Skeptical Suspension in the Face of Disagreement

1 Introduction

When scholars describe the difference between dogmatists and the Pyrrhonian skeptics, they typically say that dogmatists hold to their beliefs while skeptics suspend judgment.^[1] This description comes from passages near the beginning of Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Sextus tells us:

The skeptical ability is one that opposes appearances and thoughts in any way at all, from which, because of the equal strength (isostheneia) among the opposing matters and accounts, we come first off to the suspension of judgment (epochē) and after this to tranquility (ataraxia). (PH I 8)^[2]

The skeptic suspends judgment in the face of equally strong oppositions. A few lines earlier, at the opening of the treatise, Sextus distinguishes between dogmatists and skeptics explicitly. There he says:

For those who investigate into some matter, what likely follows is either discovery, or denial of discovery and admission that it is inapprehensible, or a continuation of investigation. For this reason perhaps, even in the case of philosophical investigation, some have said that they have discovered the truth, and others have declared that it is not possible to grasp this, and others continue investigating. Those who are properly called dogmatists (for example, those in the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics and some others) think they have discovered [the truth], but those in the school of Clitomachus and Carneades and other Academics declared that they have found things to be inapprehensible, and the skeptics are investigating. (PH I 1–3)

What distinguishes the skeptic from the dogmatist in the first case is that the former suspends judgment as a result of the skeptical ability, while the latter takes a position; but in the second case the skeptic continues investigating while the dogmatist is satisfied with some answer or other. These distinct descriptions raise a question about the relationship between skeptical investigation and suspension of judgment. How do they fit together? After all, Sextus says both that epochē comes after the investigation (PH I 7) and that the skeptic continues investigating. If skeptics do not stop investigating, how can they suspend judgment after the investigation? Or alternately, what causes the skeptics to suspend judgment at one point in an on-going investigation as opposed to another?

Scholars have had trouble reconciling these two descriptions. It is not uncommon when describing how and why skeptics suspend judgment to ignore PH I 1–3. Indeed, classic scholarly accounts of Pyrrhonism say that skeptics suspend judgment after looking into the arguments for and against a particular position, but say little about their continued investigation following that suspension.^[3] Others raise doubts about the sincerity of Sextus’ claim to persistent inquiry, suggesting that it amounts to a sham.^[4] Still others claim that these two passages represent distinct, ultimately incompatible strands of skepticism, arguing that the philosophy presented by Sextus Empiricus is at best confused and at worst incoherent.^[5] Thus, these distinct descriptions of skepticism constitute a problem for many.^[6]

In response, I believe that these passages harmonize once we grasp that there is a more fundamental difference between the dogmatist and the skeptic. I claim that the skeptic suspends judgment immediately in the face of disagreement at the onset of an investigation, and I think that this practical norm, which governs the skeptical response to disagreement distinguishes the skeptic from the non-skeptic.^[7] When skeptical inquiry fails to resolve a dispute, that does not change the skeptic’s mind, but sustains a prior and on-going suspension. My thesis will seem surprising, perhaps even ridiculous, to those who think that suspension of judgment can only come after one has evaluated the available evidence, that is, after weighing the strength of each side.^[8] So, in what follows, I explain this skeptical norm of disagreement, and I raise problems for the view that skeptical epochē begins after investigation into considerations for and against a position. I then look at several passages where Sextus indicates that he follows the rule I describe, and I show how my interpretation helps to explain the relevant texts as well as to illuminate important features about the character of Pyrrhonism.

2 The Skeptical Response to Disagreement

When faced with a disagreement, say about whether or not p is true, there are generally two conditions in which you might find yourself even before you begin to think about reasons in favor of either side. You might lean toward one side (or the other) or you might feel that both positions are roughly on equal footing and prefer neither of them. Obviously, the strength of your conviction can vary.^[9] You might have simply assumed that p is the case without asking why you think that p or without stopping to consider the other side. For example, a student recently told me that although he has always believed in God, he never gave any consideration to why he thinks that God exists. Alternately, you might have a strong belief that p based on genuinely good reasons for believing that p is true. Or you might have never been faced with the claim that p, and if you have no gut reaction to it, then you might not initially take a position. For example, suppose you overhear students disagreeing about the value of the reduced Planck constant. You may not have a view about the correct answer unless you happen to know it.

Now, typically, if you are faced with a disagreement and you are not sure which side is correct, you can look into the evidence in favor of each side. But even before you begin to inquire in earnest, you can take a cognitive attitude vis-à-vis the question. Roughly, the choice is, as I just suggested, to stick with the side that seems right or to withhold judgment until you get more data. What I want to claim now is that the Pyrrhonian skeptic always suspends judgment in the face of disagreement. This can be expressed as a rule I call the Pyrrhonian Disagreement Norm (DN):

DN: When faced with a dispute about the truth of claim p, suspend judgment about the truth of p (even if you previously held a position regarding the truth of p) until you have good reason to choose one side over the other.^[10]

We can think of this rule as a norm of belief in the face of a disagreement. I suspect that most people do not follow this rule much of the time: We tend to believe a credible news report even when the truth of the report is questioned (as so many are), at least until there is a preponderance of evidence that the report is unreliable.^[11] But, in other cases, suspension may be the rational course to take.^[12]

