Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time
-
Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson
Abstract
It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor's and Simons' claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have incompatible properties at those different times, and thereby change. In effect I argue that they do not resolve the charge that the tenseless view of time is incomatible with endurantism because the tenseless view does not allow anything to change temporal location and thereby come to be ‘wholly present’ at various times.
© Philosophia Press 2009
Articles in the same Issue
- Wittgensteins Traum von der Klarheit der Sprache
- Sharing my Body. Personal Identity and Individuation
- Two Sorts of Dualism. McDowell's Oscillation Between a Transcendental and a Metaphysical Conception of Reason and Nature
- Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time
- Intentions and Compositionality
- Intuitvely Assessed Reasonableness as a Criterion of Validity in Empathetic Understanding
- Essentialism and the Theory of Direct Reference
Articles in the same Issue
- Wittgensteins Traum von der Klarheit der Sprache
- Sharing my Body. Personal Identity and Individuation
- Two Sorts of Dualism. McDowell's Oscillation Between a Transcendental and a Metaphysical Conception of Reason and Nature
- Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time
- Intentions and Compositionality
- Intuitvely Assessed Reasonableness as a Criterion of Validity in Empathetic Understanding
- Essentialism and the Theory of Direct Reference
