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Property-Owning Democracy and the Circumstances of Politics

  • Francis Cheneval
Published/Copyright: February 11, 2016
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Abstract

The article argues that Rawls’s property-owning democracy should not be understood as a necessary standard of democratic legitimacy. This position contradicts Rawls’s own understanding to some extent, but a rejoinder with elements of political liberalism is possible. He concedes that justice as fairness is a ‘comprehensive liberal doctrine’ and that a well ordered society affirming such a doctrine ‘contradicts reasonable pluralism’. Rawls makes clear that reasonable pluralism in combination with the burdens of judgment lead to rare unanimity in political life and to the necessity of majority and plurality voting procedures.

Published Online: 2016-02-11
Published in Print: 2013-05-01

© 2013 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

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