Controlling Collusion in the Era of Algorithms: A Comparative Analysis of European and Vietnamese Competition Laws
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Tran Thang Long
and
Nguyen Xuan Hoa
Abstract
The Fourth Industrial Revolution has introduced transformative technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithms, fundamentally reshaping global competition and collusion dynamics in digital markets. This article explores how algorithms facilitate collusion through four scenarios – Messenger, Hub-and-Spoke, Predictable Agent, and Digital Eye – and examines the ensuing legal challenges: indirect information exchange, tacit collusion, and liability attribution. By conducting a detailed comparative analysis of the European Union (EU) and Vietnamese competition law frameworks, the study considers their capacity to address these issues and proposes legal reforms. Although the EU’s sophisticated legal system effectively tackles certain aspects of algorithmic collusion, it still struggles with tacit collusion and liability in autonomous algorithmic scenarios, needing innovative regulatory approaches. In contrast, Vietnam’s competition law lacks adequate provisions, leaving it ill-prepared for digital market challenges. This research contributes policy frameworks adapted to Vietnam’s regulatory context and proposes implementable solutions that balance technological innovation with competitive market integrity.
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