Socrates on Cookery and Rhetoric

1 Introduction

Food, eating, and cookery were of great interest to Greek writers in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Literary engagement with this topic spans from comic commentary on excessive, luxurious eating and elaborate cookery to serious engagement with cookery as a craft and medical treatises on dietetics.^[1] Instructions on how to cook were collected in cookbooks – at the time, a new literary genre modeled on instructions in other crafts and sciences, such as medical instructions on how to treat the sick.^[2] The collection of recipes by Mithaikos (mentioned in Plato’s Gorgias 518b, among other sources) is perhaps the first and most famous widely distributed Greek cookbook. While professional cookery and hedonic eating (that is, eating for the sake of pleasure) was a subject of mockery in our literary sources – the boastful chef even became a comic stock character – medical dietetics (that is, eating to preserve or reestablish health) was taken seriously.^[3] When the Hippocratics began regarding nutrition as crucial in treating and preventing diseases, dietetics became “one of the most relevant branches in ancient Greek medicine.”^[4]

I will show that Socrates added his salt to this discourse by commenting on how one should consume and produce food. While interpreters have noted the importance of food and eating for other ancient Greek philosophers – such as the Pythagoreans (who famously abstain from beans), or the Cynics (whose peculiar eating habits are one of their most prominent features), and Plato in his middle and later dialogues (where he claims that overindulgence in food is the “greatest threat to philosophy”)^[5] – Socrates’ comments on food and eating in the Socratic dialogues of Plato and Xenophon have not been the focus of much investigation.^[6]

This lack of scholarly engagement is somewhat unsurprising. Socrates seems to be an intellectualist about living well: we live well if we act well, and we act well if we have true beliefs or, better yet, knowledge about what is best for us to do.^[7] In this account, the Socratic quest for living well is primarily (even exclusively, according to some interpreters) an intellectual undertaking. Intellectualists care about the intellect – beliefs and reasoning. It might seem that eating, as an activity related to the body, is only of interest to the intellectualist insofar as it can interrupt, perhaps even disturb, our thinking and prevent us from living well. This intellectualism may seem to go hand-in-hand with Socrates’ apparent asceticism – his turning away from the body by devaluing, limiting, or perhaps even avoiding bodily pleasures and activities that involve such pleasures.^[8] The only thing one might expect the ascetic to say about food and eating is that one should abstain as much as possible.

But we will see that Socrates is not at all disinterested in food and eating and that his stance is much more nuanced than one might expect. I will argue that a common theme in Socrates’ comments on food and eating is a suspicion of and warning about one type of food in particular: opson (ὄψον), that is, any food added to the staple food (bread). I will here take a closer look at two passages. The first is an amusing passage in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (3.14.2–4) in which Socrates calls out a fellow dinner guest for eating opson without bread, calling him an opsophagos (ὀψοφάγος), someone who ‘feeds on opson.’ The second is a passage in Plato’s Gorgias (462b–466a) in which Socrates harshly criticizes professional opson cookery (ὀψοποιία). I will show that comparing these two passages enhances our understanding of both: Socrates’ criticism of professional producers of opson (ὀψοποιός)^[9] in Plato’s Gorgias helps us understand his criticism of unrestrained consumers of opson (ὀψοφάγος) in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and vice versa.^[10]

I argue that once we understand the specific cultural meaning of eating opson, we see that Socrates takes a nuanced stance on food, eating, and cookery: he recommends careful consumption and skillful production of opson, not austerity or abstinence. Socrates believes that we should consume opson very carefully because indulging in opson can promote psychological and physiological disorder in the individual as well as disorder in the polis and even in the cosmos. The opsophagos personifies these dangers. By serving pleasant meals without any regard for the good of the consumer, the opson chef nourishes the condition of opsophagia (‘feeding on opson’). However, if produced skillfully and consumed carefully, opson can contribute to the human good. This nuance in Socrates’ discussion of food also changes our interpretation of Socrates’ criticism of rhetoric in the Gorgias: in comparing rhetoricians to opson chefs – not to pastry chefs, as many have assumed – Socrates evokes the dangers of indulging in speeches while acknowledging their necessity and potential positive value for Athenian public life. Speeches, like opsa, are not superfluous or inherently bad, but they can be consumed and produced wrongly – analogous to the case of the opsophagos and conventional opson chefs – and then they cause great harm.

This paper has four main sections. I will first explain that opson is any food added to the staple food (bread) and thus a necessary part of one’s diet (Section 2). I then analyze Socrates’ criticism of ‘feeding on opson’ in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (Section 3) and his attack on professional opson cookery in Plato’s Gorgias (Section 4). I propose that Socrates attacks the professional producers and unrestrained consumers of both opson and speeches because indulging in them promotes psychological and physiological disorder in the individual as well as disorder in the polis and the cosmos (Section 5).

2 Eating Opson

The typical ancient Greek meal had three parts: sitos (σίτος), opson (ὄψον), and drink (πότος).^[11] Sitos refers to ‘staple foods,’ which were usually made from barley (like barley bread and cakes) and sometimes from wheat.^[12] Opson (plural: opsa), from which we get the English term ‘opsony,’ is notoriously difficult to translate. English translators have rendered opson as ‘prepared food’ or ‘delicacy,’ but also as ‘appetizer’ or ‘seasoning.’^[13] While each of these translations may work in certain contexts, none of them accurately captures the meaning of opson. Consider Socrates’ list of opsa in Rep. 372c2 (salt, olives, cheese, boiled roots, and vegetables), his comments on onions as opsa (Xen. Symp. 4.8.5; Ion 538c3), and Athenaeus’ various references to all sorts of fish as opson (see esp. Ath. 7.4). These examples show that some (but not all) opsa are seasonings or delicacies, that opsa may be served as appetizers but can also be part of the main course, and that opsa are usually prepared to some extent (but so is sitos).

