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23. The Agreement Made at Yalta: February 1945

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China Tangle
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CHAPTER 23 The Agreement Made at Yalta: February 1945 THE President and his company set off for Yalta with a sense of excite­ment tempered by knowledge that many hard problems awaited them. They were used to making great decisions. But this time they were fac­ing all the complexities of a smashed Europe. They wondered whether the understanding reached with Stalin at Teheran would turn friendlier or be lost in a battle of purposes. The experience of the year in between left doubt. The Soviet government had carried out its main military promises. But it had often been demanding, suspicious, and quick to advance grievances. Churchill's visit to Moscow in October had been useful in keeping the lines of war cooperation clear, but had settled noth­ing else. Every mile that the Allied armies from the west and the Soviet armies from the east traveled toward one another had made greater the need for a meeting among all three. In the search for a mutually convenient spot to meet, American and British suggestions had ranged all the way from Northern Scotland to Jerusalem. But Stalin was not to be budged out of the Soviet Union. So the President and Churchill finally agreed to go to the Crimea, where the ruins left by the German army were to be plain to their sight. This was the limit of time and space within which the President could keep in necessary touch with the operations of the American gov­ernment. A cruiser, the U.S.S. Quincy, brought him across the ocean to Malta. He left it there and flew on to Yalta, while the ship took station in Great Bitter Lake, near the Suez Canal. A navy communica­tion ship, the U.S.S. Catoctin, was moored alongside a seawall in the harbor of Sevastopol, eighty miles away from Yalta. Roosevelt struck many of those who saw him as looking tired, over­tired, even at the end of an easy sea voyage. All photographs taken at Yalta explain this impression. Age had struck with cruel speed. But still he seemed to those about him as active-minded and eager as always to take on the work ahead. Hopkins was sick, kept alive only by great care. He stayed away from the dinners and the regular meetings and played his part, a leading part, from bed. Secretary of State Stettinius was along, wishful as always to do the right thing. No desperate doubts or stubborn opinions sent him on lonely walks or kept him awake at night. The President and Hopkins told him what they thought it was useful for him to know, and no more. They made the ultimate decisions

CHAPTER 23 The Agreement Made at Yalta: February 1945 THE President and his company set off for Yalta with a sense of excite­ment tempered by knowledge that many hard problems awaited them. They were used to making great decisions. But this time they were fac­ing all the complexities of a smashed Europe. They wondered whether the understanding reached with Stalin at Teheran would turn friendlier or be lost in a battle of purposes. The experience of the year in between left doubt. The Soviet government had carried out its main military promises. But it had often been demanding, suspicious, and quick to advance grievances. Churchill's visit to Moscow in October had been useful in keeping the lines of war cooperation clear, but had settled noth­ing else. Every mile that the Allied armies from the west and the Soviet armies from the east traveled toward one another had made greater the need for a meeting among all three. In the search for a mutually convenient spot to meet, American and British suggestions had ranged all the way from Northern Scotland to Jerusalem. But Stalin was not to be budged out of the Soviet Union. So the President and Churchill finally agreed to go to the Crimea, where the ruins left by the German army were to be plain to their sight. This was the limit of time and space within which the President could keep in necessary touch with the operations of the American gov­ernment. A cruiser, the U.S.S. Quincy, brought him across the ocean to Malta. He left it there and flew on to Yalta, while the ship took station in Great Bitter Lake, near the Suez Canal. A navy communica­tion ship, the U.S.S. Catoctin, was moored alongside a seawall in the harbor of Sevastopol, eighty miles away from Yalta. Roosevelt struck many of those who saw him as looking tired, over­tired, even at the end of an easy sea voyage. All photographs taken at Yalta explain this impression. Age had struck with cruel speed. But still he seemed to those about him as active-minded and eager as always to take on the work ahead. Hopkins was sick, kept alive only by great care. He stayed away from the dinners and the regular meetings and played his part, a leading part, from bed. Secretary of State Stettinius was along, wishful as always to do the right thing. No desperate doubts or stubborn opinions sent him on lonely walks or kept him awake at night. The President and Hopkins told him what they thought it was useful for him to know, and no more. They made the ultimate decisions

