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The Problem of the Criterion, Skepticism, and the Cartesian Circle

  • Timo Kajamies
Published/Copyright: March 16, 2010
SATS
From the journal Volume 7 Issue 2

Abstract

This paper tackles the famous predicament known as the Cartesian Circle. This notorious problem can be understood as manifesting an ancient dilemma—the diallelus, or the problem of the criterion. Now, the problem of the criterion can be approached from either particularistic or methodistic standpoint. In a nutshell, a particularist accepts instances of knowledge prior to criteria of knowledge, and the methodist goes the other way around. In this paper Descartes's struggle with the problem receives a particularistic reading. Using James Van Cleve's and Jaakko Hintikka's thoughts as my main leverage, I argue that the particularist Descartes can reach knowledge without circularity. However, problems will remain and I shall bring out those that to me seem most pressing.

Published Online: 2010-03-16
Published in Print: 2006-November

© Philosophia Press 2006

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