For better translations of opson, we may turn to non-English dictionaries that propose translations like: ‘companage’ (Pabón 1967); ‘tout ce qu’on mange avec le pain’ (Bailly 1901); and ‘alle was zum Brote gegessen wird, besonders Fleisch, Fisch, Gemüse’ (Gemoll 1908). In other words, opson is an ‘add-on’ food, that is, any food added to the staple food of bread, such as spices, cheese, nuts, fish, meat, and vegetables. To get a better idea of what opson means, we can help ourselves to the following comparison. Envision a typical Ethiopian meal. The injera (the sour, fermented, spongy flatbread) is the sitos. All the delicious stews (wat) and salads on top of the bread are the opsa. Pieces of the bread are torn to take bits of the stew, and then both are eaten together. In a similar way, ancient Greeks would take a piece of sitos and eat it together with an opson.

We learn in Xenophon that Socrates maintains very frugal eating habits, limiting himself to sitos and simple, easy-to-come-by opsa. Socrates

schooled his body and soul by following a regimen which, under ordinary circumstances, would afford anyone a life of confidence and security and make it easy to meet the required expenses. For he was so frugal that it is hardly possible to imagine a man doing so little work as not to earn enough to satisfy the needs of Socrates. He ate just enough food to make eating a pleasure, and he was so ready for his food that his desire for staples (sitos) was his add-on food (opson). Any kind of drink was pleasant to him because he drank only when he was thirsty. (Xen. Mem. 1.3.5, trans. Marchant 2013, modified)^[14]

Xenophon describes Socrates’ frugal eating habits with the idiom: “Socrates’ desire for staples (sitos) was his add-on food (opson).” In other words, ‘hunger is the best sauce’ (Marchant 2013). When Socrates eats, he is so hungry that he is satisfied with simple meals. Of course, this does not mean that Socrates abstains from opson entirely – not even Socrates can live on bread alone – but it suggests that Socrates needs only a small amount of opson. Further, the passage suggests that when Socrates does eat opsa, he is satisfied with simple ones that are easy to come by for someone living a frugal life – like salt, olives, cheese, boiled roots, and vegetables (Rep. 372c). This does not mean that Socrates never consumes fancier opsa like fish or meat; however, it suggests that Socrates does not eat them often. In addition to what Socrates eats (mainly sitos and simple opson), this passage also speaks to when and how much Socrates eats. According to Xenophon, Socrates eats when he is hungry; he does not eat excessively or merely for pleasure.

Socrates’ diet is so remarkably frugal that it is a common subject of mockery in both Xenophon and Plato: “Your food and drink are the poorest,” Antiphon ridicules; “You are living a life that not even a slave would put up with. […] Consider yourself a teacher of unhappiness” (Xen. Mem. 1.6.2–3). In the Gorgias, Callicles compares the frugal life to which Socrates aspires to live to the lives of stones and corpses (Gorg. 492e), and in the Republic, Glaucon compares it to the life of a pig (Rep. 372d).

Socrates’ conversation with Glaucon in Republic Bk. II reveals just how important Socrates considers a frugal diet for a good life. While Republic Bk. II is usually not considered to be an ‘early’ dialogue and thus does not provide evidence for a narrowly Socratic view of food and eating, it does offer a particularly clear discussion of the dangers of opson that is remarkably similar to what we will find in Xenophon’s and Plato’s Socratic dialogues. When Socrates and Glaucon set up a fictitious city to investigate justice, Socrates explains that they will be guided by their needs (χρεία, Rep. 369c10): “Our first and greatest need is to provide food to sustain life” (Rep. 369d1–2). When Socrates later specifies the kind of food that would satisfy the citizens’ primary needs, Glaucon is stunned: Socrates appears to have the citizens live on sitos alone – wheat and barley bread and cakes – without any opson (Ἄνευ ὄψου, Rep. 372c2). In response to Glaucon’s complaint, Socrates explains that of course the citizens will have opson: salt, olives, cheese, boiled roots, vegetables, figs, chickpeas, beans, myrtle, and acorns. Socrates’ comic response is telling. It confirms that opson is any food added to the staple food of bread, and it shows Socrates’ concern with opsa that are simple and rural (eaten ‘in the country,’ ἐν ἀγροῖς, Rep. 372c6) as opposed to fancy and urban. Glaucon complains that such a diet is insufferable for humans and only appropriate for pigs (Rep. 372d).^[15] Socrates is happy to go along with Glaucon’s request and add fancier kinds of opsa, but he emphasizes the consequences of this change in diet: if the citizens live according to the Socratic diet, they will live long lives in peace and health (ἐν εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ὑγιείας, Rep. 372d1–2). If, however, they live according to the Glauconean diet, they will be more prone to war and sickness (Rep. 373d1–2, e2–7). Thus, depending on the diet, we get two different cities: one ‘true’ and ‘healthy,’ the other ‘luxurious’ and ‘feverish’ (Rep. 372e–373a). Note that Socrates’ claim is not only or mainly that a certain diet is a symptom of an unhealthy life, but rather that a certain diet promotes such a life. Give them fancier opsa, Socrates seems to claim, and their lives will decline.

