More Than Words Can Say: Searle on the Constitution of Social Facts

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Preface by the Editors 11
4. Acknowledgements 13
5. List of Abbreviations 15
6. 1. Introduction:
7. The Basic Reality and the Human Reality 19
8. 2 Colloquium, Part I:
9. Subjectivity as the Mark of the Mental 47
10. Problems with Searle’s Account of Intrinsic Intentionality 61
11. Searle’s Biological Naturalism: A Typology 73
12. Searle on Mental Causation: 87
13. Acting on Gaps? John Searle’s Conception of Free Will 103
14. 51 Years on: Searle on Proper Names Revisited 117
15. Searle on External Realism 133
16. Trivial, Platitudinous, Boring? Searle on Conceptual Relativism 143
17. The Role of Declarations in the Construction of Social Reality 163
18. Normative Validity through Descriptive Acceptability? 173
19. More Than Words Can Say: Searle on the Constitution of Social Facts 187
20. 3 Colloquium, Part II:
21. Reply to “Subjectivity as the Mark of the Mental” 201
22. Reply to “Problems with Searle’s Account of Intrinsic Intentionality” 205
23. Reply to “Searle’s Biological Naturalism: A Typology” 210
24. Reply to “Searle on Mental Causation: Biological Naturalism, or Something Near Enough” 214
25. Reply to “Acting on Gaps? John Searle’s Conception of Free Will” 217
26. Reply to “51 Years on: Searle on Proper Names Revisited” 220
27. Reply to “Searle on External Realism” 222
28. Reply to “Trivial, Platitudinous, Boring? Searle on Conceptual Relativism” 225
29. Reply to “The Role of Declarations in the Construction of Social Reality” 227
30. Reply to “Normative Validity through Descriptive Acceptability? Why Searle’s Theory of Social Reality Is Incomplete” 230
31. Reply to “More Than Words Can Say: Searle on the Constitution of Social Facts” 233