The Pyrrhonian skeptic always uses DN, and this distinguishes the skeptic from the dogmatist.^[13] Specifically, the skeptic immediately withholds assent to p in the face of a question about the truth of p even before she considers what can be said in favor of p or not-p and regardless of her previous cognitive inclinations regarding p.^[14]

3. Suspension Occurs at the Start of Investigation

Those familiar with Pyrrhonism may think that I am misrepresenting Sextus. After all, he says that the skeptics have the ability to oppose thoughts and phainomena in order to generate epochē (as in PH I 8 above). Typically, the skeptic is portrayed as weighing both sides of a question and, finding neither side stronger than the other, suspending judgment, which unexpectedly leads to tranquility. Barnes – glossing PH I 8 – says:

The sequence for the Sceptic is: investigation—opposition—equipollence—ἐποχή—ἀταραξία. That sequence is causal: famously, ἀταραξία follows ἐποχή ‘by chance’ (PH 1.26) or ‘like a shadow’ (PH 1.29; D.L. 9.107); and ἐποχή follows ἰσοσθένεια in just the same fashion. (Barnes 1982, 1)

Barnes claims that suspension of judgment is the causal result of investigating a question and finding the conflicting answers to be equally strong; it cannot be the causal result of a process if it precedes that process, so according to Barnes, suspension must follow investigation.^[15]

Barnes is by no means alone in this representation of the skeptical ability,^[16] but other scholars have argued against the causal reading of suspension, offering what has been called a normative reading; that is, epochē follows as a conclusion of an argument that we ought to suspend judgment.^[17] For example, Lammenranta claims that

the skeptical strategy consists of three stages: The skeptic first points out or argues that there are disagreements on some question, then tries to show that these disagreements cannot be resolved, and finally concludes that we should suspend belief about the matter. (Lammenranta 2011, 203)^[18]

So, Lammenranta suggests that suspension occurs after an investigation that aims to establish the dispute is irresoluble. This implies a terminus to the investigation at which point the conclusion regarding epochē can be drawn.^[19]

For our purposes, it matters not whether Sextus suspends judgment as a result of some psychological necessity or on the basis of normative considerations; the issue with both of these interpretations is that they have the skeptic suspending judgment invariably (and problematically) after the investigation has already begun.^[20] There are both textual and philosophical reasons to doubt this order of events. First, skeptical suspension cannot be the conclusion (in the sense of the end) of an inquiry given the opening passage of the Outlines (PH I 1–3) with which I began: The skeptic continues to investigate. If the investigation has not ended, then skeptical epochē cannot come at the end of it.^[21]

If suspension cannot come at the end of an investigation, we must re-evaluate texts which seem to suggest the particular temporal ordering of investigation, equipollence, epochē, followed by tranquility. In fact, contrary to Barnes’ claim, the passage at PH I 8 says nothing about investigation. Sextus tells us that epochē comes about because of the isostheneia among oppositions, but these oppositions must come from what is available to the skeptic. Prior to any genuine searching, if the skeptic has no arguments to offer on either side of a question, then the two sides are trivially equivalent – which is enough to generate suspension for the skeptic. So it is consistent with PH I 8 that suspension precedes any actual research even though the skeptic could also evaluate the strength of either side at some later point in the inquiry.^[22]

If I am wrong and the skeptic does not always withhold assent right from the start, then the only other choice is that she suspends judgment after some evidence is in but before the investigation is complete. The view that skeptical suspension arises in the midst of an inquiry raises more puzzling questions about skeptical practice and the move to epochē, questions that are often ignored by contemporary commentators. If the skeptic holds to a position until the balance of considerations on either side forces her to suspend judgment (whether for psychological or normative reasons), consider what happens once the skeptic finds new logoi for one side following further investigation. Do these new considerations compel the skeptic to assent once again?

It is implausible to suggest – using the common image of the skeptic as an argumentative chemist – that one could maintain equally strong logoi on each side in perpetual balance, as drugs on a scale.^[23] For, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that once the scales are balanced, the skeptic only considers equal accounts going forward, as if the chemist could simply drop equivalent weights on each side simultaneously so that equipollence is never lost. After all, the skeptic cannot intuit the strength of an argument prior to weighing it. Thus, as soon as either side gains new evidence, the whole precarious balance could tip again, and suspension is lost.^[24]

Perhaps one might respond that once suspension is achieved, the skeptic can maintain her current mental state in the face of new evidence in favor of one side because she assumes she will be able to find the counter-balancing arguments in the future. This need not be a dogmatic position on the part of the skeptic; rather, it could be an expression of her experience thus far (cf. PH I 202–205).^[25] But if this is the skeptic’s view after finding the two sides are equally balanced in her mind, why is it not the skeptic’s view prior to the initial inquiry? In other words, if the mature skeptic can use the working assumption that isostheneia is possible at some arbitrary point in the middle of the investigation, then she can also begin from that same assumption. If this assumption is sufficient to maintain epochē in the face of (at present) unequally weighted considerations in the middle of an investigation, then there seems little reason to doubt that the skeptic can suspend judgment right from the start.^[26]

Thus, I think that skeptics follow the Pyrrhonian Disagreement Norm. I have provided some philosophical motivation for why they accept this rule, and raised problems for competing views. Still we should address the textual question: Does Sextus ever claim that he follows this rule? His own argumentative practices make it admittedly difficult to show that the skeptics are committed to anything. Nevertheless, in what follows, I discuss passages indicating that he does accept this norm.

