Abstract
This essay argues that a purely objective economic theory of crime (i.e., one devoid of moral or ethical judgments) is impossible. The basis for this claim is the reciprocal nature of causation in externality settings as first pointed out by Coase (1960), which renders the definition of harm indeterminate. At most, economic theory can prescribe an efficient pricing scheme once the direction of causation, and hence the nature of harm, has been defined. The essay concludes by discussing the implications of this idea for civil disobedience, cancel-culture, and victimless crimes.
References
Adelstein, R. 2017. The Exchange Order: Property and Liability as an Exchange System. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.10.1093/oso/9780190694272.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Beccaria, C. (1764 [1986]). On Crimes and Punishments. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.Search in Google Scholar
Becker, G. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76: 169–217. https://doi.org/10.1086/259394.Search in Google Scholar
Bentham, J. (1780 [1970]) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.Search in Google Scholar
Carbonara, E., F. Parisi, and G. von Wangenheim. 2012. “Unjust Laws and Illegal Norms: One View of the Cathedral.” International Review of Law and Economics 32: 285–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2012.03.001.Search in Google Scholar
Coase, R. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” The Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44. https://doi.org/10.1086/466560.Search in Google Scholar
Calabresi, G., and A. D. Melamed. 1972. “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.” Harvard Law Review 85: 1089–128. https://doi.org/10.2307/1340059.Search in Google Scholar
Cooter, R. 1998. “Expressive Law and Economics.” Journal of Legal Studies 27: 585–607. https://doi.org/10.1086/468036.Search in Google Scholar
Cooter, R. 1984. “Prices and Sanctions.” Columbia Law Review 84: 1523–60. https://doi.org/10.2307/1122472.Search in Google Scholar
Cooter, R. 1982. “The Cost of Coase.” Journal of Legal Studies 11: 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1086/467690.Search in Google Scholar
Cooter, R., and T. Ulen. 1988. Law and Economics. Glenview: Scott Foresman and Co.Search in Google Scholar
Epstein, R. 1972. “A Theory of Strict Liability.” Journal of Legal Studies 2: 151–204. https://doi.org/10.1086/467495.Search in Google Scholar
Friedman, D. 2000. Law’s Order: What Economics Has to Do with the Law and Why it Matters. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.10.1515/9781400823475Search in Google Scholar
Garoupa, N. 1997. “The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement.” Journal of Economic Surveys 11: 267–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00034.Search in Google Scholar
Hart, H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.Search in Google Scholar
Holmes, O. W. 1897. “The Path of the Law.” Harvard Law Review 10: 457–78.10.2307/1322028Search in Google Scholar
Holmes, O. W. (1881 [1963]). The Common Law. Boston: Little Brown.Search in Google Scholar
Hylton, K. 2005. “The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law.” Review of Law & Economics 1: 175–201. https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1024.Search in Google Scholar
Klevorick, A. 1985. “On the Economic Theory of Crime.” In NOMOS XXVII: Criminal Justice, edited by J. Pennock and J. Chapman. New York: New York Univ. Press.Search in Google Scholar
Lewin, J., and W. Trumbull. 1990. “The Social Value of Crime?” International Review of Law and Economics 10: 271–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(90)90014-k.Search in Google Scholar
McAdams, R. 2017. The Expressive Powers of Law: Theories and Limits. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.Search in Google Scholar
Miceli, T. 2022a. “Counting Offenders’ Gains? Economic and Moral Considerations in the Determination of Liability.” European Journal of Law and Economics 54: 475–96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-022-09744-7.Search in Google Scholar
Miceli, T. 2022b. “Of Coase, Cattle, and Crime: Why the Becker Model Is Compatible with a Moral Theory of Law.” Review of Law & Economics 18: 179–98. https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2022-0010.Search in Google Scholar
Posner, R. 1990. The Problems of Jurisprudence. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.Search in Google Scholar
Posner, R. 1985. “An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law.” Columbia Law Review 85: 1193–231. https://doi.org/10.2307/1122392.Search in Google Scholar
Polinsky, A. M., and S. Shavell. 2007. “The Theory of Public Law Enforcement.” In Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 1, editor by, A. Polinsky and S. Shavell. Amsterdam: Elsevier, North-Holland.10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2745-1Search in Google Scholar
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press.10.4159/9780674042605Search in Google Scholar
Shavell, S. 2004. Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Cambridge: Belknap Press.10.4159/9780674043497Search in Google Scholar
Stigler, G. 1970. “The Optimum Enforcement of Law.” Journal of Political Economy 78: 345–55.10.1086/259646Search in Google Scholar
Sunstein, C. 1996. “On the Expressive Function of Law.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144: 2021–53.10.2307/3312647Search in Google Scholar
© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- What Do Judges Want? How to Model Judicial Preferences
- On the Impossibility of a Purely Objective Economic Theory of Crime
- Why Sentencing Codification Could be More Complex than Anticipated
- Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers
- n-Defendant Litigation and Settlement: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability
- The Places We’ll Go
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- What Do Judges Want? How to Model Judicial Preferences
- On the Impossibility of a Purely Objective Economic Theory of Crime
- Why Sentencing Codification Could be More Complex than Anticipated
- Second, But Not Last: Competition with Positive Spillovers
- n-Defendant Litigation and Settlement: The Impact of Joint and Several Liability
- The Places We’ll Go