Two Sorts of Dualism. McDowell's Oscillation Between a Transcendental and a Metaphysical Conception of Reason and Nature
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Charlotta Weigelt
Abstract
In Mind and World, John McDowell tries to achieve a reconciliation between reason and nature. In his view, this pursuit derives its motivation from the modern conception of nature as the space of law, which seems to relegate human rationality to a state of utter isolation from man's nature as an animal. Accordingly, we need to rethink the modern understanding of nature in such a way as to make room for a notion of “second nature”, in which human reason may properly be situated. In this article I argue, from a phenomenological point of view, that McDowell's proposed solution to the problem of dualism is unsatisfactory, basically because it seeks to combine two radically different perspectives on experience: as a vehicle of reasons and meaning and as a transaction in nature respectively. But, it is suggested, that kind of reconciliation is neither possible, nor even desirable. At bottom, it rests on a confusion of transcendental with metaphysical issues.
© Philosophia Press 2009
Articles in the same Issue
- Wittgensteins Traum von der Klarheit der Sprache
- Sharing my Body. Personal Identity and Individuation
- Two Sorts of Dualism. McDowell's Oscillation Between a Transcendental and a Metaphysical Conception of Reason and Nature
- Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time
- Intentions and Compositionality
- Intuitvely Assessed Reasonableness as a Criterion of Validity in Empathetic Understanding
- Essentialism and the Theory of Direct Reference
Articles in the same Issue
- Wittgensteins Traum von der Klarheit der Sprache
- Sharing my Body. Personal Identity and Individuation
- Two Sorts of Dualism. McDowell's Oscillation Between a Transcendental and a Metaphysical Conception of Reason and Nature
- Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time
- Intentions and Compositionality
- Intuitvely Assessed Reasonableness as a Criterion of Validity in Empathetic Understanding
- Essentialism and the Theory of Direct Reference