4 Investigation Requires Suspension

Sextus begins the second book of his Outlines defending the “specific account” of skepticism (cf. PH I 5–6) against a particular worry. The worry, reminiscent of Plato’s paradox of inquiry, asserts that skeptics cannot even look into an issue in dogmatic philosophy because either they already apprehend it (and so do not need to investigate) or else they do not grasp it at all (and so cannot even talk about the issue) (PH II 1–3). Sextus, in classic Pyrrhonian style, turns the argument on its head, suggesting that – whatever the dogmatists mean by apprehension – the argument requires the dogmatists suspend judgment themselves and become skeptics (PH II 4–9). Sextus goes on to argue that nothing prohibits the skeptics from investigating dogmatic philosophy as long as that investigation merely requires thinking about and understanding what the dogmatists say:

For, I suppose, the skeptic is not prohibited from thinking if it both comes about from passive experiences and evident appearances and does not wholly import the reality of the things that are thought. For we think, as they say, not only about real things, but also about unreal things. Thus, the skeptic (ephektikos), when inquiring and thinking (kai zētōn kai noōn), maintains the skeptical disposition (en tēi skeptikēi diathesei). For, it has been made clear that he assents to his experiences that are due to a passive impression to the extent that it appears to him. (PH II 10)^[27]

Sextus indicates that the skeptic “maintains the skeptical disposition” while inquiring, and he names the skeptic ‘ephektikos’ in this context to indicate that the disposition he has in mind is the suspension of judgment. But if the skeptic always suspends judgment while inquiring, then the suspension of judgment must come at the beginning of the investigation. This interpretation is reinforced by the reason given, namely that skeptics do not dogmatize, unless that means accepting the passive impressions (phantasiai pathētikai) provided by the appearances they experience (cf. PH I 13).

But perhaps one might say that this passage does not show that Sextus thinks epochē and investigation must necessarily go hand-in-hand. We need not interpret the participial phrase “kai zētōn kai noōn” as expressing a sufficient condition for the suspension of judgment. However, Sextus goes on to explain:

And see whether instead the dogmatists are not prohibited from investigating. For it is not inconsistent for those who agree that they are ignorant about what things are by nature still to investigate about them, but it is inconsistent for those who think they understand these things accurately. For the latter, the investigation is already at its end, as they suppose, but for the former, the reason why every investigation is joined, namely that they suppose they have not discovered [the nature of things], is paramount. (PH II 11)

Again Sextus turns the dogmatic charge on its head, arguing that only skeptics can investigate. Dogmatists cannot investigate because they think they understand the nature of things. Skeptics are ignorant of such natures, so they have something about which to inquire. Although Sextus does not use the word epochē in this passage, I take it that the phrases that they “are ignorant about what things are by nature” and “suppose they have not discovered [them]” are synonymous with the skeptical condition. Indeed, what explains skeptical investigation is precisely that the skeptics do not think they have made a discovery and are thus ignorant. But if the skeptical frame of mind is required for investigation, that suggests that suspension of judgment must come at its start.^[28] After all, it would be strange for a particular mental state to explain an activity if it arose after the start of that activity.

At this point, one might object that, while Sextus distinguishes between the skeptics and the dogmatists in these passages, he does not mean that the skeptic always suspends judgment. Perhaps Sextus thinks that the skeptic has one mindset early in an investigation and only suspends judgment at some later point. For example, Machuca distinguishes between aporia, which he says is “a state of mere non-belief regarding” some statement p, and epochē, which is “a state of non-belief regarding p after having considered the question whether p and found no answers.”^[29] Later he claims that “suspension results from the careful scrutiny of issues regarding which he has so far found no answers”; in other words, the skeptic begins looking for an answer to a question in the state of aporia and eventually transitions to suspension after evaluating the evidence.^[30]

I claim that skeptical epochē does not require any actual research be done, but rather the investigation requires epochē. PH II 11 reveals the impetus of the suspension of judgment at the start of investigation: awareness of one’s own ignorance and the thought that no discovery has yet been made. These thoughts arise in the face of an existing disagreement, as we will see, but they also continue throughout the investigation. Thus, one and the same mental state abides in the midst of inquiry.