Below, I will argue that in both Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates expresses a very similar stance on food and eating as he does in the Republic: eating well is the foundation of a good life for the individual and the polis, and we should watch out for those who risk our health and peace by cooking or indulging in delicious opsa. Thus, while Republic Bk. II may not be evidence of a narrowly Socratic view of opson and its dangers, it does suggest some continuity between Socrates’ stance on food in Plato’s early and middle dialogues. At the same time, my discussion will reveal a significant nuance in Socrates’ stance: the Socratic diet is frugal but not austere. Socrates does not avoid the pleasures of eating, nor does he necessarily abstain from eating delicious opson.

3 Socrates against Opsophagia in Xenophon’s Memorabilia

Socrates does not shy away from scolding those who exhibit improper table manners regarding opson and sitos. Xenophon reports that Socrates once called out a fellow dinner guest for eating opson without any bread by calling him an opsophagos (ὀψοφάγος), that is, a person who ‘feeds on opson.’ Turning to the other dinner guests, Socrates asks,

“Can we say, gentlemen, for what kind of action a man is called an opsophagos? For, in fact, everyone eats opson on the sitos whenever it is available, but I don’t think they are called opsophagos for this reason.” “No, certainly not,” said one of those present. “What, then, if someone eats the opson itself, without the sitos, not because he is in training, but for the sake of pleasure (ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα) – does he seem to be an opsophagos or not?” “If not, it’s hard to say who does,” replied the other. Someone else said, “What about the man who eats a large amount of opson on a bit of sitos?” “To me, it seems that this one too would rightly be called an opsophagos,” said Socrates. (Xen. Mem. 3.14.2–3, my translation)

The opsophagos, Socrates says, can be identified by his actions: he eats opson without sitos (or a lot of opson with a little bit of sitos) not because he is an athlete who requires an opson-heavy diet (like Milo the wrestler; see Aristotle EN 1106b4), but simply because opson is pleasant.^[16] Hearing this insult, the dinner guest takes some bread with his opson, but Socrates does not let it go. Let us see, Socrates comments loudly, “whether he treats the sitos as his opson or the opson as his sitos” (Xen. Mem. 3.14.4).

Socrates believes that the opsophagos is doing something wrong, and that is why he calls him out at the dinner party. But what is the opsophagos’ crime? If you have attended dinner parties with an opsophagos or are familiar with the TV show Curb Your Enthusiasm, the answer to this question might seem obvious to you. The opsophagos seems to go over his allotment, that is, over the socially acceptable amount of food to take for oneself. In the TV show, Larry David calls out a fellow dinner guest for shoveling caviar onto his cracker: “You know, we’re each entitled to take a certain amount, so everybody else can have a little bit, too. Feels like you’re going over.” For David, the fellow guest is violating the rules of distributive justice – caviar is a zero-sum good, so if you take too much, someone else has less or none. Now imagine that running out of caviar is not a concern at said dinner party. There will be enough for everyone. Would you still judge the opsophagos? If so, why? Socrates, as will become clear below, might still judge the opsophagos because, for him, opsophagia is a symptom of a larger issue, namely, of being an intemperate person – someone who wants more and more, not only at the buffet but also in other areas of life. I suspect that Socrates’ criticism of opsophagia still resonates with us today. Even if running out of caviar at the party is not a concern, we might still judge the opsophagos because we suspect that his eating habits reflect on him as a person and reveal him as someone who also behaves intemperately when it comes to other goods, such as money and power.

For a first hint as to what exactly Socrates finds problematic about opsophagia, we can return to Xenophon’s testimony above. The opsophagos, Socrates explains, eats opson simply “for the sake of pleasure” (ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα). Pleasure is one of the defining features of opson. About onions, Socrates says that they are called opson because or in so far as (ὡς) they make bread and drink pleasant (Xen. Symp. 4.8).^[17] Sitos, on the other hand, is famously unpleasant; people generally do not indulge in barley bread and cakes. Despite being a staple food, barley bread was known to be “poor stuff.”^[18] It was so poor that the Romans “mostly fed [it] to animals,” and “even slaves were fed on wheaten bread.”^[19] The thing that made sitos palatable was opson.

Since opson is pleasant, it is a ‘persuader’; it ‘persuades’ one to eat more and more, even when one is full, as Socrates warns his dinner companions:

Whenever [Socrates] accepted an invitation to dinner, he guarded himself without difficulty against filling oneself up beyond the limit of satiety (τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸν κόρον ἐμπίμπλασθαι); and he advised those who could not do likewise to watch out for those foods that persuade one (τὰ πείθοντα) to eat when one is not hungry and to drink when one is not thirsty. (Xen. Mem. 1.3.6, trans. Marchant 2013, modified)

These passages reveal what Davidson (1995; 1997) calls the “ambivalence” of opson. On the one hand, opson is one of the standard parts of a typical Greek meal: “Everyone eats opson,” Socrates notes (Xen. Mem. 3.14.2). On the other hand, opson is somewhat superfluous; it is an essential inessential, a “dietary accessory,” a “mere garnish” that is pleasant and persuasive and thus a possible object of overindulgence, threatening to take over the meal.^[20]

While Xenophon presents a rather comic dinner scenario in which Socrates calls out an opsophagos for his improper table manners, in the Gorgias, Plato paints a much more serious and tragic picture of opsophagia. There, Socrates describes what it is like when opson has not only taken over one’s meal but one’s entire life.