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Foreword v
  3. Contents ix
  4. Part One. From Pearl Harbor to the Cairo Conference
  5. 1. December 1941: The Longed-for Combination 3
  6. 2. The Dispatch of the Stilwell Mission 14
  7. 3. China Is Isolated 24
  8. 4. After the Defeat in Burma 34
  9. 5. Ardors and Refusals: During the Rest of 1942 45
  10. 6. How Best to Keep China in the War: The Dark Winter of 1942-1943 55
  11. 7. For the Relief of the Siege of China: The Argument Prolonged 63
  12. 8. Further Plans and Discords: The Later Months of 1943 71
  13. 9. To Keep Peace Within China 81
  14. Part Two. From the Cairo Conference to the Surrender of Japan
  15. 10. To Make China a Great Power 95
  16. 11. Cairo and Teheran Conferences: Political Plans 103
  17. 12. Cairo and Teheran Conferences: Military Plans 115
  18. 13. Trouble in Burma Once More: Spring of 1944 126
  19. 14. Again the Communists: Chinese and Russian 136
  20. 15. The Wallace Mission 145
  21. 16. After the Wallace Mission 157
  22. 17. The American Emergency Proposals: Summer of 1944 166
  23. 18. Hurley Goes to China via Moscow 178
  24. 19. The Crisis about Stilwell 185
  25. 20. Stilwell Goes and Wedemeyer Takes Over 200
  26. 21. Hurley Goes On with His Assignment (October 1944 to February 1945) 208
  27. 22. The Syndrome of the Yalta Agreement 226
  28. 23. The Agreement Made at Yalta: February 1945 240
  29. 24. Differences about Policy: The Seams Traced 255
  30. 25. The Focal Issue Argued: Should the United States Enlist the Chinese Communists? 265
  31. 26. The Soviet Side 278
  32. 27. Blurred American Policy: Late Spring 1945 290
  33. 28. Steps Pursuant to the Yalta Agreement 304
  34. 29. Agreements at Potsdam: July 1945 322
  35. 30. From Potsdam to V-J Day 333
  36. Part Three. From the Surrender of Japan to the Marshall Mission
  37. 31. The Struggle for Control of China 355
  38. 32. How Much Aid for China after the War? 368
  39. 33. The Darkening Prospect 377
  40. 34. Contemporaneous Trouble about Japan 390
  41. 35. Crisis of Decision: Toward New Policy 396
  42. 36. The Hurley Resignation 406
  43. 37. Marshall Is Instructed 413
  44. Index 431
  45. Backmatter 446
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400868278-024

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Foreword v
  3. Contents ix
  4. Part One. From Pearl Harbor to the Cairo Conference
  5. 1. December 1941: The Longed-for Combination 3
  6. 2. The Dispatch of the Stilwell Mission 14
  7. 3. China Is Isolated 24
  8. 4. After the Defeat in Burma 34
  9. 5. Ardors and Refusals: During the Rest of 1942 45
  10. 6. How Best to Keep China in the War: The Dark Winter of 1942-1943 55
  11. 7. For the Relief of the Siege of China: The Argument Prolonged 63
  12. 8. Further Plans and Discords: The Later Months of 1943 71
  13. 9. To Keep Peace Within China 81
  14. Part Two. From the Cairo Conference to the Surrender of Japan
  15. 10. To Make China a Great Power 95
  16. 11. Cairo and Teheran Conferences: Political Plans 103
  17. 12. Cairo and Teheran Conferences: Military Plans 115
  18. 13. Trouble in Burma Once More: Spring of 1944 126
  19. 14. Again the Communists: Chinese and Russian 136
  20. 15. The Wallace Mission 145
  21. 16. After the Wallace Mission 157
  22. 17. The American Emergency Proposals: Summer of 1944 166
  23. 18. Hurley Goes to China via Moscow 178
  24. 19. The Crisis about Stilwell 185
  25. 20. Stilwell Goes and Wedemeyer Takes Over 200
  26. 21. Hurley Goes On with His Assignment (October 1944 to February 1945) 208
  27. 22. The Syndrome of the Yalta Agreement 226
  28. 23. The Agreement Made at Yalta: February 1945 240
  29. 24. Differences about Policy: The Seams Traced 255
  30. 25. The Focal Issue Argued: Should the United States Enlist the Chinese Communists? 265
  31. 26. The Soviet Side 278
  32. 27. Blurred American Policy: Late Spring 1945 290
  33. 28. Steps Pursuant to the Yalta Agreement 304
  34. 29. Agreements at Potsdam: July 1945 322
  35. 30. From Potsdam to V-J Day 333
  36. Part Three. From the Surrender of Japan to the Marshall Mission
  37. 31. The Struggle for Control of China 355
  38. 32. How Much Aid for China after the War? 368
  39. 33. The Darkening Prospect 377
  40. 34. Contemporaneous Trouble about Japan 390
  41. 35. Crisis of Decision: Toward New Policy 396
  42. 36. The Hurley Resignation 406
  43. 37. Marshall Is Instructed 413
  44. Index 431
  45. Backmatter 446
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