If, as Machuca suggests, the skeptic’s state of mind changes during the investigation, one must wonder what distinguishes the initial aporia from the later informed suspension of judgment.^[31] Part of the problem hinges on what exactly counts as being ‘informed.’ Machuca suggests that this involves “careful scrutiny of issues” which have revealed “no answers.” But of course, the skeptic has no answers prior to the careful scrutiny of the issues, so we are left wondering what explains a change in the mental state in the midst of the investigation. Machuca makes it clear that suspension occurs when the skeptic evaluates the evidence as equipollent, but he gives no clear reason why the skeptic evaluates it at one time versus another. The answer cannot be that the positions are equally weighted since that is the result of the evaluation and not the cause of it.^[32]

One might also worry that Sextus’ claims at PH II 10–11 are simply false, and thus we should not think that he holds to them. It is possible to investigate a question without suspending judgment on that question. After all, we often look for corroborating evidence for views we already hold. This is a fair point although I think it arises, in part, from the contemporary view that belief is not an all-or-nothing affair, and from the fact that our credence often increases as we acquire more evidence for a given position.^[33] But, as I have already said, Sextus does not treat assent this way, so it would be anachronistic to read it back into the Outlines.^[34] Moreover, Sextus might point out that if one assents to a given position but continues to investigate, the question of the investigation has necessarily changed. If one believes, for example, that motion exists, one can still inquire into motion. But the question of the investigation becomes not merely whether motion exists, but how it works or why the arguments against it fail.

Finally, one might point out that Sextus cannot have a dogmatic belief that suspension of judgment must precede investigation. Indeed, some scholars, noting that the beginning of Book II responds to certain dogmatic objections to skepticism, suggest that we ought to read such statements in a dialectical light. That is, Sextus’ arguments about the relationship between suspension and investigation may seek to undermine the dogmatist’s objection insofar as they depend on dogmatic commitments themselves, but that does not mean Sextus is committed to the view.^[35] In response, I find such an interpretation difficult to accept given what Sextus says about skepticism earlier in the Outlines. He can report how skeptical philosophy appears to him without any dogmatic commitments (PH I 4). Moreover, while PH II 10–11 expands on what Sextus says in Book I, these passages clearly align with other texts about suspension and investigation as we shall see.

5 Disagreement in Agrippa’s Modes

Sextus says suspension follows immediately from disagreement in his discussion of the Five Agrippan Modes.^[36] He makes it clear that the Five Modes are meant to work together in some sense to generate epochē (PH I 170–177). But when he talks about the Modes individually, he says that suspension of judgment follows each one of them (with the exception of the Mode of Hypothesis; cf. PH I 168). The correct understanding of the Modes of Agrippa is controversial, not least because Sextus' description of them is terse and challenging to understand. Most interpretations have significant difficulty explaining the text; for example, the standard interpretation – due to Barnes – cannot account for the Mode of Relativity and simply excludes it.^[37]

I have argued elsewhere that the Modes are a systematic collection of dialectical moves that help the skeptic put off deciding a given question by shifting the discussion from the support for the current question to the support for the support. Pushing the question of support back can continue as long as the skeptic’s interlocutor wishes, but typically (ancient) dogmatists attempt to ground their positions in some foundational claim. Three of the Modes (Relativity, Hypothesis, and Reciprocity) allow the skeptic to raise questions about the need to support the foundations (which are not supposed to need support). This causes the discussion to continue. In other words, the Agrippan Modes use a general strategy of continuing the discussion indefinitely by raising yet another question of support so as to put off evaluating the evidence. As long as the dialectic continues, the skeptic can keep pushing the question of support back and decision is never reached.^[38]

Given my account, the Mode of Disagreement must be the first mode applied because it presents the dogmatist with a conflict that needs resolution. Here is what Sextus says:

The Mode of Disagreement is that according to which we discover an undecidable dispute (anepikriton stasin) concerning the proposed matter coming about in life or among the philosophers because of which (di’hēn), while we are not able to select or reject something (ou dunamenoi haireisthai ti ē apodokimazein), we end up (katalēgomen) in suspension of judgment. (PH I 165)^[39]

The Mode of Disagreement makes the dogmatist and the skeptic aware that there is a decision to be made, but it is one that has up-to-this point been undecidable.^[40]

Barnes in The Toils of Scepticism argues that the fact of disagreement is not sufficient on its own to generate epochē.^[41] He claims that disagreement should only cause one to suspend judgment if that person is aware that the disagreement is in some sense undecided.^[42] Typically, the undecidability of any given question will depend on the use of the other Modes to undermine the support for either side. In other words, the Mode of Disagreement depends on the other Modes to generate the suspension of judgment.^[43] But the text does not indicate this reliance: Although the participial construction (“while we are not able to select or reject something”) may indicate that the (un)decidablity of the dispute is an ongoing matter of investigation, the reason given for suspending judgment (di’hēn) is the dispute (stasis) itself.^[44]

Moreover, the standard interpretation ignores the diachronic character of skeptical inquiry. When the skeptic is faced with a disagreement, but before she has heard the evidence for one side or the other, the disagreement is undecidable for that person at that time. As an inquiry begins and one hears evidence for both sides, it may seem that one side is stronger than the other. But, as I mentioned, on my interpretation, the system of the Modes is designed to help the skeptic perpetuate the investigation. If the inquiry is on-going, the skeptic can put off decision indefinitely.

One might object that the claim “we are not able to select or reject something” is quite general and implies that some amount of investigation must have occurred prior to epochē. This impression is reinforced by the Annas and Barnes translation of PH I 165, which says: “Because of this we are not able either to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgment.” This translation suggests a certain temporal order: First, we try to choose one side or rule it out. Second, failing in our attempt, we suspend judgment. But construing the text in this way is misleading because the participial phrase ou dunamenoi haireisthai ti ē apodokimazein is clearly circumstantial, and as a present participle, it indicates an on-going or coincident activity. That is, the inquiry into the dispute happens while the skeptic is suspending judgment, not prior to it. Here again, we see Sextus signaling that investigation and epochē go hand-in-hand.

