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Kant’s conception of self as subject and its embodiment
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Christian Onof
Published/Copyright:
May 17, 2010
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Articles in the same Issue
- Contents
- Transcendental idealism and metaphysics: Kant’s commitment to things as they are in themselves
- Kant and the Understanding’s Role in Imaginative Synthesis
- Pure Reason’s Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant’s first Critique
- Kant on the Soul’s Intensity
- The Aeneas Argument: Personality and Immortality in Kant’s Third Paralogism
- Kant’s Epistemological Reorientation of Ontology
- Kant’s conception of self as subject and its embodiment
- Time and Metaphysics: Kant and McTaggart on the Reality of Time
Articles in the same Issue
- Contents
- Transcendental idealism and metaphysics: Kant’s commitment to things as they are in themselves
- Kant and the Understanding’s Role in Imaginative Synthesis
- Pure Reason’s Enlightenment: Transcendental Reflection in Kant’s first Critique
- Kant on the Soul’s Intensity
- The Aeneas Argument: Personality and Immortality in Kant’s Third Paralogism
- Kant’s Epistemological Reorientation of Ontology
- Kant’s conception of self as subject and its embodiment
- Time and Metaphysics: Kant and McTaggart on the Reality of Time