Μέγιστα Γένη and Division in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals

Byron J. Stoyles

doi:10.1515/apeiron-2012-0010

Article

Μέγιστα Γένη and Division in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals

Byron J. Stoyles

Published/Copyright: January 1, 2013

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From the journal Apeiron Volume 46 Issue 1

Abstract

Aristotle refers to some animal kinds as μέγιστα γένη, or greatest kinds. The goal of this paper is to make clear the nature and significance of these kinds. I argue that Aristotle thinks of greatest kinds as the most general kinds within a specified domain. I then consider the fact that Aristotle’s discussion of animals’ reproductive parts and modes of reproduction in Generation of Animals is organized around divisions related to the cause of each of the features being explained. I conclude that, while classification is an important goal in Aristotle’s biological treatises, it is of little significance that some of the kinds he identifies are referred to as greatest kinds. The important divisions are, for Aristotle, the divisions that best serve his goal of explaining the various features of animals and these divisions sometimes group together and sometimes cut across the commonly recognized, including the greatest, animal kinds.

Keywords : Megista Genē; Greatest Kinds; Extensive Kinds; Division; Aristotle

Published Online: 2013-01-01

Published in Print: 2013-01-01

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Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2012-0010

Keywords for this article

Megista Genē; Greatest Kinds; Extensive Kinds; Division; Aristotle