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On the Original Contract: Evolutionary Game Theory and Human Evolution
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Alex Rosenberg
Published/Copyright:
May 14, 2016
Abstract
This paper considers whether the available evidence from archeology, biological anthropology, primatology, and comparative gene-sequencing, can test evolutionary game theory models of cooperation as historical hypotheses about the actual course of human prehistory. The examination proceeds on the assumption that cooperation is the product of cultural selection and is not a genetically encoded trait. Nevertheless, we conclude that gene sequence data may yet shed significant light on the evolution of cooperation.
Published Online: 2016-05-14
Published in Print: 2005-05-01
© 2005 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
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Articles in the same Issue
- Editorial
- Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins
- Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory
- Altruists with Green Beards
- Altruists with Green Beards: Still Kicking?
- Strong Reciprocity and the Comparative Method
- The Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity
- The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation
- On the Original Contract: Evolutionary Game Theory and Human Evolution
- Social Relations Instead of Altruistic Punishment
- ‘Nostrism’: Social Identities in Experimental Games
- Altruism and the Indispensability of Motives
- Fehr on Altruism, Emotion, and Norms
