emphasised the importance of a holistic approach with the aim of facilitating active participation in the debates and decision-making processes of pluralistic democracies and complex societies. They tended to take an eclectic approach and did not refer directly to the theoretical traditions of democratic thinking. On the other hand, they did address earlier resolutions of the Council of Europe and referred, for example, to the principles of human rights education (ibid., 14). It is fair to say that the concept is not based on any recognisable democratic theory, but on different elements – a problem that we are familiar with in citizenship education as a whole. However, this deficit does not make such models any less influential. After all, they are used as a basis for citizenship education in schools and other educational concepts.

In the framework, the essential dimensions of a democratic culture are divided into values, attitudes, skills, knowledge and critical understanding. The values include human dignity and human rights, cultural diversity, democracy, justice, fairness, equality and the rule of law. The dimension of ‘attitudes’ includes ‘openness to cultural otherness and other beliefs, world views and practices’, ‘respect’, ‘civic-mindedness’, ‘responsibility’, ‘self-efficacy‘ and ‘tolerance of ambiguity’. The abilities are composed of ‘autonomous learning skills’, ‘analytical and critical thinking’, ‘ability to listen and perceive things’, ‘empathy’, ‘flexibility and adaptability’, ‘linguistic, communicative and plurilingual abilities’, ‘co-operation skills’ and ‘conflict resolution skills’. The last dimension, ‘knowledge and critical thinking’, is made up of ‘knowledge and critical self-understanding’, ‘knowledge and critical understanding of language and communication’ and ‘knowledge and critical understanding of the world’ (38).

No fundamental hierarchy emerges from the list of these competences for a democratic culture. In principle, they are all equally important. We cannot say with certainty whether Fromm, Camus and Pateman would be satisfied with this list, but it seems at least plausible that the values and competences mentioned fit with their ideas. While they do provide a useful basis and broaden the debate on democratic competences, they neglect the dimension of democratic resilience. They are primarily aimed at enabling citizens to exercise their rights and actively participate within existing and functioning democratic systems. What they do not address, or address only very marginally, is the defence of democracy when it is threatened. Thus, the democratic resilience of citizens is not sufficiently considered in this concept. There is no explicit mention of rebellion against authoritarianism; that is at the core of democratic resilience. Under the current circumstances of autocratisation, this indicates a desideratum. It is not enough to have democratically competent citizens – they must also be democratically resilient. To do that, they need to possess the abilities described by Fromm and Camus in relation to revolt and resistance to authoritarianism. Therefore, they would have to learn to say no and, in solidarity with others, be prepared to defend democracy. Solidarity is of central importance here as a value. Camus said: “I rebel, therefore we exist” (Camus 1954, 28). For him, rebellion is inextricably linked to human solidarity, which arises from the shared existential experience of alienation and loneliness in the face of an absurd world. For Camus, a protest motivated by mere self-interest is not a rebellion.

Before discussing the relationship between the Council of Europe’s competence model and the concept of democratic resilience, a closer look at the conditions in the workplace is necessary.

3 Experiences of Democracy in the Workplace

In most phases of human history, there have been oppressors and oppressed, free and unfree people. Even if one does not share Karl Marx’s historical materialism, it is hard to avoid this fact (Lucassen 2008; Stanojevic, Akkerman, and Manevska 2020). Power relations were usually expressed and reflected in labour relations. In early democracies, such as the ancient Attic polis, slaves without political rights did the work for free citizens who took care of public affairs (Pabst 2003). Medieval feudalism was based on the principle of serfdom and a strict hierarchy in which there was hardly a trace of equality or democracy (Fossier 2009; Evans 2016). Capitalism and industrialisation changed labour relations. The forms of feudal exploitation came to an end; instead, a class society developed in which capitalists exploited their workers, including women and children (Humphries 2013, 395–6). A democratic spillover effect from the world of work into the political sphere, as Carole Pateman and others assumed, could not take place under these circumstances. Revolt against oppression, as described by Albert Camus, could not be practised in such working conditions, because, if it did occur, it was met with harsh sanctions. It took long, hard struggles before workers movements and trade unions were able to win rights, including a reduction in working hours and other improvements in working conditions. Waves of democratisation (Huntington 1991), in which labour parties gained ground and welfare states emerged, led to the rise of a middle class in the 20th century (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kaufman 2004). However, despite the emergence of these welfare states in a few parts of the world, mainly in the liberal democracies of Europe, the democratisation of the world of work remained marginal at best. This becomes clear when we compare democratic processes at the state level with the structures and processes in companies. As Axel Honneth noted, despite certain quantitative improvements in the world of work, particularly in Europe and its trade union achievements such as reductions in working hours and wage increases, the qualitative dimension of work has remained largely the same. Subordination, dependency and, to some extent, exploitation are still central elements of the capitalist world of work, with its existential pressure to take paid employment (Honneth 2023, 305).

