Plato’s Master Argument for a Two-Kind Ontology in the Sophist: A New Reading of the Final Argument of the Gigantomachia Passage (249b5–249c9)
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Pauline Sabrier
Abstract
In this paper I defend a new reading of the final argument of the Gigantomachia passage of Plato’s Sophist (249b5–249c9), according to which it is an argument for a two-kind ontology, based on the distinction between the changing beings and the unchanging beings. This argument, I urge, is addressed not only to Platonists but to all philosophers – with one exception. My reading is based on the claim that this argument does not rely on the view that nous requires unchangeable objects – what I call the traditional reading – but on the view that nous itself is unchanging. The difference between the traditional reading and my reading is that on the former, Plato’s argument relies on a distinctive epistemological assumption, whereas on the latter, Plato’s argument is free from any such commitments. If the argument of this paper is along the right lines, then this implies that this argument has a much more far-reaching scope than critics have usually assumed. It also invites us to reconsider Plato’s approach to the question of being in the Sophist.
Acknowledgements
This paper has been ‘in the pot’ for so long that it is actually difficult to thank all those who have at some point contributed to it. I would like to particularly thank audiences in Dublin and Beijing for their comments on previous versions of this paper. For specific comments, I am especially grateful to Lesley Brown, Damian Caluori, Antonio Ferro, Kristian Larsen, Peter Larsen, Béatrice Lienemann, Sebastian Odzuck and, last but not least, Vasilis Politis.
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- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Xenocrates and the Two-Category Scheme
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- Replenishment and Maintenance of the Human Body (Timaeus 77a–81e)
- Plato’s Master Argument for a Two-Kind Ontology in the Sophist: A New Reading of the Final Argument of the Gigantomachia Passage (249b5–249c9)
- A Peripatetic Argument for the Intrinsic Goodness of Human Life: Alexander of Aphrodisias' Ethical Problems I
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Xenocrates and the Two-Category Scheme
- Plato’s Medicalisation of Ethics
- Replenishment and Maintenance of the Human Body (Timaeus 77a–81e)
- Plato’s Master Argument for a Two-Kind Ontology in the Sophist: A New Reading of the Final Argument of the Gigantomachia Passage (249b5–249c9)
- A Peripatetic Argument for the Intrinsic Goodness of Human Life: Alexander of Aphrodisias' Ethical Problems I
- Keeping the Friend in Epicurean Friendship
