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Entity Realism Meets the Pessimistic Meta-Induction Argument. The World is not Enough

  • Jacob Busch
Published/Copyright: March 16, 2010
SATS
From the journal Volume 7 Issue 2

Abstract

In the following I briefly set out Devitt's (Realism and Truth, Princeton University press, 1997) definition of entity realism and compare it to Hackings (1983) definition. I then set out the pessimistic induction argument as suggested by Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Routledge & K. Paul, 1978). I present an argument developed by Bertolet (Dialectica vol. 42: 59–71, 1988) to the effect that Devitt's abductive defence of realism fails. In the light of its failure, Devitt offers the ability of his definition of scientific realism to solve the pessimistic induction argument as a tactical advantage for his definition. I argue that Devitt's account is not adequately suited for defending realism when confronted with the pessimistic induction argument. I do this by setting out three problems for Devitt. In particular I argue that Devitt does not provide an adequate account of how to identify entities across theories across time. I argue that his proposed solution employing ‘partial reference’ of terms generates a new pessimistic induction, and that Devitt's position does not provide an adequate account of how to make sense of the progress of science.

Published Online: 2010-03-16
Published in Print: 2006-November

© Philosophia Press 2006

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