The Potentialities and Limits of a Rational Justification of Ethical Norms, or: What Precisely Is Minimal Morality?

Chapters in this book

1. I-VI I
2. Preface VII
3. Contents IX
4. Abstracts XIII
5. Introduction
6. Preferences - an Introduction XX
7. Preferences - a Short Bibliography XLIV
8. Part I: Preference and Decision
9. Deciding to Desire 3
10. Desiring at Will (and at Pill): A Reply to Millgram 26
11. Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision? 33
12. Intrinsic Desirabilities: A Reply to Lumer 57
13. The Rational Criticism of Preferences 63
14. Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt 78
15. Is Motivation Internal to Value? 88
16. Motivation and Value: A Reply to Velleman 103
17. Numerical Representations of Value-Orderings: Some Basic Problems 114
18. Interval Orders Defended: A Reply to Danielsson 123
19. Part II: Preference and Metaethics
20. Prima Facie Obligations in Deontic Logic: A Chisholmian Analysis Based on Normative Preference Structures 135
21. The Meaning of "Ought, Prima Facie" and Decision Situations: A Reply to Åqvist 156
22. Values and Duties 163
23. Beyond Duty: A Reply to von Kutschera 172
24. Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Obligation 176
25. Autonomy and Morality: A Reply to Willaschek 204
26. In a Subjectivist Framework, Categorical Requirements and Real Practical Reasons 212
27. Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins 233
28. Preference and Preferability 239
29. Goodness and Rational Preferability: A Reply to Gibbard 260
30. Part III: Preference and Ethics
31. Extended Preferences 271
32. Wish You Were Me: A Reply to Broome and a Comment on Harsanyi's Extended Preference Theory 288
33. Experimental Ethics: A Computer Simulation of Classes, Cliques, and Solidarity 298
34. Solidarity among Rational Egoists: A Reply to Hegselmann 321
35. The Potentialities and Limits of a Rational Justification of Ethical Norms, or: What Precisely Is Minimal Morality? 327
36. A Hobbesian Choice: Reply to Trapp 361
37. Symposium on Possible Preferences
38. Introduction to Possible Preferences 367
39. Possible Preferences 383
40. Preferences of Possible People 399
41. Who Counts? 406
42. Procreation 429
43. Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing 471
44. McMahan on Psychological Continuity and the Value of Future Goods 503
45. A Pareto Principle for Possible People 508
46. Notes on Contributors 544
47. Name Index 550
48. Subject Index 555
49. 569-570 569