CHAPTER 1. REAL, IDEAL AND 'NON-SUBSISTING' OBJECTS

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS iii
3. Acknowledgments 6
4. INTRODUCTION 7
5. PART I. OBJECTIVES AND OTHER OBJECTS OF INTENTIONAL REFERENCE
6. CHAPTER 1. REAL, IDEAL AND 'NON-SUBSISTING' OBJECTS 9
7. CHAPTER 2. OBJECTIVES AS OBJECTS OF HIGHER ORDER 27
8. PART II. MEANING AND TRUTH
9. CHAPTER 3. MEINONG'S THEORY OF MEANING 49
10. CHAPTER 4. MEINONG'S LOGICAL REALISM 93
11. PART III. MEINONG'S TRUTH IN THE EYES OF HIS CRITICS
12. CHAPTER 5. RUSSELL'S RECEPTION OF MEINONG'S PHILOSOPHY 127
13. Appendix to Chapter 5: MEINONG'S DEFENCE AGAINST RUSSELL'S OBJECTIONS 139
14. CHAPTER 6. AGAINST THE POST-RUSSELLIAN VIEW OF MEINONG'S PROPOSITIONS 147
15. CHAPTER 7. SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING MEINONG'S PHILOSOPHY 163
16. PART IV. MEINONG'S THEORY IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SEMANTICS
17. CHAPTER 8. REFERENCE IN A MEINONGIAN SEMANTICS 191
18. CHAPTER 9. THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF A MEINONGIAN SEMANTICS 215
19. CONCLUSION: THE COSTS OF PRESERVING EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM 249
20. BIBLIOGRAPHY 255
21. INDEX OF NAMES 261
22. Backmatter 263