Let me be clear: on my view, the existence of a philosophical disagreement is sufficient all on its own to generate skeptical suspension of judgment and the start of an investigation. Investigation is essential to the skeptical way of life, but the outcome of the investigation is not what generates suspension for the skeptic. On the contrary, the suspension represents the opening of an investigation.

One might object to my interpretation of this Mode by noting that when Sextus describes it, he says that we “end” or “stop” (katalēgomen) at suspension of judgment, and one might suppose this indicates the termination of a process. I do not think the language of “stopping” refers to the cessation of the investigation. Rather, it refers to the stability of the on-going cognitive state as a result of a continued failure to decide the question at hand.

If my interpretation of the Agrippan Modes is correct, then the Mode of Disagreement simply amounts to presenting a disagreement and beginning an investigation into what can be said for each side of the dispute. What makes the dispute undecidable is the fact that the skeptic is not currently in a position to give decisive reasons for one side or the other. But this is not the result of the investigation since it is the position from the outset, that is, from which one begins. This means that the Mode of Disagreement does not require an argument, but merely the presentation of the opposition to generate the suspension of judgment.^[45] Thus it is an expression of the Pyrrhonian Disagreement Norm.

6 The Invitation to Continued Investigation

The presence of an open dispute drives the dogmatist to give reasons for one side or another. Sextus says that the skeptic will pursue an answer too, looking at both sides to evaluate the issue. But what if the available evidence only represents arguments for one side of a disagreement? Suppose the skeptic runs into a clever dogmatist who advances a new question and so conceives a theory about a topic on which no one else has spoken. In a sense, there is a potential dispute; if the theory claims p, then one can start a debate about p even if no one has ever argued for not-p. But there is no existing advocate (i. e., someone arguing for not-p). If there are no arguments for not-p, the sides may not seem equally weighted. Should the skeptic succumb to the dogmatic position in this case?

Sextus addresses this question in his introduction to the collections of Modes. When he introduces the Modes, he explains that suspension of judgment occurs as a result of different types of oppositions (PH I 31). Following this explanation, he claims the skeptics not only oppose things in the present, but also consider oppositions from the past and the future:

According to another way of thought, we sometimes oppose present things to present things, as in the cases we have just mentioned, but at other times we oppose present things to past or future claims, like whenever someone should give an account that we are not able to refute, we say to him, “Just as, before the birth of the leader of the school to which you belong, the school’s account, while it is no doubt sound, did not as yet appear so, even though it really existed. In the same way, it is possible that the account opposing the one you currently espouse also really exists, but it is not yet apparent to us, so that (hōste) it is not yet necessary that we assent to your account which currently seems strong.” (PH I 33–34)

Although this passage is puzzling for several reasons, this much is clear: Sextus says the skeptics will suspend judgment in the face of an argument “we are not able to refute.” Why? They do not believe all the evidence is in. In a sense, this is just like any other situation where the skeptics hear an argument on one side, but not on the other. They will not jump to a hasty conclusion until the evidence has been heard on both sides. Thus, they continue to follow the Disagreement Norm, and not allow the fact that one side seems stronger than the other for now to sway them.^[46]

We might wonder then, why Sextus seems concerned in this passage to pose an opposition. It is important to see the sense in which there is an opposition present and the sense in which there is not. It is not the case that Sextus fails to see that not-p opposes p; obviously, he must know that the opposing position to p is not-p. What is “not yet apparent” is the philosophical defense of not-p. The opposition is “in the future” just in the sense that the support for not-p is lacking. Here, we see that the possibility of opposing evidence is sufficient to generate (and maintain) suspension.^[47]

Someone might object at this point that the existence of the possibility of disagreement is not itself a disagreement. From what I have said, it seems that skeptics could generate suspension of judgment from any old contradiction. Does this give us skepticism on the cheap? I think not for two reasons. First, the dialectical context is important here. The skeptic is responding to a dogmatic account but is unaware of any opposing position. So I am not claiming that Sextus would suspend judgment about literally every claim.^[48] The skeptic does not mindlessly contradict anything anyone says, but responds in this way to someone espousing a dogmatic position. Second, although Sextus describes a scenario in which there is no existing disagreement between opposing dogmatic positions, we should not forget that the skeptics themselves advocate at times for one side of a disagreement.^[49] Thus, I suggest that Sextus intends the skeptics to stand in as the disagreeing party, but when asked to defend the position, they concede that they need time to do some research. This means that there is – in a sense – an actual disagreement, namely between the dogmatic philosopher and the skeptic, although the skeptic is admittedly not acting in propria persona, but merely defending the opposing dogmatic position for the sake of argument. The skeptic suspends judgment in the face of this disagreement, but since she does not have the evidence to launch her defense, she seeks to investigate the issue.

