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2. The hybrid theory of mixed quotation

  • Savas L. Tsohatzidis
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Truth, Force, and Knowledge in Language
This chapter is in the book Truth, Force, and Knowledge in Language
© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Acknowledgements VII
  3. Contents XI
  4. Introduction 1
  5. Part I. Matters of meaning and truth
  6. 1. Truth ascriptions, falsity ascriptions, and the paratactic analysis of indirect discourse 17
  7. 2. The hybrid theory of mixed quotation 25
  8. 3. Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth 43
  9. 4. Performativity and the “true/false fetish” 49
  10. 5. Speaking of truth-telling: The view from wh-complements 73
  11. 6. The distance between “here” and “where I am” 86
  12. 7. A problem for a logic of “because” 98
  13. 8. What “lack” needs to have: A study in the semantics of privation 102
  14. 9. A fake typicality constraint on asymmetric acceptability 114
  15. 10. Correlative and noncorrelative conjunctions in argument and nonargument positions 126
  16. Part II. Matters of meaning and force
  17. 11. Yes–no questions and the myth of content invariance 141
  18. 12. Deontic trouble in speech act botany 163
  19. 13. The gap between speech acts and mental states 169
  20. 14. A purported refutation of some theories of assertion 182
  21. 15. Two consequences of hinting 192
  22. 16. How to test a test for perlocutionary act names 198
  23. 17. Speaker meaning, sentence meaning, and metaphor 204
  24. 18. Voices and noises in the theory of speech acts 214
  25. 19. Searle’s derivation of promissory obligation 255
  26. 20. Searle’s Making the Social World 271
  27. 21. A paradox of cooperation in the theory of implicatures 278
  28. 22. An inferential impasse in the theory of implicatures 285
  29. Part III. Knowledge matters
  30. 23. How to forget that “know” is factive 299
  31. 24. Three problems for the knowledge rule of assertion 312
  32. 25. Grammars as objects of knowledge: The availability of dispositionalism 319
  33. References 329
  34. Index 339
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