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Epicurus on the Fear of Death and the Relative Value of Lives
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Benjamin A. Rider
Published/Copyright:
September 26, 2014
Abstract
Epicurus argued that death is no misfortune, because when a person dies, he no longer has sensation, and sensation is a necessary condition of value for a person. This argument, however, faces a powerful objection. Contemporary philosophers argue that death is bad precisely because it deprives one of good experiences one would have had, had one not died. I analyze and evaluate the Epicurean response to this objection, showing how, according to Epicurus, this objection reflects mistaken and unhealthy ideas about how lives should be evaluated. Uncovering and addressing these modes of evaluation constitutes a central aim of Epicurean therapy.
Published Online: 2014-9-26
Published in Print: 2014-10-1
© 2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Socratic Metaphysics?
- Aristotle on the Deliberative Abilities of Women
- Epicurus on the Fear of Death and the Relative Value of Lives
- And yet she moves! – The earth rests on water: Thales on the role of water in Earth’s mobility and in nature’s transformations
- Γραμματική in Plato and Aristotle
- Euclid’s Optics and Geometrical Astronomy
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Socratic Metaphysics?
- Aristotle on the Deliberative Abilities of Women
- Epicurus on the Fear of Death and the Relative Value of Lives
- And yet she moves! – The earth rests on water: Thales on the role of water in Earth’s mobility and in nature’s transformations
- Γραμματική in Plato and Aristotle
- Euclid’s Optics and Geometrical Astronomy
