Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents v
3. Abbreviations viii
4. Introduction 1
5. Part I From the Beginning of the Franco-German Strategic Dialogue to the Nuclear Ambiguities of the ‘Adenauer/de Gaulle’ Era
6. Chapter 1 Raymond Aron, Germany and the Atomic Bomb 25
7. Chapter 2 France and the Abandoned Dream of a European Bomb, 1954–58 43
8. Chapter 3 From Bonn to Valhalla? West German Nuclear Ambitions, France and U.S. Nuclear Assistance, 1960–63 61
9. Chapter 4 De Gaulle’s Nuclear Policy, West Germany and the Second Berlin Crisis. A Historiographical Reappraisal, 1958–63 90
10. Part II Ostpolitik and the Franco-German Nuclear Relations in the 1970s
11. Chapter 5 ‘Military Cooperation Is Not in Itself an Instrument of Progress’ The Role of the French Nuclear Deterrent in Early Concepts of Ostpolitik 119
12. Chapter 6 Implicit Convergence? Franco-German Relations, European Security and Nuclear Cooperation in the Era of Ostpolitik, 1969–74 143
13. Chapter 7 French Deterrence, the Defence of Europe and the German Question in the 1970s and 1980s 175
14. Part III The ‘Mitterrand/Kohl’ Era and the End of the Cold War
15. Chapter 8 Evolution of the French Nuclear Strategy towards Germany during Mitterrand’s Presidency 195
16. Chapter 9 France and the FRG during the 1980s. When Strategic Questions Became Political Debates 214
17. Chapter 10 ‘Not a Nuclear Switzerland’ France’s Deterrent Posture and the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1980s 233
18. Part IV Nuclear Uncertainties in the Post-Cold War Era
19. Chapter 11 France, Germany and Nuclear Deterrence since the End of the Cold War. From Estrangement to Rapprochement? 285
20. Chapter 12 Walking Together in Different Directions Prospects for French-German Cooperation on Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control after the End of the Cold War 321
21. Appendix Figures of the French Nuclear Arsenal and of the U.S. Nuclear Warheads Deployed in NATO-Europe 343
22. Index 345