Articulating Context-Dependence: Ad Hoc Cognition in the Prototype Theory of Concepts
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José V. Hernández-Conde
Abstract
Recently, Casasanto and Lupyan (2015) have proposed an appealing and daring thesis: there are no context-independent concepts-that is, all concepts are ad hoc concepts. They argue that the seeming stability of concepts is merely due to commonalities across their different instantiations but that, in fact, there is nothing invariant in them. In their view, concepts only exist when they are instantiated for categorizing, communicating, drawing inferences, etc., and those instantiations are produced on the fly from a set of contextual cues. However, the main weakness of Casasanto and Lupyan’s framework is that it lacks a proposal for articulating it within a theory on the structure of concepts. My aim is to show that the ad hoc cognition framework can be characterized by means of a prototype theory of concepts developed in terms of a conceptual similarity space.
Abstract
Recently, Casasanto and Lupyan (2015) have proposed an appealing and daring thesis: there are no context-independent concepts-that is, all concepts are ad hoc concepts. They argue that the seeming stability of concepts is merely due to commonalities across their different instantiations but that, in fact, there is nothing invariant in them. In their view, concepts only exist when they are instantiated for categorizing, communicating, drawing inferences, etc., and those instantiations are produced on the fly from a set of contextual cues. However, the main weakness of Casasanto and Lupyan’s framework is that it lacks a proposal for articulating it within a theory on the structure of concepts. My aim is to show that the ad hoc cognition framework can be characterized by means of a prototype theory of concepts developed in terms of a conceptual similarity space.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction 1
- Moorean Paradoxes, Assertion, and Certainty 7
- Meaning Holism and Contextualism[s]: Friends or Foes? 21
- On the Nature of Non-Doxastic Disagreement about Taste 41
- Why the Basic Problem Is Not a Problem 63
- Gettier Cases, Warranted Assertability Maneuvers, and the Fourth Condition 83
- Self vs Other? Social Cognition, Extended Minds, and Self-Rule 99
- Articulating Context-Dependence: Ad Hoc Cognition in the Prototype Theory of Concepts 119
- Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality 131
- De Re Explanation of Action in Context, the Problem of ‘Near-Contraries’ and Belief Fragmentation 155
- The Role of Presuppositions and Default Implicatures in Framing Effects 181
- Transcending the Situation: On the Context-dependence of Practice-based Cognition 209
- Indirect Relations and Frames: Coreference in Context 229
- Author‘s Index 247
- Subject Index 251
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction 1
- Moorean Paradoxes, Assertion, and Certainty 7
- Meaning Holism and Contextualism[s]: Friends or Foes? 21
- On the Nature of Non-Doxastic Disagreement about Taste 41
- Why the Basic Problem Is Not a Problem 63
- Gettier Cases, Warranted Assertability Maneuvers, and the Fourth Condition 83
- Self vs Other? Social Cognition, Extended Minds, and Self-Rule 99
- Articulating Context-Dependence: Ad Hoc Cognition in the Prototype Theory of Concepts 119
- Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality 131
- De Re Explanation of Action in Context, the Problem of ‘Near-Contraries’ and Belief Fragmentation 155
- The Role of Presuppositions and Default Implicatures in Framing Effects 181
- Transcending the Situation: On the Context-dependence of Practice-based Cognition 209
- Indirect Relations and Frames: Coreference in Context 229
- Author‘s Index 247
- Subject Index 251