4 Socrates against Opsopoiia in Plato’s Gorgias

In the Gorgias, Socrates seeks to talk to the famous rhetorician Gorgias, but as Socrates arrives, we learn that he is late for the “feast” (ἑορτῆς, Gorg. 447a3).^[21] Gorgias had just given his audience a taste of his art, serving “very dainty” (μάλα ἀστείας) and “many fine” (πολλὰ καὶ καλά) speeches (Gorg. 447a5).^[22] But Socrates is, of course, not interested in feasting. He did not come to indulge in a presentation (ἐπιδείξεται, Gorg. 447b2); instead, Socrates hopes to have a discussion (διαλεχθῆναι, Gorg. 447c1) with Gorgias. The very first words of the dialogue set the tone for that discussion: Socrates might be late for the feast, but he is just in time for war and battle (πολέμου καὶ μάχης, Gorg. 447a1).^[23] In what follows, Socrates will challenge Gorgias and his fans Polus and Callicles to defend their alleged art, rhetoric (ῥητορική), against the charge of being nothing other than professional opson cookery (ὀψοποιία) for the soul. For Socrates, both rhetoricians and opson chefs are mere “servants and satisfiers of appetites” (διακόνους καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστάς, Gorg. 518c3–4).^[24] They fill up people’s appetites (τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, Gorg. 503c5) with pleasure without any consideration for what is truly good for the consumer (Gorg. 464d, 501a–b, 503a, 513d–514a).^[25]

The allusions to food in the opening scene of the Gorgias foreshadow the importance of Socrates’ comparison between rhetoric and opson cookery. This comparison is central to Socrates’ criticism of rhetoric. But despite its importance, it has not yet been fully analyzed; further, Socrates has often been misinterpreted as comparing rhetoricians to pastry chefs. These interpretations stem from mistranslating opsopoiia (ὀψοποιία) as ‘pastry baking.’^[26] But, as we saw, opson does not refer to ‘pastries’ but to ‘add-on foods’, that is, to anything eaten with bread (sitos). This is confirmed when Socrates mentions one opson chef, Mithaikos, by name (Gorg. 518b6). Mithaikos’ famous cookbook did not survive, unfortunately. A partial version of his only remaining recipe can be found in Athenaeus’ Deipnosophists (Ath.); it is a recipe not for pastry but for ταινία, a kind of fish (Ath. 7.128). In the Gorgias, Socrates does not have a beef with pastry chefs, but with opson chefs, that is, with those who make opson (such as fish) professionally and elaborately and thus produce particularly delicious opsa.^[27]

Understanding opsopoiia as pastry-baking is not only historically incorrect but also philosophically hazardous, as it affects our interpretation of Socrates’ criticism of rhetoric. If Socrates were comparing rhetoricians to pastry chefs, we might take him to suggest that speeches, like pastries, are superfluous, and thus we can live without them. In fact, they have only negative nutritional value; they are bad for us. In that case, we might conclude that Socrates recommends that we abstain from consuming both speeches and pastries and that we abolish both rhetoric and pastry baking. However, once we see that Socrates compares speeches to opsa and not to pastries, his position becomes much more nuanced.

On the one hand, speeches and opsa are pleasant and thus risky – they threaten to take over politics and meals, respectively. When speeches and opsa are professionally prepared, these threats become imminent. Laymen’s rhetoric and cookery can be tasty and thus risky, but their products are not as enchanting as those of professionals.^[28] This is, I propose, why Socrates attacks professional speech- and opson-makers. Professional speeches – especially courtroom speeches, which seem to be Socrates’ main target in the Gorgias – are seasoned with a blend of pleasant ingredients (flattery, drama, poetry, comedy, and juicy gossip) for the sake of maximal enjoyment (ἥδιστον, Gorg. 521e1).^[29] Defendants may flatter the jury and slander their opponents; they may recite verses and tell jokes; they may beg for mercy and present their weeping wives and children – behavior that Socrates famously condemns (Apol. 34c–35b). As Hall (1995) argues, courtroom speeches were performances that entertained and pleased audiences in ways similar to comedies and tragedies in the theater.

On the other hand, opsa and speeches are ordinary and necessary parts of Athenian everyday life: an opson is not an optional pastry dessert, but rather a necessary part of the main course. No one can live on bread alone. Likewise, Athenian democracy needs speeches.^[30] So, when Socrates compares rhetoric to opson cookery and criticizes both, he does not suggest that we should abstain from speeches and opsa entirely.^[31] Far from it! We need both opsa and speeches.

One might think that perhaps Socrates does not recommend abstinence, given that this is impossible, but austerity. Austerity has sometimes been attributed to Plato’s Socrates, most prominently in the Phaedo, and in the following sense: the austere philosopher actively avoids every bodily pleasure and the activities that involve such pleasures as much as possible and in all circumstances (Ebrey 2017, 2, 7, 11). When it comes to food, that would mean that the austere philosopher avoids eating opson as much as possible, and when he does eat opson, he intentionally makes his meal unpalatable in order to avoid deriving pleasure from eating. Whatever may be going on in the Phaedo, this is not what Socrates does in Plato’s Gorgias and Xenophon’s Memorabilia. We saw above that instead of avoiding the pleasures of eating, Socrates “eats with pleasure” (ἡδέως ἤσθιε, Xen. Mem. 1.3.5). The pleasures that Socrates derives from eating appear to be what he in the Gorgias calls “good bodily pleasures,” that is, pleasures that produce bodily excellence (ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, Gorg. 499d).^[32] Thus, in both Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates experiences pleasures from eating. While Socrates could avoid or at least significantly reduce these pleasures – for example, he could make his meals less appealing in taste, smell, and sight by oversalting them or consuming them next to the latrine – he does not do so. Socrates sometimes even makes his meals more pleasant. At one dinner party, Socrates orders that a large amount of opson be distributed equally among all dinner guests (Xen. Mem. 3.14.1). Socrates does this to disincentivize the person who brought all the opson from bringing such large amounts to future dinner parties; but by sharing the opson, Socrates makes the meal more pleasant for all the guests, himself included. Thus, he does not actively avoid the pleasures of eating as much as possible and in all circumstances; in this case, he actively increases these pleasures.

