Independence of Central Banks: The Need for an Urgent Revamp!
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Philippe Moutot
Abstract
Over the last years, independent central banks were often criticized. Many critics felt that the fatal flaw of the current system lied in its independent nature. Some critics argued that the remedy to such problems was to replace independence with interdependence. Such a drastic measure is completely unnecessary. No more time should be lost discussing further the merits or the weaknesses of central bank independence. But taking central bank independence as a given, one should simply try to equip central bankers with the mandates, the tools, and the values best fitted to help them face future shocks. Deeper checks and balances with other institutions and the fair financing of investment by all economic agents, including startups and SMEs, are urgently necessary to head off financial crises that will inevitably arise in this era of growing wealth inequality, disruptive technologies and climate change.
Funding source: European Central Bank
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Central Banking in Perilous Times: An Open-Ended Chronicle
- The Future of Central Banking
- Independence of Central Banks: The Need for an Urgent Revamp!
- Two Major Economic Crises in the Early Twenty-First Century and their Impact on Central Bank Independence
- What Is the European Central Bank Supposed to Do?
- Central Banks of the Visegrad Group States in the Light of Constitutional Regulations
- Book Commentary on “Financial Citizenship: Experts, Publics, and the Politics of Central Banking” by Anne-Lise Riles
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Central Banking in Perilous Times: An Open-Ended Chronicle
- The Future of Central Banking
- Independence of Central Banks: The Need for an Urgent Revamp!
- Two Major Economic Crises in the Early Twenty-First Century and their Impact on Central Bank Independence
- What Is the European Central Bank Supposed to Do?
- Central Banks of the Visegrad Group States in the Light of Constitutional Regulations
- Book Commentary on “Financial Citizenship: Experts, Publics, and the Politics of Central Banking” by Anne-Lise Riles
