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9. Meaning in first language acquisition

  • Stephen Crain
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Abstract

Every normal child acquires a language in just a few years. By four or five, children are effectively adults in their abilities to understand novel sentences, to discern entailment relations, and to assess the truth or falsity of endlessly many statements presented to them in conversational contexts. There are two main approaches to explain this remarkable acquisition scenario: one emphasizes the contribution of innate knowledge, and one emphasizes the availability of relevant cues in children’s experience. Semantic knowledge is a good testing ground for adjudicating between these alternative approaches, because evidence for principles of interpretation appears to be thin at best. The main focus of this chapter is on children’s interpretation of disjunction (e.g., English or). In classical logic, disjunction has truth conditions corresponding to inclusive-or. It is evident from cross- linguistic research that human languages assign the inclusive-or interpretation to disjunction, and it is evident from recent experimental research that this is children’s initial interpretation, despite the absence of decisive evidence in children’s experience. This invites two conclusions: that disjunction has the same basic meaning in classical logic and in human languages, and that children do not learn what disjunction means from experience; rather, this knowledge is innately specified.

Abstract

Every normal child acquires a language in just a few years. By four or five, children are effectively adults in their abilities to understand novel sentences, to discern entailment relations, and to assess the truth or falsity of endlessly many statements presented to them in conversational contexts. There are two main approaches to explain this remarkable acquisition scenario: one emphasizes the contribution of innate knowledge, and one emphasizes the availability of relevant cues in children’s experience. Semantic knowledge is a good testing ground for adjudicating between these alternative approaches, because evidence for principles of interpretation appears to be thin at best. The main focus of this chapter is on children’s interpretation of disjunction (e.g., English or). In classical logic, disjunction has truth conditions corresponding to inclusive-or. It is evident from cross- linguistic research that human languages assign the inclusive-or interpretation to disjunction, and it is evident from recent experimental research that this is children’s initial interpretation, despite the absence of decisive evidence in children’s experience. This invites two conclusions: that disjunction has the same basic meaning in classical logic and in human languages, and that children do not learn what disjunction means from experience; rather, this knowledge is innately specified.

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