Comparing structures and processes between states and companies depends on which definition of democracy we start from. In the public perception, the concept of democracy is generally reduced to a form of majority government in which parties fight for votes of citizens at regular intervals in elections that are as free and fair as possible. This understanding of democracy, which the economist Joseph Schumpeter compared to free market processes (Schumpeter 2010), emphasises the competitive nature and marketing orientation of party democracy. Even if we use such minimum standards from political theory to define democracies, it becomes clear that the world of work did and does not fulfil them. Heads of companies, CEOs, managers, etc. are not elected by workers or employees. Usually, they cannot ‘remove’ their superiors as citizens can do with their government – something that was seen as minimal principle of democracy by Karl Popper (Popper 2013, 57). Democratic organisations would have to at least provide for a right of co-determination in relevant issues. They could be described as democratic only if their rules were based on the equal participation of all those affected and if these rules could be changed by them. This is usually not the case because it would imply the right to argue, agitate and revolt against prevailing rules to ultimately change them (Pausch 2019, 93). Therefore, companies usually do not fulfil the basic minimum principles of democracy.

If we use established measuring instruments to assess the quality of democracy, the discrepancy becomes particularly clear. According to V-Dem, one of the most sophisticated measures of democracy, or what Dahl called a polyarchy (Dahl 2008), we must consider five principles: the electoral principle (the core value that makes rulers responsive to their citizens), the liberal principle (which guarantees the protection of individual and minority rights), the participatory principle (which embodies the active participation), the deliberative principle (the idea of equal and reason-based dialogue at all levels), and the egalitarian principle (which aims to minimise material and immaterial inequalities) (Coppedge et al. 2019). It seems relatively clear that hardly any company could meet these criteria, even if some might approach them to some extent. If other instruments for measuring democracy such as Freedom House with a focus on civil liberties and political rights (Armstrong 2011) or the democracy barometer with its principles equality, freedom and control (Bühlmann et al. 2012, 115–6) were used, the results for the majority of companies would not be any different.

In the private sector in particular, structures and processes are usually organised in an autocratic manner, meaning that key decisions about the organisation are made by one or a few people, while employees have little opportunity to have a say or even to resist without sanctions (Ellerman 2009; Anderson 2017; Honneth 2023). This was summarised recently by Elisabeth Anderson, who referred to companies as private governments and dictatorships. She argued that regarding employees as free in the labour market is one of the biggest confusions in modern history. Employers regulate the working hours, location and activities of their employees, and they can also hire and fire them as they please, although in some countries they have to adhere to certain criteria when doing so (Anderson 2017; 2023).

Assuming that the vast majority of people spend a large part of their lives in employment, the dependencies are clear. In our jobs, we usually commit ourselves to doing certain activities at certain times and usually in certain places, with certain equipment and certain colleagues – and we can hardly influence or co-decide any of this. Resistance often ends in dismissal from the organisation. Therefore, from a political point of view, the corporate structure is, in many cases, designed as a dictatorship (Anderson 2023, 180), a tyranny or oligarchy, even if there are certain rights via trade union regulations or work councils.

Thus, work continues to be carried out for the most part in undemocratic conditions because, unlike the modern nation state, the organisations of our everyday lives were never fully democratised, although there are different grades of approximation to democracy. In general, there was no spillover effect from the political world, with parliamentarism, elections, and opposition, onto the economic world.

Enterprises have remained instruments of power for a small elite; that is, those actors who have access to leadership positions and can influence the decisions of the governing bodies (Abraham and Büschges 2004, 42). This situation is exacerbated by the fact that access to management positions is still a privilege of certain milieus (Stojmenovska, Steinmetz, and Volker 2021, 601). Studies show that the proportion of women and minorities in management jobs remains low in almost every country in the world, even the most progressive ones (cf. Hartmann 2018).

