The “Object Theoretic Operational” View of Natural Science
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the conceptual changes that occurred in the structure of physical knowledge during the second half of the 19th century, are reflected by the concept of the “primary ideal object” (PIO) and its implicit definition within appropriate systems of statements, called a “nucleus of a branch of physics” (NBP). Within an NBP focus shifts away from discovering “law of nature” to observations of a physical object (system) and its states, while the distinct notion of “measurable” replaces the vague notion “observable”. On the basis of this notion, the roles of physical models and measurements within physics, different kinds of work, experiments, and laws are discussed. Next follows a discussion of different levels of change in science, after which this distinction is compared to Kuhn's model. Finally, I present a new combination of “realism” and “constructivism”, which differs from both the “constructive empiricism” of van Fraassen and from different “empirical realisms”.
© Philosophia Press 2007
Articles in the same Issue
- The “Object Theoretic Operational” View of Natural Science
- On Repetition
- “I want to say the nude”: The Philosophical Contribution of Cubism
- What is the Point? Ethics, Truth, and the Tractatus
- A Sketch of Equal Human Value
- The Validity of the Human Rights. Reconstruction, Justification, and Application
- Is There a Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance?
- Leben und Denken in Philosophie und Religion – vom Idealismus zur Phänomenologie
- A Logical Response to Blackburn's Supervenience Argument
Articles in the same Issue
- The “Object Theoretic Operational” View of Natural Science
- On Repetition
- “I want to say the nude”: The Philosophical Contribution of Cubism
- What is the Point? Ethics, Truth, and the Tractatus
- A Sketch of Equal Human Value
- The Validity of the Human Rights. Reconstruction, Justification, and Application
- Is There a Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance?
- Leben und Denken in Philosophie und Religion – vom Idealismus zur Phänomenologie
- A Logical Response to Blackburn's Supervenience Argument