I propose that Socrates argues neither for austere meals nor austere speeches. He even seasons his own speeches with pleasant ingredients: Socrates recites poetry (Gorg. 526d) and tells myths (Gorg. 523a–524a); he makes references to tragedy (Gorg. 492e) and comedy (Gorg. 481c–e,^[33] 505e). He even ridicules and insults his opponents when he calls the rhetorician a “friendship-faking sucker-up” (kolax, Gorg. 463a-b) and compares the rhetorician’s way of life to the life of the “scratcher” (a man who “has an itch and scratches it […] to his heart’s content […] his whole life long,” Gorg. 494c) and the kinaidos (a womanish man with a foul mouth and a busy bottom, Gorg. 494e4).^[34] Socrates could serve more austere speeches, but he chooses not to.^[35]

On the ‘pastry’ interpretation, pastries and, by analogy, pleasant speeches are unhealthy and bad. Thus, their production (pastry baking and rhetoric) and consumption (eating pastries and listening to pleasant speeches) are also bad.^[36] But on my interpretation, pleasant speeches and opsa are neutral; they are not inherently bad, and whether they lead to bad consequences depends on the producer and consumer.^[37] Speeches and opsa become problematic when they are professionally prepared for maximum pleasure and served to anyone without the guidance of real experts on the human body and soul (Gorg. 517e–518a). But if served skillfully and consumed wisely, speeches and opson can contribute to the human good (Gorg. 517e–518a, 527c). In other words, producing and consuming speeches and opson well are skills (τέχνη, Gorg. 503d1).

In my reading, Socrates’ distinction between good or true rhetoric (τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ) and bad or kolakik rhetoric (τῇ κολακικῇ ῥητορικῇ, Gorg. 517a) – that is, rhetoric that only aims to please – follows naturally and plausibly. Socrates claims that we “must flee” (φευκτέον, Gorg. 527c3) kolakik rhetoric but not true rhetoric. Likewise, we might infer that we should avoid kolakik cookery – that is, cookery that only aims to please – but not true cookery – that is, cookery that contributes to the human good. Perhaps good rhetoric can aid justice (soul-correction) by making healthy speeches pleasant, and good opson cookery can aid medicine (body-correction) by making healthy meals tasty.^[38] However, conventional rhetoricians like Gorgias and opson chefs like Mithaikos do not contribute to the human good because they aim only at maximizing pleasure (ἥδιστον, Gorg. 521e1), and thus Socrates rightfully criticizes them. The problem, it seems, is not pleasure per se but maximizing pleasure without any concern for the human good.^[39]

By catering to our appetites without any concern for our good, conventional opson chefs and rhetoricians promote a certain kind of life (bios), namely, a life of unrestrained pleasure-seeking (Gorg. 492d–495a). In defending rhetoric, Callicles argues that such a life is a good life. He lives well, Callicles proclaims, who does not restrain his appetites but allows them to become as large as possible and then “fills them with whatever he may have an appetite for at the time” (Gorg. 492a2–3). The happy life, Callicles claims, is a life of constantly filling and emptying one’s appetites. In Callicles’ account, rhetoric is conducive to the happy life because rhetoricians can get “a greater share” (πλεονεκτεῖν) of goods for themselves and their associates (Gorg. 483c). Against Callicles, Socrates argues that the life of unrestrained pleasure-seekers is “terrible (δεινός), shameful (αἰσχρός), and miserable (ἄθλιος)” (Gorg. 494e5).

To better understand Socrates’ criticism in the Gorgias, I introduce the character of the opsophagos that we encountered above in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. The opsophagos illustrates the life of unrestrained pleasure-seeking and of taking ‘a greater share’ in at least three important ways. He is thus walking evidence of the harmfulness of conventional opson cookery and, by analogy, rhetoric.

First, the lives of unrestrained pleasure-seekers center around satisfying their appetites. Socrates describes such a life as busy and stressful because the objects of pleasure-seekers’ appetites are often “scarce and difficult to come by, procurable only with much toil and trouble” (Gorg. 493e). Socrates’ description applies well to the opsophagos. For the opsophagos, opson is the first and last thing on his mind: he is “in the habit of taking a walk, first thing in the morning, in the fish market” (Ath. 8.27), and on his deathbed, his last wish is to finish his meal (Ath. 8.26). He deeply mistrusts others and constantly worries that they might steal his precious opson, not even trusting his own mother to watch his food (Ath. 8.25). Professionally prepared opson is also expensive and harder to come by than home-cooked opson. Opsophagia is thus economically stressful and dangerous. The restlessness and anxiety of the financially-ruined opsophagos was a common trope.^[40]

Second, the appetites of such pleasure-seekers are undisciplined (ἀκόλαστον) and insatiable (ἀπληστίαν); they are “leaky jars” that require constant filling (Gorg. 493b). Such agents take pleasure in constantly filling and emptying their jars, not in the state of being full (Gorg. 494a–b).^[41] We can see this insatiability in the opsophagos’ eating manners. The opsophagos consumes opson quickly and hastily by, for example, eating opson without bread, as we saw above, or, as popular opinion has it, by gulping down a hot piece of fish, thereby burning himself (Ath. 8.32) or even dying (Ath. 8.35; see also Ath. 8.26).^[42]

Third, insatiable pleasure-seekers violate social order to “get a greater share” (πλεονεκτεῖν), which Callicles regards as admirable, natural, and just (Gorg. 483c–d). The opsophagos violates social order at the table. Not only does he eat opson without bread, but it is rumored that some opsophagoi even spit on the food to make it inedible for anyone else (Ath. 8.35). I suggest that this disorder, injustice, and lawlessness are at the heart of Socrates’ attack. I will propose that Socrates calls out the opsophagos and attacks the opson chef (and, by analogy, the unrestrained consumers and conventional producers of speeches) because indulging in opson promotes disorder not just at the dinner table, but also in the individual, the polis, and even throughout the cosmos.