Hierarchies are structured at different levels and are usually based on the principle of controlling subordinates, while the heads or owners of the organisation are not, or are only weakly, controlled by their employees (Markowitz 1996; Bryson 2018). These relationships are closely linked to the overall social and political structures and cannot be viewed as isolated phenomena (Atzeni 2016; Piketty 2014). In a national economy based on dependent wage labour and gainful employment as well as individual profit, the corporate structure tends to be undemocratic. Profit maximisation is at the forefront of a profit-oriented company. Everything else is subordinate to this principle (Landemore and Ferreras 2016, 66). Following this logic, anything that could have a negative impact on profits must be eliminated. Therefore, controlling potential sources of disruption is the task of management (Vallas, Johnston, and Mommadova 2022, 436).

Basic democratic principles such as the right to revolt against oppression, criticism, dialogue, participation, doubt, etc. are – from a managerial perspective – sources of disruption in companies. Everything that is fraught with uncertainty poses a threat to profits and the ability to plan (Jürgens 1984, 62; Ratinho and Sarasvathy 2024). Therefore, in some countries employees are equipped with secondary power in their work through collectively achieved rights such as working time regulations, works councils and collective agreements, but apart from that they can hardly criticise and revolt without being sanctioned (Trinczek 2010; Rudman and Ellem 2024). Primary power within the company is generally distributed unequally in favour of the leadership and the management. Employees can only increase their power through their knowledge and competence monopolies, quasi through their market value (Malleson 2013, 604; Colton, Edenfield, and Holmes 2019, 59). In combination with exit options, this gives them a certain power (Pausch 2025). Overall and in most cases, however, they only have very limited influence on key issues in their working environment, such as income, working hours, company objectives and the hiring and firing of new employees.

For the most part, power in the company lies where the company’s social relationships are determined, which in turn depends on procedures, methods and framework conditions for the fulfilment of tasks and time sequences. The consequence of a power relationship for the person subject to power is individual insecurity, the potential of sanctions available to bosses ranges from dismissal to harassment and humiliation, against which there is usually little legal recourse (Hansen et al. 2006). The practice of implicit or explicit threats of sanctions against employees by their superiors is usually sufficient to nip resistance in the bud. A rebellion against authoritarianism hardly stands a chance in this context. The unequal power distribution includes rights and means of control – a control that is mainly top-down. Also, the possibilities for this control have increased significantly in recent decades thanks to technological innovations. The collection and storage of data, AI and digitalisation now make it possible to monitor employees almost seamlessly (Aloisi and Gramano 2019). When employees revolt and lose their jobs, the costs of challenging dismissals under labour law are often so high, both health-wise and financially, that submission is often preferable to resistance. The possible forms and effects of this submission include docility, lack of alternatives, acceptance, fear and resignation (cf. Therborn 1980, 94).

According to the theory of the spillover effect, these authoritarian experiences in the workplace are one possible explanation for the success of anti-democratic populists in the political context, especially in times of crisis (cf. Gerlsbeck and Herzog 2020; Herzog 2023). They can lead to authoritarianism being seen as a common, legitimate and incontrovertible form of behaviour, both in everyday life as well as in politics. As a result, citizens might view the dismantling of democracy, as we have been experiencing in many countries since 2005, as somewhat normal (Freedom House 2022).

Despite the overall undemocratic nature of companies as ‘private governments’ (Anderson 2017), employees can experience democracy at work under certain circumstances. It is not only the corporate structure that determines experiences, but also how superiors and teams deal with them. For example, if employees successfully protest against certain decisions made by superiors, show solidarity, stand up fight against discrimination and for equality, etc., then these experiences can strengthen democratic competences and even contribute to resilience (Flint-Taylor and Cooper 2017; Larsen and Broderick 2022).

4 Steps for Democratization of Work

Although we must assume that the world of work is not a place of democracy, neither in early modern capitalism nor in later global and neoliberal capitalism, there are gradual differences and examples that show the possibilities of democratising the world of work. If democratic competences are to be learned and practised in the workplace, democratic organisational structures and processes are needed. For the former, we are not yet talking about democratic resilience, even though it would plausibly also benefit from co-determination and experiences of participation in the workplace.

The most democratic organisations in the economic sphere are, without doubt, cooperatives. A worker cooperative is owned and managed by its workers, who participate equally in decision-making and are a kind of citizen in their company. The American thinker David Ellerman has studied various forms of cooperatives (2009; 2021). In workers’ cooperatives, democratic principles, including rebellion against authoritarian behaviour, are fulfilled because employees are shareholders and have equal rights. Many cooperatives are rather small in terms of the number of their members, but there are also big players, such as in the banking and insurance sectors (Mitra 2014; Dirninger 2022). The best-known example of a large cooperative is the Mondragon company based in Spain (Morla-Folch et al. 2021; Christiansen 2014). However, the idea of such an economy with only co-operatives on a global scale is difficult to imagine. Therefore, most scholars prefer to strengthen democratic principles in existing companies, regardless of their organisational form. We can distinguish between structural democratisation and participatory management, which in turn have an impact on everyday experiences and are relevant to the spillover effect.

