CONTENTS

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS v
3. Permissions vii
4. Foreword ix
5. Contributor ix
6. An Appreciation xi
7. Contributor xi
8. 1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. 3
9. 2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. 5
10. 3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295. 14
11. 4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301. 27
12. 5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952). 36
13. 6. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216. 46
14. 7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. 69
15. 8. Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100. 80
16. 9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. 87
17. 10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. 119
18. 11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. 127
19. 12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477. 140
20. 13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17. 170
21. 14. The Core of an ^-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69. 192
22. 15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. 216
23. 16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. 289
24. 17. On Market Games. IE. T. 1 (1969) 9-25. 296
25. 18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. 317
26. List of Contributors 355
27. Index 357