Chapter Five Imagining

Anthony Hatzirnoysis

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Chapter Five Imagining

Anthony Hatzirnoysis
Anthony Hatzirnoysis

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This chapter is in the book The Philosophy of Sartre

CHAPTER FIVE Imagining As I look at a horse coming slowly towards me I am presented, in expe- rience, with that elegant animal. Yet seeing something face to face is not the only way for it to appear to us. I may look at a black and white pho- tograph of a horse by the sea, observe Whistler's vivid painting, dream that I am edging ahead at the Grand National, or simply visualize a stallion with its thick hair caressed by the light wind. Looking at pic- tures, having a dream or just imagining something are all phenomena too ordinary for any theory of human experience to attempt to ana- lyse. A proper analysis of such phenomena, though, encounters a serious puzzle: how is it possible that we are presented with something that is not physically present? Several philosophers have outlined a story of how to deal with that perplexing aspect of human experience. They usually approach the phe- nomena as deliverances of a supposedly peculiar faculty whose role is to populate one's consciousness with immaterial entities we call images. Imagination is thus conceived as a failed perception, a weak or defective attempt to launch into reality, that effectively locks oneself inside one's mind. This approach treats perception and imagination on a par, render- ing the former a particularly vivid version of the latter, turning the sharp distinction between looking at something, and visualizing it, into a dubi- ous difference of degree. Sartre sees imagination in a very different light. For him, clarity of philosophical vision brings respect for sharpness of conceptual distinc- tions. And the concept of "the percept" (what is perceived), is very

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CHAPTER FIVE Imagining As I look at a horse coming slowly towards me I am presented, in expe- rience, with that elegant animal. Yet seeing something face to face is not the only way for it to appear to us. I may look at a black and white pho- tograph of a horse by the sea, observe Whistler's vivid painting, dream that I am edging ahead at the Grand National, or simply visualize a stallion with its thick hair caressed by the light wind. Looking at pic- tures, having a dream or just imagining something are all phenomena too ordinary for any theory of human experience to attempt to ana- lyse. A proper analysis of such phenomena, though, encounters a serious puzzle: how is it possible that we are presented with something that is not physically present? Several philosophers have outlined a story of how to deal with that perplexing aspect of human experience. They usually approach the phe- nomena as deliverances of a supposedly peculiar faculty whose role is to populate one's consciousness with immaterial entities we call images. Imagination is thus conceived as a failed perception, a weak or defective attempt to launch into reality, that effectively locks oneself inside one's mind. This approach treats perception and imagination on a par, render- ing the former a particularly vivid version of the latter, turning the sharp distinction between looking at something, and visualizing it, into a dubi- ous difference of degree. Sartre sees imagination in a very different light. For him, clarity of philosophical vision brings respect for sharpness of conceptual distinc- tions. And the concept of "the percept" (what is perceived), is very

You are currently not able to access this content.

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