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3 The Later Husserl: Time, Body, Intersubjectivity, and Lifeworld

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Husserl’s Phenomenology
This chapter is in the book Husserl’s Phenomenology
3 The Later Husser!: Time, Body, Intersubjectivity, and Lifeworld In Parts 1 and 2, I first presented a number of central aspects of Husserl's theory of intentionality, and then went on to account for the more general character of his transcendental phenomenology. The under-lying claim has been that it was Husserl's more and more radical analysis of intentionality that led him toward transcendental philosophy. To argue that subjectivity is not merely yet another entity in the world, but a condi-tion of the possibility for appearance and meaning, and that it is the very dimension where reality can display and manifest itself in all its richness is, however, not the end but only the beginning of phenomenological work. As Husser! puts it, the nature ofintentionality might seem obvious, partic-ularly when defined as a consciousness of something. But this platitude merely conceals its enigmatic nature. In reality, 'intentionality' is the title of a problem, and not the answer to all the questions (Hua 3hoo-2oi, 337). More thorough investigations are therefore called for. This third part will be divided into four sections, each presenting dif-ferent aspects of Husserl's continuing investigation of the constitutive process. Although all four topics can already be found in Husserl's early writings, nevertheless each increase in significance in the course of his writ-ings. Each section, therefore, will also serve as a presentation of Husserl's later thinking.
© 2022 Stanford University Press, Redwood City

3 The Later Husser!: Time, Body, Intersubjectivity, and Lifeworld In Parts 1 and 2, I first presented a number of central aspects of Husserl's theory of intentionality, and then went on to account for the more general character of his transcendental phenomenology. The under-lying claim has been that it was Husserl's more and more radical analysis of intentionality that led him toward transcendental philosophy. To argue that subjectivity is not merely yet another entity in the world, but a condi-tion of the possibility for appearance and meaning, and that it is the very dimension where reality can display and manifest itself in all its richness is, however, not the end but only the beginning of phenomenological work. As Husser! puts it, the nature ofintentionality might seem obvious, partic-ularly when defined as a consciousness of something. But this platitude merely conceals its enigmatic nature. In reality, 'intentionality' is the title of a problem, and not the answer to all the questions (Hua 3hoo-2oi, 337). More thorough investigations are therefore called for. This third part will be divided into four sections, each presenting dif-ferent aspects of Husserl's continuing investigation of the constitutive process. Although all four topics can already be found in Husserl's early writings, nevertheless each increase in significance in the course of his writ-ings. Each section, therefore, will also serve as a presentation of Husserl's later thinking.
© 2022 Stanford University Press, Redwood City
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