Contrary to what I have said, many claim that Sextus is making an argument here. Striker, for instance, says that Sextus “appears to rely on an inductive argument to show that even the most compelling philosophical theory might one day be overthrown, and to suspend judgment because he wants to avoid rash assent.”^[50] It is not entirely clear how Striker thinks the opposition is supposed to work, but it seems to be something like this: The dogmatist gives an argument for p that the skeptic cannot refute. The skeptic then responds with an argument that p is likely false since most of the philosophical views that we regarded as certain in the past have turned out to be false. So we should expect p to turn out false in the future as well.^[51]

In response to Striker, we should note that while Sextus says that there is an opposition between present and future things, he makes no argument for the conclusion that p is false. What Sextus actually says is that it is possible that p is false, and he appeals to past experience; but the question is precisely whether this appeal is meant as the reason to believe a conclusion. As others have pointed out, this seems to be incredibly weak evidence for not-p, so it is difficult to understand why the skeptic would feel that the arguments and accounts for and against p are equally strong on this interpretation.

Machuca gives an alternate reading of the text. He glosses the passage at PH I 33–34, saying:

Although at the present time one cannot refute a given argument advanced by a Dogmatist, one should nonetheless remain cautious and refrain from assenting to it, given that one cannot rule out the possibility that, in the future, one might discover an opposite argument which will appear to be as sound or epistemically persuasive as the argument that is currently under consideration. (Machuca 2011, 154)

Machuca suggests that Sextus offers an argument – which he calls “the argument from possible disagreement” – that goes something like this:

1. One cannot rule out the possibility that, in the future, one might discover a sound or persuasive argument for not-p.

2. Therefore, one ought not assent to p.

There are a couple of reasons to doubt this interpretation. First, it seems to get the opposing position wrong. When Sextus gives examples of oppositions just prior to our passage at PH I 32, he offers contrary or contradictory positions (i. e., the tower is round or square; providence exists or it does not; snow is white or black). This is the sort of opposition we should expect Sextus has in mind at PH I 33–34, but the claim “one should […] refrain from assenting to” p does not oppose p in this sense.^[52]

The second problem with this argument can also be expressed as a dilemma: On the one hand, as in Striker’s case, this argument seems incredibly weak. Why should the skeptic feel that it is as strong as the apparently irrefutable dogmatic argument for p? On the other hand, if one does feel the force of this argument, it seems to lead us to the conclusion that we should suspend judgment about every p without even considering what evidence there might be for p. If this argument works, it will generate universal skeptical suspension, but it will do so on the basis of the contingency of p alone, and not because of any evidence for or against p. This interpretation does give us skepticism on the cheap, and frankly flies in the face of Sextus’ actual practice.

There is one final aspect of this passage that should give us pause. Sextus says that the skeptics oppose arguments and appearances, but when he describes the skeptical response to an apparently irrefutable argument, it is spoken to the individual (tis) who offered the argument. Why portray the dialectical context in this way? My interpretation explains this aspect of the text better than competing theories: In the library on her own, the skeptic does not need to explain why she fails to assent to p in the face of persuasive proof because she does not believe her investigation is complete. She just continues reading, looking for more evidence regarding p and not-p. But in the dialectical context where a skeptic is debating a dogmatic interlocutor, things are different. What can the skeptic do when she cannot refute p? The skeptic cannot try to persuade the dogmatist to give up his view since the latter claims to have irrefutable evidence, so the skeptic’s response cannot be aimed at creating the suspension of judgment in her opponent. Instead, I claim that Sextus portrays a dialectical context because he is aware that in such a situation, the interlocutor deserves some kind of explanation why the skeptic refuses to budge in the face of such evidence. And the reason is that the skeptic is still looking.^[53]

Thus, I claim that the skeptic suspends judgment merely on the basis of the existence of a disagreement alone without waiting for evidence or arguments to support one side or the other. That is not to say that the skeptic does not investigate what can be said for and against the view. But by suspending judgment from the start, the skeptic need not worry if the evidence seems to support p more than not-p as of right now. The investigation is not complete, so we should not draw any hasty conclusions.

7 An Objection and Reply

The obvious objection to my thesis is that Sextus explicitly says the skeptic suspends judgment after investigation. When describing the different names applied to skepticism, he says: “The skeptical way of life is called […] ‘suspensive’ (ephektikē) from the pathos that happens to the inquirer after the investigation” (PH I 7). This looks like a clear statement that suspension of judgment follows investigation.

Moreover, Sextus does not typically portray the skeptic as suspending judgment up-front, but rather following a collection of arguments. There are numerous examples of this. Consider the arguments about ‘place’ (topos) in the Outlines.^[54] When Sextus introduces the topic of place, he differentiates between the loose sense of the term – roughly where a thing is – and the precise technical sense as defined by philosophers. Then he says, “Thus we investigate [what is said] about place in the precise sense. Some posit this, others have denied it, and still others suspended judgment about it” (PH III 119). He proceeds to give pages of arguments about place. Finally, he ends the section saying:

It is possible also to say many other things [about place], but in order not to prolong our account, we ought to bring up that the arguments confound the skeptics, and evident experience also disconcerts them. And for this reason (dioper), we side with neither of the two as far as what is said by the dogmatists is concerned, but we suspend judgment about place. (PH III 135)

From this, it looks like suspension of judgment occurs as the conclusion to the investigation. Someone objecting to my view might point to the dioper to claim that the epochē here is inferred because neither side looks decisive only after considering the evidence.