There have been many concrete proposals for the implementation of workplace democracy in capitalist economies (Herzog 2022; Landemore 2022; Piketty 2022). In their book Democratizing Work, Isabelle Ferreras and her colleagues argued that employees should be seen as citizens and have corresponding rights. The authors called for a radical departure from the prevailing conditions in the workplaces of a neoliberal world. Therefore, the changes would have to have a strong political dimension and be made possible by laws (Ferreras, Julie Battilana, and Méda 2022).

Above all, the structural democratisation of companies involves strengthening workers’ rights. In the EU, there is a right to information and consultation in corporate decision-making. In some countries, especially in Scandinavia, but also Germany and Austria, various laws protect employees from the arbitrariness of their employers. They are also represented in committees and have voting rights on certain topics. Nevertheless, from a democratic theory perspective, these rights are not enough. If we take the ladder of participation developed by Arnstein (1969), for example, the discrepancies become apparent. According to Arnstein’s classification, there are several stages of potential participation. Information and consultation are relatively far down and only as precursors to real participation (Arnstein 1969, 217).

The democratisation of work should logically include a structural strengthening of workers’ rights, with more opportunities for them to have a say on crucial aspects such as pay, working hours, working conditions and corporate decisions. In order to come closer to a fundamental democratic principle, that of equality, questions of representation are also crucial at the structural level. Women and minorities in the workplace could be supported by quota regulations. In addition to granting and protecting rights, increasing co-determination at the workplace, and improving representation at the structural level, rights of control over superiors would also have to be expanded, as would, ultimately, the right to criticise them. Companies could also incorporate ideas from the field of democratic innovation when implementing workplace democracy at the structural level. In addition to sharing power through co-determination, elections, quotas and representation, lotteries could be used to enable mini-publics within a company (Landemore 2022, 53). In the Democratize Work manifesto, the authors also referred to particular challenges of the present day, ranging from globalisation and the ecological crisis to care work and other precarious professions that are affected by severe exploitation (Ferreras, Julie Battilana, and Méda 2022).

In management theories, the idea of participative leadership has developed and differentiated itself since the 1970s and 1980s (Estragó 2023; Bernstein 1976). It is clear from these theories that a company, like any organisation, can be managed and controlled in different ways. In conventional top-down management, input and decision-making are the responsibility of the managers or management bodies. In bottom-up processes, on the other hand, employees at all levels are equally involved in decision-making (Van der Vliet 2012, 12). An expansion of employee co-determination is conceivable in many areas. It ranges from voting on working hours and workplace design, salary schemes and budget allocation to profit sharing. Participatory management, if practised seriously, can increase transparency in an organisation as well as the possibilities for criticism, doubt, and contradiction without sanction, and above all, dialogue (Ruck 2021, 93–4).

Initiatives and concepts can be found not only in European trade unions, but all over the world. For the German Trade Union Confederation, improving co-determination is a central issue, especially in times of rapid change in the world of work (Telljohann 2022). It has been claimed that many companies do not want to allow the establishment of a works council, for example, or avoid or even ignore co-determination at board level (Telljohann 2022). Therefore, the German Trade Union DBG recommends an increase in the scope of co-determination at the workplace and emphasises the challenges of a new digitalised world of work. There are also new approaches in the more management-oriented track of corporate democratisation. In 2022, Traci Fenton, an American management consultant, published a book entitled ‘Freedom at Work’ (Fenton 2022). In this non-scientific but management-based work, she described how entrepreneurs can implement a strategy based on some democratic principles. While she did not fundamentally question ownership or call for cooperative structures, she did make some relatively far-reaching proposals that include elections, transparency and dialogue.

