Argumentative Discourse: The Transcendental Starting Point of Apelian Discourse Ethics
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Matthias Kettner
Abstract
This paper deals with the question whether some morally normative content is grounded in the dialogical practice that both Apel and Habermas call argumentative discourse, and, if so, how to demonstrate that it is so grounded. Apel (unlike Habermas) claims that discourse has rationally necessary conceptual presuppositions; that morally normative content is part of such presuppositions; and that this can be ascertained in transcendental reflection, i. e. by a kind of transcendental argument. I argue that these claims can be charitably interpreted but require clarifications of their key concepts, i. e. “discourse”, “validity claims”, “performative self-contradiction”, and “community of communication”. I argue that discourse as a practice of reason-sensitive agents who are communicatively connected via argumentation can be explained by its normatively constitutive aim, namely fixing the true values of our reasons; that the primary level of validity claims are claims concerning good reasons; that performative self-contradictions are pragmatic-cum-logical inconsistencies that we can know a priori to be incompatible with discourse’s constitutive aim; and finally, that competent discourse participants can know a priori that they would be performatively inconsistent if they flouted a moral kernel that is intrinsic in discourse.
Abstract
This paper deals with the question whether some morally normative content is grounded in the dialogical practice that both Apel and Habermas call argumentative discourse, and, if so, how to demonstrate that it is so grounded. Apel (unlike Habermas) claims that discourse has rationally necessary conceptual presuppositions; that morally normative content is part of such presuppositions; and that this can be ascertained in transcendental reflection, i. e. by a kind of transcendental argument. I argue that these claims can be charitably interpreted but require clarifications of their key concepts, i. e. “discourse”, “validity claims”, “performative self-contradiction”, and “community of communication”. I argue that discourse as a practice of reason-sensitive agents who are communicatively connected via argumentation can be explained by its normatively constitutive aim, namely fixing the true values of our reasons; that the primary level of validity claims are claims concerning good reasons; that performative self-contradictions are pragmatic-cum-logical inconsistencies that we can know a priori to be incompatible with discourse’s constitutive aim; and finally, that competent discourse participants can know a priori that they would be performatively inconsistent if they flouted a moral kernel that is intrinsic in discourse.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction 1
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A. Reflexions on the general structure and problems of transcendental arguments
- Silencing the Sceptic? The Prospects for Transcendental Arguments in Practical Philosophy 9
- Ambition, Modesty, and Performative Inconsistency 25
- On Pain of Self-Contradiction? 47
- Claims as Departure Points for Transcendental Arguments: Understanding Argumentation as a Game 71
- Still Lonely: The Moral Solipsist after Transcendental Argumentation 89
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B. Uses and discussions of transcendental reasoning based on the self-reflective structure of personal autonomy, rational agency, or human self-understanding
- Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy 109
- Transcendental Arguments for a Categorical Imperative as Arguments from Agential Self-Understanding 141
- Transcendental Arguments and Practical Self-Understanding—Gewirthian Perspectives 161
- Transcendental Arguments in Favour of Absolute Values 179
- Neither for Beasts nor for Gods: Why only morally-committed Human Beings can accept Transcendental Arguments 195
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C. Transcendental reasoning inspired by pragmatism, linguistics, and theories of intersubjectivity
- Normative Pragmatics: Approach, Promise, Outlook 213
- Social Constitutivism and the Role of Retorsive Arguments 231
- Transcendental-Pragmatic Foundation of Ethics. Transcendental Arguments and Ethics 247
- Conceptual Pragmatism and Normativity: Clarence Irving Lewis 265
- Transcending Value: Two Readings of Performative Inconsistency 283
- Transcendental Anti-Theodicy 301
- Argumentative Discourse: The Transcendental Starting Point of Apelian Discourse Ethics 325
- Notes on Contributors 349
- Index 351
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Introduction 1
-
A. Reflexions on the general structure and problems of transcendental arguments
- Silencing the Sceptic? The Prospects for Transcendental Arguments in Practical Philosophy 9
- Ambition, Modesty, and Performative Inconsistency 25
- On Pain of Self-Contradiction? 47
- Claims as Departure Points for Transcendental Arguments: Understanding Argumentation as a Game 71
- Still Lonely: The Moral Solipsist after Transcendental Argumentation 89
-
B. Uses and discussions of transcendental reasoning based on the self-reflective structure of personal autonomy, rational agency, or human self-understanding
- Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy 109
- Transcendental Arguments for a Categorical Imperative as Arguments from Agential Self-Understanding 141
- Transcendental Arguments and Practical Self-Understanding—Gewirthian Perspectives 161
- Transcendental Arguments in Favour of Absolute Values 179
- Neither for Beasts nor for Gods: Why only morally-committed Human Beings can accept Transcendental Arguments 195
-
C. Transcendental reasoning inspired by pragmatism, linguistics, and theories of intersubjectivity
- Normative Pragmatics: Approach, Promise, Outlook 213
- Social Constitutivism and the Role of Retorsive Arguments 231
- Transcendental-Pragmatic Foundation of Ethics. Transcendental Arguments and Ethics 247
- Conceptual Pragmatism and Normativity: Clarence Irving Lewis 265
- Transcending Value: Two Readings of Performative Inconsistency 283
- Transcendental Anti-Theodicy 301
- Argumentative Discourse: The Transcendental Starting Point of Apelian Discourse Ethics 325
- Notes on Contributors 349
- Index 351
