Conflicts of Interest of Target Company's Directors and Shareholders in Leveraged Buy-Outs
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Andrea Vicari
Abstract
The article analyses a number of characteristic cases of target company's directors and shareholders conflicts of interest in leveraged buy-outs, noting that such cases have not been extensively studied by European researchers and addressed by the judiciary of the European countries. There is reason to believe that, on the basis of an interpretation applying general legal principles, the possibility that the directors and shareholders of the target will use the operation to achieve extra-company interests is potentially high. As a consequence, the article proposes a different, more rigorous interpretation of the laws on conflict of interest of directors and shareholders.
© Walter de Gruyter
Articles in the same Issue
- The Evolution of the Concept of “Corporate Group” in France
- Conflicts of Interest of Target Company's Directors and Shareholders in Leveraged Buy-Outs
- Effects of the Better Regulation Approach on European Company Law and Corporate Governance
- The US Concept of Corporate Governance under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Its Effects in Europe
- Cross-Border Takeover Regulation: a Transatlantic Perspective
Articles in the same Issue
- The Evolution of the Concept of “Corporate Group” in France
- Conflicts of Interest of Target Company's Directors and Shareholders in Leveraged Buy-Outs
- Effects of the Better Regulation Approach on European Company Law and Corporate Governance
- The US Concept of Corporate Governance under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Its Effects in Europe
- Cross-Border Takeover Regulation: a Transatlantic Perspective