On explaining metonymy: Comment on Peirsman and Geeraerts, “Metonymy as a prototypical category”
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William Croft
Abstract
In their article in this issue of Cognitive Linguistics, Piersman and Geeraerts (henceforth P and G), consider a very wide range of semantic shifts to be instances of metonymy. P and G propose a single conceptual process to account for all of these supposed metonymic semantic shifts, namely contiguity. P and G provide a prototype definition of contiguity. In great detail, P and G classify the range of examples of metonymy in their article according to three ‘dimensions’ of prototypicality: strength of contact, degree of boundedness and domain (from space to time to spatiotemporal and ‘categorical’ domain). In this comment, I argue that contiguity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for metonymy, even granting the prototype definition of contiguity provided by P and G; that association, analyzed in terms of domain highlighting (Croft 1993, 2002) provides a valid necessary condition; and that many examples taken by P and G (and other cognitive linguists) to be metonymy are better explained in terms of other theoretical constructs developed in cognitive linguistics.
© Walter de Gruyter
Articles in the same Issue
- Metonymy as a prototypical category
- On explaining metonymy: Comment on Peirsman and Geeraerts, “Metonymy as a prototypical category”
- Don't let metonymy be misunderstood: An answer to Croft
- A symbolic approach to deverbal -ee derivation
- Coming to terms with subjectivity
- On the conceptual, cultural and discursive motivation of Greek pain lexicalizations
- Book review
Articles in the same Issue
- Metonymy as a prototypical category
- On explaining metonymy: Comment on Peirsman and Geeraerts, “Metonymy as a prototypical category”
- Don't let metonymy be misunderstood: An answer to Croft
- A symbolic approach to deverbal -ee derivation
- Coming to terms with subjectivity
- On the conceptual, cultural and discursive motivation of Greek pain lexicalizations
- Book review