5 Individual, Political, and Cosmic Disorder

In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that each thing – whether body, soul, animal, or artifact – is good if it realizes its excellence (ἀρετή) and that it realizes its excellence if it is brought into its “own order” or “the order that belongs” to it (οἰκεῖος κόσμος, Gorg. 506d5–e5). The soul’s own order is “law” (νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, Gorg. 504d2), which Socrates defines as having self-control (σώφρων, Gorg. 507a1). The souls of insatiable pleasure-seekers like the opsophagos are thus disorderly and lawless. While Socrates’ diagnosis of intemperance in the Gorgias remains somewhat cryptic, it is worth pointing out how innovative it is. According to North (2019, 190), “No one had previously defined the virtue [i. e., temperance] as ‘good order or arrangement within the soul.’” If this is so, no one before Socrates had explicitly understood intemperate agents like the opsophagos in terms of psychological disorder.

In the Gorgias, Socrates advises that “we must keep it [i. e., the soul of an insatiable pleasure-seeker] away (εἴργειν) from its objects of appetite (τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἀφ’ ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ) and we must not permit (μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν) the soul to do anything other than what makes it better” (Gorg. 505b).^[43] Our actions can make the soul better and more orderly, but, we may infer, they can also make it worse and more disorderly. Socrates describes the worsening of the soul through overindulgence with the imagery of leaky jars (Gorg. 493a–494b): the more that goes into the leaky jar (i. e., the appetites), the more that must go out, and thus the holes in the jar become bigger and bigger (i. e., the agent desires more and more). Acting intemperately, then, promotes pleonexia, wanting more. Opsophagia is thus a symptom of a disorderly soul, and indulging in opson promotes psychological disorder.^[44] But this is not to say that eating opson promotes disorder in everyone. Socrates can enjoy opson (even particularly delicious ones on occasion) without falling into psychic disorder, whereas the opsophagos cannot. Thus, different diets are good for different people (Gorg. 505a).

Xenophon’s Socrates offers a different, though compatible, diagnosis of the dangers of opson: indulging in opson – and specifically in a variety of opsa – is problematic because we can become accustomed to it (Xen. Mem. 3.14.5–6). He who mixes (συμμιγνύων) many different (πολλὰ […] παντοδαπά) opsa and crams them into his mouth all at once risks “getting into the habit of eating many things at the same time” (τῷ ἅμα πολλὰ ἐσθίειν ἐθισθέντι). Then, when there is no such variety, “he thinks that he gets less than his share (μειονεκτεῖν) because he desires what he is used to (ποθῶν τὸ σύνηθες),” while he who is used to eating only one kind of opson (ἑνὶ ὄψῳ) will easily make do. Getting into the habit of eating a variety of opsa promotes pleonexia, and thus, when there is no such variety, the person who “wants more” (pleonektein) feels like he is “not getting enough” (meionektein).

Thus, while Plato’s Socrates in the Gorgias identifies a problem with the consumer’s soul (“indulging in opson itself promotes psychological disorder in some people”), Xenophon’s Socrates identifies a problem with “the types of opson consumed (a variety, prepared so as to induce maximum pleasure)” as well as with “the way in which opson is consumed (a variety in every mouthful).” Food being ‘moreish’ (i. e., so pleasant that one wants to eat more) “is one kind of danger that Socrates identifies,” but such foods are more dangerous for some than for others.^[45] In order to eat opson properly, we might have to attend to the distinct sources of danger separately.

In the Gorgias, variety is a problematic feature of both opson cookery and rhetoric. The opson chef serves “many pleasant meals of all sorts” (πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ, Gorg. 522a3), constantly changing the ingredients of dishes to cater to the taste of his customers. Likewise, the rhetorician serves “many” (πολλά, Gorg. 447a5) speeches, constantly changing their content to please the audience (Gorg. 481e). People’s tastes change, but what is truly good for them – physiologically and psychologically – stays the same. Thus, we find Socrates emphasizing that, in contrast to the rhetoricians, he always says the same things (Gorg. 491b, 527d).^[46]

Opsophagia is not only detrimental to psychological health – it also throws the body into disarray. Socrates says in the Gorgias that the body is orderly when it is healthy and disorderly when it is sick (Gorg. 504c). Overindulging in opson leads to bodily sickness (νόσον, Gorg. 518d1, d4), that is, to disorder. Socrates claims that opson chefs bring about bodily sickness and disorder when they “fill and fatten (ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες) people’s bodies […] and destroy (προσαπολοῦσιν) their original flesh” (Gorg. 518c5–7). Since bodily health and order are necessary for living well (Gorg. 504e, 512a; see also Crit. 47e), opson chefs harm their consumers.^[47] Note again the similarity to rhetoric. Rhetoricians, Socrates argues, have given the city festering sores (ὕπουλος, Gorg. 518e4), filling it with what gratifies the citizens – “fortification, dockyards, an empire, and tribute” (Gorg. 519a; see also 455e, 517c) or, to pick more contemporary examples, tax cuts and football stadiums – without caring about what is truly best for the city.

