Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of the movement to make patents a new asset class, and its relative failure. Our thesis is that this creation is largely dependent on the construction of a market devoted to transactions in patents, and not just in technology licenses, and on the emergence of new intellectual property intermediaries akin to finance, whose activity must nevertheless be regulated. Our analysis is based on the various patent valuation conventions that underpin its institutionalization and the variety of its uses.
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