Others have pointed to the dynamic leadership models as democratic innovations. According to this view, democratic companies experiment with leadership. They give their employees the opportunity to debate, influence and co-decide company developments. Together with their employees, they ensure that the workload is balanced and that what has been earned is distributed fairly. Employees have significantly more say and freedom than in companies with a traditional top-down structure. Some young companies are even employee-managed. Diversity also plays an important role. However, it is not just about nationality, gender or age, but also about different world views that inspire discourse within a company (Sattelberger 2015). There is a wide range of possibilities for improving democracy in companies. At present, however, decisions about the management and decision-making structures mostly remain with the entrepreneurs as they have the decisive power to decide whether or not they allow more or less participation. Therefore, the forms of democratisation of companies are diverse. Every step towards more participation is important in terms of the spillover effect. Despite contrary developments in many areas of the economy, which are related to global exploitation, neo-liberal deregulation and similar phenomena (Herzog 2023), the desire for co-determination is not purely academic. Studies from the USA and Europe have shown that citizens expect and hope for a certain degree of co-determination at work (Mazumder and Yan 2024).

5 Conceptualising Democratic Resilience at the Workplace

Even if the number of democratic companies worldwide is not particularly high, there are still many companies in which co-determination exists, at least to some extent. From research on these companies, we know about the spillover effect. Empirical findings support Pateman, at least in part, but recently the debate has become much more nuanced. Kim and others have rightly argued that the relationship between experiences in the workplace and attitudes or behaviour in the political context is very complex, with demographic factors, professional skills, socio-economic factors and others intervening (Kim 2021, 20).

Greenberg (2008) proposed three follow-on hypotheses that can be derived from Pateman’s assumptions. The first is the hypothesis of increased self-efficacy, which posits that people who experience democracy in the workplace also develop a sense of self-efficacy in the political sphere. The second thesis is that a stronger sense of community develops from participation and dialogue at work, leading to stronger social engagement. The third thesis is that workplace democracy strengthens democratic skills, such as rhetorical and other communication skills, or organisational skills such as moderation. Again, we were only able to find indirect reference to democratic resilience, although it is plausible that all three of these effects have a positive impact on withstanding. Those who perceive themselves as effective are more likely to take a stand against injustices because they see a chance of success. Those who are more committed to others are willing to stand in solidarity with the oppressed. And those who develop democratic skills and competences will better be able to use them against authoritarianism in the political context. Recently, Johannes Kiess and Andre Schmidt (Kiess and Schmidt 2024) showed, in a German context, that democratic efficiency in the workplace actually leads to a stronger rejection of right-wing extremist attitudes. Their results confirm the assumption that democracy in the lifeworld can work against authoritarian regimes. Therefore, I add a fourth hypothesis to the three mentioned above: Experience of democracy in the workplace strengthens resilience to authoritarianism; or, in other words, democratic resilience. However, the argument that I have already presented in the theoretical part should be re-emphasised at this point: A democratic culture with the skills mentioned by the Council of Europe is not enough to defend democracy when it is threatened. The explicit emphasis on democratic rebellion against anti-democratic phenomena should be reflected in the competences and trained in the workplace.

Thus, to better understand spillover effects from the workplace to the political sphere, we need a more precise understanding of democratic resilience. According to Merkel and Lührmann (2021), the term can be divided into three categories: withstanding, adaptation and recovery. The focus in the present article is on the first category, withstanding and resistance to authoritarianism. Here, withstanding is understood synonymously with the concept of rebellion against anti-democratic phenomena. I suggest further subdividing withstanding into refusal and counter-speech. Refusal means that an employee or citizen does not fulfil anti-democratic orders. Counter-speech means that an employee or citizen openly contradicts anti-democratic behaviour or statements. The reference framework hardly addresses resilience in terms of competences. The only example given is that someone who represents democratic values is more likely to speak out against hate speech (Council of Europe 2018, 34). Therefore, we can assume that the competences of the reference framework for a democratic culture are helpful when it comes to defending democracy. However, they must be complemented by competences for democratic resilience.

From a conceptual point of view, the first conclusion we can draw is that the Council of Europe’s reference framework needs to be linked to democratic resilience with its elements of refusal and counter-speech. The theoretical question that arises from this is: Do the competences for a democratic culture as described in the reference framework contribute to democratic resilience? This has not been sufficiently spelled out. If democratic resilience is part of a democratic culture, which we can argue with the theories inspired by Fromm and Camus, then the list of competences is obviously insufficient.

We could count refusal, courage and counter speech among attitudes. Solidarity, as Camus understood it, would be a further important value. Different forms of rebellion like subversion, satire or others would need certain skills. In this way, it would be possible to expand the framework of competencies, provided that democratic resilience is recognised as part of a democratic culture.

