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Data and grammar: Means and individuals

  • Marcel Den Dikken , Judy B Bernstein , Christina Tortora and Raffaella Zanuttini
Published/Copyright: December 13, 2007
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Abstract

1. Introduction

In the abstract of his target piece, Featherston states that ‘it is no longer tenable for syntactic theories to be constructed on the evidence of a single person's judgements’. In our commentary, we focus on this issue and on (what we perceive to be) Featherston's claims that individual speakers' judgments are intrinsically unreliable and ‘noisy’, that variation among individuals' judgments should be smoothed out by averaging the judgments of a large pool of informants, and that only this golden mean counts as genuine data. We argue that these claims are at odds with the basic premises of Chomskian linguistics, which is centered on the I-language of the individual speaker/hearer, not the E-language of the speech community. This is not to say that the way generative grammar approaches and accumulates its data is in no need of improvement: we will make some specific recommendations of our own to this end in the last section of our commentary.

Published Online: 2007-12-13
Published in Print: 2007-12-11

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