I do not deny that Sextus regularly says that once we look at what can be said on both sides of a debate, we as skeptics suspend judgment. Of course, the skeptic may (and will) evaluate the state of the evidence at various stages of the investigation, and if neither side seems decisive, the skeptic will maintain epochē. In other words, when Sextus says that “for this reason, we side with neither,” he is not saying that up to this point he thought place in the precise sense existed, but now that he has gone through the evidence, he does not know what to think. A dogmatist might feel that way. But the skeptic has already been suspending judgment throughout the investigation. Indeed, when Sextus mentions that some suspend judgment about place already at PH III 119, presumably he is talking about the skeptics.

Note, too, that Sextus is quite explicit at PH III 135 that his account in the Outlines is not meant to be exhaustive. This is consistent with an attitude of ongoing investigation. We know that Sextus provides a lengthier discussion about place in Adversus Mathematicos Book X, but even that is not all that could be said. Thus, we should not interpret the conclusions he offers at the end of a discussion to mean that the investigation is over or that Sextus is satisfied with an answer. It seems more likely that he means such comments to function as transitional markers for the readers’ benefit to close out a particular topic and to indicate what he intends for them to conclude about the preceding discussion.

These thoughts also provide a way to understand the passage at PH I 7. There, Sextus does not say that the skeptic experiences suspension of judgment only after investigation. So it is consistent with the text that the skeptic experiences suspension after some investigation, but that is not a new state of mind. Rather, it is an on-going suspension that continues throughout the investigation. Still, someone might press the point: Why would Sextus indicate this temporal order if the skeptic also suspends judgment beforehand? Perhaps he intends to capture the way that the skeptic’s attention is drawn anew to the pathos she experiences when some episode of inquiry fails to yield the truth. Or perhaps he has in mind the experience of becoming a skeptic, to which I turn now.

8 Becoming a Skeptic

Sextus speaks the way he does at the end of his discussion about place because he wants dogmatists to conclude that they should suspend judgment. Many scholars have pointed out that Sextus encourages dogmatists to become skeptics, and this seems to be a central purpose of his works (cf. PH III 280–281). Obviously, if the dogmatist is going to suspend judgment about some tenant of his dogma, suspension will not come at the beginning of the investigation. But if the arguments about place (or time or causation or anything else) are meant for the dogmatist, that does not tell us much about the skeptic’s practice. For that, we need to look at the general account of skeptical philosophy.

We have already seen that at the start of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, as part of his general description of skepticism, Sextus indicates that the skeptic experiences epochē after investigation. Another such passage occurs when he describes the telos of skepticism:

For when [the skeptic] began (arxamenos) to philosophize to judge the appearances and apprehend which are true and which are false so as to achieve tranquility, he came upon an equally strong disagreement, and since he could not decide [the issue], he suspended judgment. And after he suspended judgment, tranquility in matters of belief fortunately followed for him. (PH I 26)

Here again, it looks like Sextus says investigation comes first, then suspension. But for whom does epochē follow investigation? The subject of arxamenos is missing, and although the obvious antecedent is “the skeptic” who appears in PH I 25, we should ask: is the skeptic a skeptic when she began to philosophize? This passage at PH I 26 seems to describe the process of becoming a skeptic. After all, the subject in question could not be a skeptic when she began to philosophize if she believed that apprehending the truth would lead to tranquility.

The subject of arxamenos can be identified, I think, in an earlier passage about the beginning (archē) of skepticism:

We say that the hope of achieving tranquility is the causal beginning of skepticism. For great-natured people, when they were troubled by the irregularities in things and when they were at a loss regarding to which of them they should rather assent, they came to investigate both what among these matters is true and what is false, with the result that, from the determination of these things, they might achieve tranquility. (PH I 12)

The subject of arxamenos at PH I 26 is most likely the same “great-natured” people that Sextus mentions in PH I 12. Both are described as investigating what is true and false in order to achieve tranquility. If this is right, then Sextus is saying that investigation precedes epochē not for the skeptic, but rather for the person who will become a skeptic, the skeptical candidate, the near-convert to skepticism. This is what some have called the proto-skeptic and what I will call the prospective Pyrrhonist.^[55]

These passages highlight important similarities and differences between the skeptic and the prospective Pyrrhonist. Both pursue investigation, but the Pyrrhonian prospect thinks that grasping the truth will lead to tranquility.^[56] Moreover, PH I 12 makes it clear that the prospective Pyrrhonist suspends judgment before the investigation is over, and thus resembles the skeptic in another way. For, the skeptical prospect is said to be at a loss about which position to take, and so suspends judgment at least where such irregularities are concerned. In this way prospective Pyrrhonists mimic skeptics: when they are unsure of the answer, they continue to investigate.^[57] Finally, both experience tranquility after they suspend judgment in the face of an equipollent dispute, but for the prospect this is an unexpected result.