Xenophon’s Socrates also shows a serious concern for the body. He urges everyone to care for their bodies (Xen. Mem. 3.12.5) and reproves those who neglect their bodies (Xen. Mem. 1.2.4), even commenting publicly on people’s physical appearance (Xen. Mem. 3.12.1–4). It is shameful, Socrates maintains, to be careless with one’s body and not try to make it as beautiful and strong as possible (κάλλιστος καὶ κράτιστος, Xen. Mem. 3.12.8.2). Care for the body is for the sake of bodily health. It includes watching what one eats and drinks as well as exercise (Xen. Mem. 4.7.9). Eating food that benefits both soul and body is part of a well-ordered life (τοῖς κοσμίως διαιτωμένοις, Xen. Mem. 3.14.7). Indulging in opson, Socrates warns us, “ruin[s] stomach, heads, and souls” (Xen. Mem. 1.3.6). As Diogenes Laertius tells the story, Socrates’ own “way of life (δίαιταν) was so remarkably well-ordered (εὔτακτός)” that “on the many occasions when a plague (λοιμῶν) broke out at Athens, Socrates was the only man who did not fall ill” (DL 2.25.9–11).

Of course, Socrates advises us not to care more for the body than for the soul (Apol. 30a–b). The soul is still more valuable than the body (Gorg. 477b–e, 512a5–6; Crit. 47e6–48a3). Thus, when at the end of his life, Socrates must choose between bodily and psychological well-being, he chooses the latter, rejecting his friend Crito’s help to flee prison. Socrates chooses to ingest something that poisons his body – hemlock – rather than something that poisons his soul – wrongdoing. And yet, once we acknowledge that bodily well-being is important for living well, Socrates’ simultaneous disdain of conventional cookery and appreciation of medicine and dietetics becomes much more plausible. The physician, Socrates thinks, produces a “fine product” (καλὸν ἔργον, Charm. 165d1–2). In my reading, Socrates is not hostile toward the body or toward certain kinds of foods; he is not somaphobic or opsonphobic.^[48] Rather, he believes that caring for the body by eating well is an important part of living well.

At this point, we understand that opsophagia is bad for the individual because it leads to psychological and physiological disorder and an overall disorderly, stressful way of life. This insight may have led Socrates to follow a certain frugal diet, but why, we might wonder, is it any of Socrates’ business how much opson other people eat? Why not eat and let eat? I propose that Socrates calls out the opsophagos and criticizes opson chefs because he is concerned for the well-being of the polis.

When Socrates in the Gorgias summarizes the conclusion to his argument against the undisciplined life, he moves seamlessly from the life of the insatiable pleasure-seeker to the life of the robber (λῃστοῦ βίον, Gorg. 507e3) and from disorder in the individual to disorder in the polis:

He should not allow his appetites to be undisciplined or undertake to fill them up […] and live the life of a robber (λῃστοῦ βίον). Such a man could not be dear to another man or to a god, for he is unable to do anything in common (κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος), and where there’s no sense of community (κοινωνία) there’s no friendship (φιλία). (Gorg. 507e, trans. Zeyl 1997, modified)

Insatiable pleasure-seekers have lawless souls and, we can explain on Socrates’ behalf, they resort to lawless behavior to satisfy their appetites – from eating opson without bread to other more serious crimes. Those who live their lives in the service of their appetites put pleasure above the law. Characters like the opsophagos were thus commonly suspected of crimes and seen as a threat to the order of the polis.^[49]

The kinds of crimes and societal disruptions that Socrates alludes to when he compares the life of the pleasure-seeker to the life of the robber are more serious than, for example, stealing eel from a fishmonger. The robber (λῃστής) takes a greater share by force (βίαιον, Soph. 222c5); in this way, he differs from the thief (κλέπτης). The robber raids and plunders on land and sea; thus, λῃστής is sometimes translated as ‘pirate’ (see, e. g., Pol. 298d). His crimes lead to fighting and war.^[50] The robber is thus a threat to the social order in a more substantial, political sense: robbers are outlaws – they live outside the law. When, earlier in the Gorgias, Callicles praised the rhetorician as belonging to the class of superior men who take a greater share “by force” (βίᾳ, Gorg. 488b3–5), he inadvertently praised the life of the robber.^[51]

For us, it might be a bit of a stretch to think of pleasure-seekers like the opsophagos as robbers or pirates. But for Socrates’ contemporaries, opsophagia is commonly associated with criminals, specifically with political disruptors.^[52] Taking a greater share at the dinner table indicates a general tendency to want more – more opson, but also more money, power, and influence. The most extreme case of ‘taking a greater share’ and the most serious political crime and threat to the polis is tyranny.

In the Gorgias, the threat of tyranny becomes apparent when Polus himself compares rhetoricians to tyrants, boasting that both are “powerful” because they can do whatever they “want” (Gorg. 466a–481b). Polus challenges Socrates to consider the Macedonian tyrant Archelaus (Gorg. 470d): does he not live an enviable, happy life? By comparing rhetoricians to opson chefs and tyrants, the Gorgias alludes to the image of the feasting tyrant.^[53] Tyrants famously indulge in opson, and while this idea is only implicit in the Gorgias, it becomes explicit in the Republic. There, Socrates says that tyrants

are always occupied with feasts […] and wander in this way throughout their lives, […] look[ing] down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bent over the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate (εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες). To get a greater share (πλεονεξίας) in these things, they kick and butt them with iron horns and hooves, killing each other, because their desires are insatiable. For the part that they’re trying to fill is like a vessel full of holes. (Rep. 585e–586b, trans. Grube and Reeve 1997, modified)

This passage echoes some of the main characteristics of the opsophagos that we identified in the Gorgias. The opsophagos has insatiable desires, or a “leaky jar”; he leads a disorderly, stressful life, “wandering” around (see also Prot. 356d5), trying to get a greater share, which leads to crimes and political disruption. Ultimately, the opsophagos’ attempts to satisfy his appetite are in vain, for his leaky jar will never become full.

