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On the Impossibility of a Purely Objective Economic Theory of Crime

  • Thomas J. Miceli EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: October 30, 2023
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Abstract

This essay argues that a purely objective economic theory of crime (i.e., one devoid of moral or ethical judgments) is impossible. The basis for this claim is the reciprocal nature of causation in externality settings as first pointed out by Coase (1960), which renders the definition of harm indeterminate. At most, economic theory can prescribe an efficient pricing scheme once the direction of causation, and hence the nature of harm, has been defined. The essay concludes by discussing the implications of this idea for civil disobedience, cancel-culture, and victimless crimes.

JEL Classification: K10; K14; K42

Corresponding author: Thomas J. Miceli, Professor, Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA, E-mail:
I acknowledge the comments of Masaki Iwasaki on a previous draft.

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Received: 2023-10-09
Accepted: 2023-10-09
Published Online: 2023-10-30

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