What then distinguishes the skeptical candidate from the mature skeptic? There are at least two differences. First, the prospective Pyrrhonist does not necessarily suspend judgment immediately. Rather, epochē only comes after spending enough time looking at the evidence to be puzzled (PH I 12). Second, the prospect does not gain tranquility right away, but only after the opposing positions are deemed equally strong (PH I 26). Prior to that point, the prospect is still troubled by the question and seeks tranquility by looking for the answer. The mature skeptic, on the other hand, considers the disagreement equipollent from the start, so suspension of judgment is an immediate source of tranquility.

The former point means that prospective Pyrrhonists (and dogmatists for that matter) do not follow the Pyrrhonian Disagreement Norm, and so disagreement is not – as a general rule – sufficient to cause them to suspend judgment.^[58] Given that Sextus wants to help both dogmatists and skeptical candidates alike achieve tranquility through the suspension of judgment, much of his writing is dedicated to offering the appearances and arguments that provide the needed oppositions. These conflicting accounts are directed at the dogmatists to generate that irregularity and inconsistency that will cause them to give up their certainty and start looking for answers again. But they also serve a function for the prospective skeptics who are already uncertain and looking; that function is made clear in Sextus’ discussion of the skeptical saying “To every account an equal one is opposed,” which he calls the constitutive principle of skepticism (PH I 12).

Sextus explains what he means by this particular saying later in Book One of his Outlines, noting that the statement only refers to the dogmatic accounts he has investigated, which seem to him to be equally plausible or convincing (PH I 202–203). Then he adds that sometimes skeptics use the phrase not as a report about the appearances, but as a way of encouraging one another to keep on the skeptical path:

But some also utter the saying thus: “To every account an equal account is to be opposed,” making this admonishing request: “To every account that establishes something dogmatically, let us oppose a conflicting account, which is dogmatically investigated and which is equal with regard to its trustworthiness or lack thereof.” [They do this] in order that the statement be [offered] to them as skeptics, but they speak it in the infinitive rather than the imperative, using “is to be opposed” rather than “let us oppose.” And they give this admonition to the skeptic so that he should not give up his investigation due to being misled by the dogmatist, and being hasty, fail to achieve the tranquility apparent to them, which they consider to be supported by the suspension of judgment concerning everything, just as we recounted in what came before. (PH I 204–205)

On the one hand, Sextus indicates that the skeptical saying means the Pyrrhonist thinks the opposing accounts are balanced. At the same time, we see an admission that they may not seem balanced. Why else would the skeptics need to encourage each other to keep looking? The directive is to continue investigating while simultaneously suspending judgment in order to find those equally strong accounts.

Moreover, it is clear from this passage that the skeptics do not regard their investigation as complete once they achieve epochē. The investigation is ongoing. It is true that Sextus does not say here that suspension of judgment occurs when the disagreement is detected, but there is, once again, the implication that investigation and suspension go hand-in-hand. This is implied by the fact that Sextus says giving up the investigation would involve succumbing to the rashness of the dogmatist, which is ceasing to suspend judgment and taking a position. But if one is always suspending judgment during the investigation, then epochē must start from the beginning, at the inquiry’s inception.

9 Conclusion

Some scholars claim that Pyrrhonism developed from two distinct strands that are essentially at odds, one that focused on suspending judgment and the other that focused on investigation. Even worse, Sextus is said to incorporate both strands into his general account of skepticism without being aware of their contrary attitudes with the result that Sextan skepticism is (at worst) necessarily incoherent. Other scholars have not charged Sextus with such blatant inconsistency, but have struggled to interpret how and why the skeptics continue to investigate when they suspend judgment.

I have not only defended Sextus against the charge of incoherence, but also clarified a central feature of Pyrrhonian philosophy: the skeptical life requires that investigation and epochē go hand-in-hand, and this can be expressed as a norm that calls one to suspend judgment immediately in the face of philosophical disagreement before considering what can be said for either side. Of course, Sextus thinks of the skeptics essentially as inquirers, so they look into the arguments and evidence on both sides. But because this occurs while they are already suspending judgment, there is no conflict in saying that they both investigate and suspend judgment.

It is true that the skeptic will – at times – evaluate the state of the debate and may conclude that both sides are equally strong so that we must suspend judgment. But, for the mature skeptic, that is not a call to change from belief to epochē, but rather a reminder to stick with her current suspensive state. The most significant benefit of my interpretation is in explaining the seemingly irrational behavior of the skeptic who, Sextus says, will continue to suspend judgment in the face of an apparently irrefutable proof. The reason that the skeptic sticks with epochē is because she does not think all of the evidence is in, so the investigation must go on. More generally, this helps to explain something that has always bothered me about Pyrrhonism: what happens if the skeptic evaluates both sides at a point when coincidentally one side seems stronger than the other? In other words, if equal weight is required for suspension, how do we know that the mature skeptic will always be able to balance opposing positions? On my interpretation, there is no worry because even if the skeptic considers the current evidence for one side stronger than the other, there is still an investigation to pursue. One should not think that merely because one side wins when the evidence is evaluated prematurely that that side has the right answer.

By proceeding in this way, the skeptic can continue the investigation while simultaneously suspending judgment. And if I am right, the skeptic uses techniques meant to perpetuate the investigation interminably and thus stay in a state of suspension forever.