However, since democratic resilience is an all-inclusive package, dividing the elements that make it up would result in a loss of clarity. Therefore, there is more argument for an addition to the competence framework for democratic culture, with a model of democratic resilience at the same level. The concrete formulation of such a model of democratic resilience should be the subject of debates in democratic theory. Refusal, counter-speech, solidarity and courage would need to be described in more detail and complemented with other aspects.

Whatever method is used to incorporate resilience aspects, the question remains as to how they can be practised or learnt in the workplace. In conclusion, I would like to make some suggestions for further theoretical and empirical research. If we break down the theoretical assumptions to the realities in a company, we can distinguish structural democratization from participatory management. Democratic structures make it possible to experience and learn competences of a democratic culture in a variety of ways. The basic values of an organisation can be considered its constitution. If there is a written declaration – a set of values that is transparent and comprehensible – then there is a first basis. Many companies have such guiding principles, regarding corporate (social) responsibility, that they also use in their external communication and that employees can refer to. Some describe themselves as democratic companies, others as sustainable or inclusive, etc. The more specific and transparent these values are, the greater their impact.

Those competencies, which are also mentioned in the Council of Europe’s reference framework, such as appreciation of diversity, interculturality, respect and similar aspects, lay a foundation so that people can stand up against the violation of these values. Organisations can even incorporate this into their structure by setting up anti-discrimination bodies or ethics commissions. In addition to transparency and clarity of values, these principles include clear rules and firmly anchored opportunities for co-determination. A company in which works councils are allowed and employee representatives are elected enables experiences of democracy and skills that are useful for participation in political processes. A culture of dialogue and mutual recognition can be established on the general level of a company but also in every subdivision, in teams and even in bilateral interaction between different actors, managers and employees. Participatory management can include democratic innovations like mini-publics per lottery or other measures.

Resilience can also be practised in less democratic organisations, through solidarity between employees who may be subject to oppression or discrimination, through objection to authoritarian instructions, or through refusal to comply. Although these measures involve a higher risk for those affected, they can lead to change in an organised way, both within an organisation and in terms of the spillover effect. Studies have shown that experiences within a team are often more important than experiences with superiors (Aubé, Brunelle, and Vincent 2014; Greenberg et al. 2012).

Finally, extra-organisational aspects are important. For example, a company can consciously promote political discussions that are not directly related to the work context. Particularly in uncertain times, it is also important for companies to discuss the concerns and hopes of employees regarding, for example, the development of democracy worldwide, military conflicts, economic conditions for the respective profession, and so on. In this way, companies can, to a certain extent, politicise their employees or act themselves in the public sphere as political actors. Companies can also explicitly promote political skills through workshops and educational programmes, training, international exchange, and so on. Entrepreneurs and managers act as role models and if they demonstrate democratic competences and resilience, this can have a positive effect on their employees.

6 Conclusions

Democratic resilience and rebellion against authoritarianism and anti-democratic phenomena are a fundamental component – indeed a prerequisite – of democracy. However, this rebellious aspect is usually neglected in both political theory and the definition of individual competences for a democratic culture. It is precisely in times of democratic crisis and a wave of autocratisation that it is important to emphasise the importance of rebellion and to promote corresponding values and skills.

Assuming a spillover effect from experiences in the workplace to political attitudes and behaviour, workplace democracy can strengthen democratic competences like those mentioned in the reference framework of the Council of Europe, but also democratic resilience as roughly conceptualised in this article. Democratic resilience encompasses various aspects. Experiences of refusal and counter-speech in the workplace can empower workers in their role as citizens. I draw a few conclusions from the conceptual assumptions. Firstly, we should pay more attention to democratic resilience and its different dimensions in research on democratic theory and democratic competences. Secondly, we should conceptualize in more detail what democratic resilience means and how it can be developed and strengthened.

My first suggestions include the aspects of refusal and counter-speech, values like solidarity and skills to find ways for rebellion that go beyond the open protest. We then need more empirical research on the spillover effect, taking into account these concepts of democratic resilience. For example, it would be instructive to analyse the effects of resistance and solidarity in teams as opposed to strictly hierarchical structures, processes and restrictive management. Non-organisational power factors, such as trade union representation, labour laws or less formalised social norms should also be examined in terms of their effect on democratic resilience. The self-perception and external perception of employees and superiors with regard to the development of authoritarian or mature character traits would also be an interesting field of research. Overall, this paper aims to enrich the debate on democratic resilience and its development in various socialisation processes.