But Socrates is not done yet. After having connected the life of the insatiable pleasure-seeker to the life of the robber, he continues connecting the life of the robber not only to political but even to cosmic disorder:

Wise men claim that partnership and friendship, orderliness (κοσμιότητα), self-control, and justice hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men, and that is why they call this universe (τὸ ὅλον) a world order (κόσμον), my friend, and not an undisciplined world-disorder (οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν). […] You’ve failed to notice that geometrical equality (ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ) has great power among both gods and men, and you suppose that you ought to practice getting the greater share (πλεονεξίαν δεῖν ἀσκεῖν). That’s because you do not care about geometry (γεωμετρίας ἀμελεῖς). (Gorg. 507e–508a, trans. Zeyl 1997, modified)

Socrates does not further explain why or how exactly taking a greater share violates cosmic order. Perhaps cosmic order is the divine product that we humans can assist the gods in producing (Euthyp. 12e–14a).^[54] Knowledge of the divine product is, presumably, out of reach for us humans (it would surpass human wisdom, Apol. 20d–e), and thus we should not expect Socrates to give a full-fledged account of how we can serve the gods.^[55] Yet Socrates is certain that his own philosophical activity is a service to the god (Apol. 21a4, 23b7, 30a7), so much so that he centers his whole life around it.^[56] Socrates alludes to his life in service of the god at the beginning of the Gorgias when he explains that he arrived late for Gorgias’ performance because he was kept in the marketplace by Chaerephon – the very person who delivered the oracle’s response that no man is wiser than Socrates, which in turn sent Socrates on his mission of leading the philosophic life (Apol. 20e–21d). Socrates’ mention of Chaerephon in the opening scene of the Gorgias is hardly a coincidence. It foreshadows Socrates’ charge of impiety against the rhetorician that comes into focus towards the end of the dialogue: the rhetorician’s activity is a disservice to the god because it promotes cosmic disorder. In light of these cosmic ramifications, Socrates’ harsh words at the very end of the dialogue follow plausibly: the life of the conventional rhetorician (and, by analogy, the opson chef) is worth nothing (οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, Gorg. 527e7).^[57]

I conclude that Socrates’ comparison between rhetoric and opson cookery is very apt and carefully chosen. By comparing rhetoric to opson cookery, Socrates calls to mind the lawlessness of the unrestrained consumer of opson, the opsophagos, whose crimes go far beyond the dinner table. By filling their consumers’ appetites with anything they desire, conventional rhetoricians and opson chefs nourish such lawlessness and promote injustice and impiety – political and cosmic disorder – not just metaphorically, but literally. They are the cause of sickness (τοὺς αἰτίους) in the individual and the polis, and people like Callicles are accessories (συναιτίων) to their crimes (Gorg. 519a–b).

6 Conclusion

A comparative reading of Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Plato’s Gorgias has proven to be beneficial to our understanding of both texts. The Gorgias illuminates Socrates’ criticism of opsophagia in Xenophon’s Memorabilia by giving us more insight into the psychology of the opsophagos. At the same time, including the opsophagos in our interpretation of the Gorgias helps us understand Socrates’ harsh criticism of opson chefs. Socrates attacks opson chefs, I have argued, because they produce maximally pleasant opsa, tempting people to overindulge and nourishing the condition of opsophagia. Socrates calls out the opsophagos, the unrestrained consumer of opson, because his eating manners are a symptom of a lawless soul and because such a person tends to resort to lawless behavior – from eating opson without bread to crimes like theft, bribery, and even revolution – all in pursuit of getting a greater share. Opsophagia is not simply an embarrassing faux pas at the dinner table, but a serious threat to the order and health of the individual, the polis, and the cosmos.

I have proposed that Socrates attacks the opsophagos and the opson chef not because he disdains the physical sphere – his own body, other people’s bodies, the political body, and related activities like eating and giving speeches – but because he values order. Careful consumption and skillful production promote order in the individual, the polis, and the cosmos. Careful consumption requires frugality (being able to live on simple opson), not austerity (avoiding opson as much as possible). If we read Socrates’ comparison between rhetoricians and opson chefs in light of his view on food and the cultural meaning of indulging in opson, Socrates’ criticism of rhetoric becomes much clearer and more nuanced: speeches are a necessary part of Athenian public life, but the way they are prepared and served conventionally – for maximum pleasure and without any concern for the health of the polis – is very dangerous.

Plato and other philosophical descendants of Socrates inherited his concern for food and eating. In the Republic, Plato describes the guardians’ diet in detail, making sure that they live on simple opson only (Rep. 404b–e).^[58] Epicurus famously advises against eating extravagant opson, for “barley cakes and water provide the highest pleasure when someone in want takes them” (Letter to Menoeceus, DL 10.131). Musonius Rufus, Epictetus’ teacher, “used to speak frequently and very emphatically” on the subject of food, advising his students to eat inexpensive, easy-to-come-by foods (Discourse 18A). He harshly criticizes opsophagia, comparing opsophagoi to swine and dogs (Discourse 18B). “The throat was designed to be a passage for food,” Musonius Rufus asserts, “not an organ of pleasure” (Discourse 18B). If we wish to live well, he maintains, we should, like Socrates, eat to live rather than live to eat.^[59]